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This dissertation consists of two complementary essays that investigate current 
product recall strategies in the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulated food 
sector. These studies address operations and supply chain factors that influence recall 
effectiveness with two theoretically-based, empirical approaches. The first essay 
examines recall effectiveness as measured by time to recall, a proxy for potential 
consumer exposure to hazardous products (Hora, Bapuji & Roth, 2011) using duration 
analysis techniques.  The unit of analysis is a recall event as documented by the product 
recall press release.  Essay 1 addresses the following question:  how do supply chain 
competencies related to integration and monitoring systems between supply chain 
partners, in addition to supply chain complexity factors, relate to time to recall?   
The second essay investigates individual consumer perceptions of operational and 
supply chain information in the context of a product recall announcement.  Consumer 
perceptions of product recalls are important indicators of recall effectiveness since they 
are linked, theoretically and empirically, with future consumer behavior; and therefore 
can affect future market share (Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994).  The unit of analysis is the 
consumer and a behavioral experiment is implemented to capture the effects of salient 
factors on consumer perceptions. Essay 2 examines the following question: how does 
information provided regarding operational and supply chain management aspects of 




The first essay, “An Econometric Analysis of Product Recall Strategies and Time to 
Recall in the Food Industry,” subjects firms’ proactive versus reactive product recall 
strategies to rigorous empirical scrutiny.  In addition, we operationalize supply chain 
recall detection competence (SCRDC), which reflects the combined operational 
monitoring, integration and coordination systems across supply chain business partners.  
We use detection entity as a proxy for SCRDC, with the notion that superior SCRDC will 
be reflected, in part, by recall defects that are detected internally (i.e., by a supplier or the 
firm conducting the recall) rather than externally (i.e., by a consumer or a regulatory 
agency).  We integrate multiple secondary data sources and apply duration analysis 
methods to test our model. Time to recall is an important aspect of recall effectiveness, 
since perishable products have a finite shelf life; consequently, there is a small window of 
opportunity in which a recall can be conducted in a way that actually reduces consumer 
exposure.  We find that internal detections (i.e., defects detected by a supplier, or the 
recalling firm, rather than a consumer or a regulatory agency) have a shorter time to 
recall than external detections. In addition, our proxy for a firm’s quality process maturity 
(i.e., the number of days of production affected by a particular defect) has a direct effect 
on time to recall (i.e., longer affected production periods are related to a longer time to 
recall).  These findings have significant implications for future research, practice and 
policy, in part, because they suggest what types of supply chain strategies and 
governmental regulations might be implemented to reduce time to recall.  Essay 1 
contributes to operations and supply chain management theory and product recall 
research by extending quality management theory (Crosby, 1979; Juran, 1992; Roth, 
iv 
 
Giffi, Seal, 1992) via the notion of SCRDC, integrating notions of supply chain 
complexity (Bozarth, Warsing, Flynn & Flynn, 2009), and illustrating key differences 
between the applicability of proactive or reactive recall strategies to food products as 
compared to durable products (e.g., toys, medical devices, automobiles and other 
consumer products). 
The second essay, “Consumer Perceptions of Product Recall Strategies:  The Effect 
of Attribution on Repurchase Intent, Recall Satisfaction, and Recall Responsibility,” uses 
a vignette-based experiment to examine the effects of firm communication to the public 
regarding the causes of quality failures on consumer perceptions of recall responsibility, 
recall satisfaction, and repurchase intent.  We conduct an exploratory study that 
manipulates these three dimensions based on attribution theory (i.e., locus, 
controllability, corrective action) as experimental factors.   We find that external locus 
failures (i.e., defects that happened within a supplier’s operations) are related to higher 
levels of recall satisfaction and a shifting of responsibility away from the recalling firm 
and towards the supplier.  Uncontrollable failures (i.e., failures outside of the volitional 
control of the recalling firm or supplier) appear to be better tolerated by consumers than 
controllable failures, as evidenced by effects on repurchase intent, recall satisfaction, and 
recall responsibility.  Finally, providing information about a corrective action intended to 
address the underlying problem which caused the recall is linked to higher levels of recall 
satisfaction.  Essay 2 contributes to supply chain management theory by adapting 
attribution theory to the context of operational and supply chain quality failures.  In 
addition to providing preliminary implications for product recall research, this theoretical 
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adaptation may be more broadly applicable to other situations where firms need to 
communicate to consumers regarding supply chain and operational events, including 
supply chain disruptions and corporate social responsibility issues. 
In summary, understanding the effectiveness of recall systems in removing 
potentially harmful products from the hands of consumers, as well as understanding the 
consumer perceptions of those systems, is not only important for the creation and 
maintenance of  sustainable supply chain performance, it is important for public health 
and well-being. In addition, this research suggests potential avenues for policy 
intervention which could provide additional incentives for firms to improve their quality 
processes.  Future research can determine how these findings may (or may not) be 
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1.1  PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This dissertation examines product recalls in two related essays which approach the 
issue from different theoretical and methodological perspectives.  Product recalls are an 
observable manifestation of quality failures which result in product harm events (i.e., 
unsafe products reach consumers) (Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994). More specifically, 
recalls are the result of external quality failures (i.e., quality failures that exist outside the 
boundaries of the firms that are primarily responsible for the quality of finished goods) 
(Juran, 1969; 1972; 1992).  Estimated societal impacts of product harm – whether from 
faulty consumer products, foodborne illnesses, or defective automobile components - are 
substantial (e.g., total costs of unsafe consumer products, including healthcare costs and 
property damage are estimated at $900 billion annually; Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, 2012).  Furthermore, the effects on businesses can be severe – in terms of 
the initial impact to the firm conducting the recall, consequences for the supply chain, as 
well as the industry-wide spillover effects.  
While recalls of many product types have been on the rise over the past decade, 
rigorous empirical research which characterizes the strategic and operational nature of 
these failures and factors that influence the relative speed of current industry and 
regulatory systems to handle the recalls, is extremely limited (Hora et al., 2011; Roth, 
Tsay, Pullman, & Gray, 2008ab). Furthermore, the extant empirical literature that deals 
with both operational and supply chain aspects of food recalls is nearly nonexistent, 
 2 
despite the significant burden which it imposes on firms as well as public health.  For 
example, foodborne illness affects 1 in 6 residents of the United States (US), and is 
estimated to create total societal costs, including healthcare costs and productivity losses 
in excess of $1.4 trillion annually (Roberts, 2007). 
This dissertation examines product recalls in the context of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) regulated food sector.  We theoretically and empirically address 
the following questions: 1) how do supply chain competencies related to integration and 
monitoring systems between supply chain partners, in addition to supply chain 
complexity factors, relate to time to recall?  and, 2) how does information provided 
regarding operational and supply chain management aspects of product failure affect 
consumer perceptions and repurchase intent when a product is recalled? 
Taken as a whole, the body of literature on product recalls varies extensively with 
respect to methods and results.  Studies have been conducted on demand and shareholder 
value impacts via event history studies (Chen, Ganesan & Liu, 2009; Chu, Lin & Prather, 
2005; Haunschild & Rhee, 2004;  Rhee & Haunschild, 2006;  Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011) 
and recall communications and consumer perceptions of firm management of product 
recalls via experiments (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Klein & Dawar, 2004, Laufer, Gillespie, 
McBride & Gonzalez, 2005; Laufer & Jung, 2010).  
While the recent empirical evidence seems to indicate that publically traded firms, in 
particular, may have significant incentives to delay recalls in order to minimize impacts 
to shareholder value (Chen et al., 2009), the marketing, communications and crisis 
management literature  suggests the opposite; namely, that firms that respond earlier and 
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take responsibility for product failures, if appropriate, can limit reputational and market 
share effects (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Pearson & Clair, 1998; 
Smith, Thomas, and Quelch, 1998).  This creates a paradox for firms developing and 
implementing recall strategies in terms of 1) recall timing and 2) recall communication 
content.   In other words, with respect to recall timing, conventional wisdom would 
suggest that it is more advantageous to announce recalls as soon as possible, yet in 
practice, firms may delay the recall announcement.  With regard to recall communication, 
again, conventional wisdom suggests that it would be preferable to directly and candidly 
communicate the circumstances of the product failure; however in practice firms may 
only communicate such information as is required by law.  This dissertation addresses 
these dilemmas by examining recall timing and recall communication in the operations 
and supply chain management context with two different theoretical and empirical 
approaches. 
Essay 1 offers implications with regard to the issue of recall timing by exploring 
recall strategy and operational and supply chain characteristics that influence recall 
timing in the FDA-regulated food sector using a duration analysis of secondary data1
                                                 
1 The FDA regulates 80% of food consumed in the US including fruits, grains, vegetables, in-shell eggs, 
infant formula, and a variety of processed and mixture items.  The United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) regulates the remaining 20% of food products which consist of egg products, meat, and poultry.  
FDA-regulated foods represent an estimated 75% of food expenditures in the US (Institute of Medicine and 
National Research Council of the National Academies, 2010) 
.  
Essay 2 takes a different perspective, investigating FDA-regulated food recalls from the 
perspective of the consumer and addressing the latter half of the recall strategy paradox 
by manipulating information provided in a framed field experiment and measuring the 
resulting differences in consumer perceptions. Figure 1.1 illustrates these two different 
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approaches and how we expect to contribute to academia, managerial practice, and 
governmental policy. 




1.2  PRODUCT RECALL AND QUALITY LITERATURE 
This dissertation builds upon the literature examining product recall speed in the toy 
industry (Hora et al., 2011), and event history studies of shareholder value impacts due to 
product recalls in the marketing (Chen et al., 2009), organizational (Haunschild & Rhee, 
2004; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006), economics (Chu et al., 2005; Crafton, Hoffer & Reilly, 
1981; Hoffer, Pruitt & Reilly, 1988; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983) and operations management 
literature (Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011).  In addition this work is grounded in the crisis 
communications and product harm literature (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 
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2006; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994).  More specific to operations 
and supply chain management literature, this dissertation broadens our understanding of 
recent work on quality risk issues in global food supply chains (Lyles, Flynn, & 
Froehlich, 2008; Roth et al., 2008ab) and in the pharmaceutical industry (Gray, Roth & 
Tomlin, 2009a; Gray, Tomlin & Roth, 2009b; Gray, Roth & Tomlin, 2011).  In addition 
to we integrate traditional quality management theory (Crosby, 1979; Juran, 1992; Roth 
et al., 1992) into the recall strategy literature (Chen et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011).  The 
prior related research highlights the critical importance of understanding firm strategies 
around recalls as an emerging, new global quality problem (Lyles et al., 2008; Roth et al., 
2008ab).   
While the body of literature dealing with product recalls draws upon multiple 
reference disciplines (e.g. marketing, economics, and strategy, and psychology), there are 
two dominant approaches to this topic:  1) event history studies, which examine 
shareholder value or demand impacts due to product recalls (Chu et al., 2005; Crafton et 
al.,  1981; Hoffer et al.,  1988; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983; Thomsen & McKenzie, 2001) and 
2) experiments, which study the different aspects of consumer behavior related to product 
harm events.  Some of this experimental work specifically addresses product recalls 
(Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Siomkos & 
Kurzbard, 1994). Furthermore, prior studies, with a few exceptions (Roth et al., 2008ab; 
Salin & Hooker, 2001; Thomsen & McKenzie, 2001; Teratanavat, Salin & Hooker, 2005; 
Marsh, Schroeder & Mintert, 2004; Thomsen & McKenzie, 2001; Thomsen, Shiptsova, 
& Hamm, 2006), evaluate product recalls in the context of durable products, rather than 
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perishable products.  Studies that deal with recall timing and associated risks, either 
empirically or conceptually, are extremely limited (Hora et al., 2011; Lyles et al., 2008; 
Roth et al., 2008ab; Teratanavat et al., 2005). 
In summary, the body of event history studies has yielded empirical results which 
suggest that 1) shareholder value may be negatively impacted by product recalls, 
contingent on a number of factors (e.g., recall severity and industry and firm 
characteristics, including size and reputation) and predominantly in the short term  (Chu 
et al., 2005; Hoffer et al., 1988; Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985, Pruitt & Peterson, 1986; Rhee 
& Haunschild, 2006; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011); 2) product recalls can have short term 
impacts on demand, which may spill over to other products manufactured by the same 
firm (Reilly & Hoffer, 1983; Thomsen et al., 2006); and 3) firms appear to learn from 
prior recalls, reducing the likelihood of future recall events (Haunschild & Rhee, 2006; 
Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011).  Literature using consumer-based experiments have indicated 
that attribution theory has predictive validity for the manner in which consumers perceive 
aspects of product failures, especially when failures may be attributable to the firm or the 
consumer (Folkes, 1984); and that consumers more favorably evaluate firms conducting 
recalls as well as the affected products when firm communications are more transparent 
and when firms take responsibility for failures (Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994; Klein & 
Dawar, 2004).  
Two other intriguing results from the literature contribute directly to this dissertation 
research:  1) the finding that publically traded firms may have incentives to delay recalls  
to minimize shareholder value impacts (Chen et al., 2009); and 2) evidence which 
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indicates that the indirect costs of product recalls to firms (e.g., shareholder value, market 
share, brand equity, reputation) exceed the direct costs (e.g., replacement/repair/refund, 
reverse logistics, product liability) (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Rupp, 2003).  These prior 
related research findings motivate our work, in part, because of their implications for 
managerial practice and policy.   
The issue of incentives to delay recalls highlights the potential for market forces to 
promote corporate policy which may not provide an adequate level of protection of 
public health and safety, since delayed recalls result in greater consumer exposure to 
unsafe products (Chen et al., 2009).  Alternatively, if, as some studies find, market 
penalties to shareholder value are not significant, on average, then market forces may 
unlikely provide adequate incentives for firms to invest in an appropriate level of quality 
systems (Hoffer et al.,  1988; Thirumulai & Sinha, 2011).  Governmental policy, 
therefore, is a necessary and critical factor in promoting, maintaining and improving the 
safety of consumer products.   
The issue of indirect versus direct costs of recalls highlights one of the challenges 
facing firms with respect to recall prevention and response.  In effect, the losses that are 
simplest to measure and manage, in some respects, are not the most serious issues facing 
the firm.  Consequently firms may have difficulty in appropriately developing and 
implementing recall strategies, because the relationship between recall strategies and 
outcomes is often unclear and delayed, at best.  The market share and reputational effects 
of product recalls are rooted in stakeholder perceptions and, perhaps, to a greater extent, 
by consumer perceptions and behavior.  The contexts in which product harm events and 
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product recalls have been studied, with respect to consumer perceptions, have varied. 
They include experiments which manipulate severity of harm, statements regarding 
corporate social responsibility, brand equity and firm reputation (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; 
Folkes, 1984; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Laufer, Gillespie, 
McBride, & Gonzales, 2005; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994).   
Attribution theory, a theoretical lens adopted from cognitive psychology, has been 
used to evaluate how consumers perceive product failures, primarily in the context of 
locus, or the source of the failure (Folkes, 1984; Laufer, 2002; Laufer et al., 2005).  These 
experiments have largely focused on perceptual differences when the source (locus) of 
product failure is the consumer (e.g., tires fail because of consumer driving habits) versus 
the firm (e.g., tires fail because of an underlying manufacturing defect).  This stream of 
literature has confirmed, in general, that severity of the recall, in terms of the hazard to 
the consumer, has negative effects on the consumer perceptions of firms. In some cases, 
brand associations, corporate social responsibility information and other firm-specific 
factors can minimize negative impacts on the consumer perceptions of the firm and the 
recalled product (Klein & Dawar, 2004; Laufer et al., 2005; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994).  
While this literature has established a cumulative tradition of using attribution theory to 
explain consumer perceptions of negative product experiences, it has, to date, not been 
applied to how consumers interpret operational information.     
1.3  GAPS IN THE OPERATIONS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT LITERATURE 
Research on how firms conduct recalls is sparse in the operations and supply chain 
management literature. Much less is known about recall strategies in the food industry, 
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where transparency is relatively low (Roth et al., 2008ab). However, once a potential 
product defect is detected, the speed of recall responsiveness as well as the content of 
information available about the failure becomes imperative for all stakeholders. Thus, 
this dissertation aims to begin filling in the gap for rigorous research that adequately 
reflects the extant operations and supply chain strategies and the complex interactions of 
focal firms with their supply chains in the context of food product recalls.   
In Essay 1, we examine the nature of product harm issues and product recalls of 
perishable food products, as compared with durable products (e.g., consumer products, 
electronics, medical devices and automobiles).  We argue that substantive differences in 
the nature of failures for perishables (e.g. food and pharmaceuticals), in addition to the 
ubiquitous nature of their consumption, presents a particular challenge to the operating 
systems – both industrial and governmental – that must deal with these failures.  For 
food, specifically, in addition to the unavoidably high level of consumer exposure, the 
conformance quality attributes of these products are largely credence attributes, which 
make it exceedingly difficult, or impossible, for consumers to verify prior to purchase 
(Darby & Karni, 1973; Nelson, 1970; Roth et al., 2008ab).  Consequently, both the 
industrial and regulatory systems that ensure process quality in food products are 
currently the primary safeguards against product harm due to conformance quality 
failures.  In summary, understanding the effectiveness of these systems in removing 
potentially harmful products from the hands of consumers is an important operational and 
societal issue in addition to being necessary for the creation and maintenance of 
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sustainable supply chain performance (FDA, 2011a; Ollinger & Moore, 2009; Gray, Roth 
& Leiblein, 2012 and Gray et al., 2011).  
Essay 2 is motivated, in part, because understanding consumer perceptions and 
related behavior subsequent to a recall is an important piece of the recall strategy 
equation.  We investigate the relationship between firm actions and consumer perceptions 
via a behavioral experiment, providing a high level of internal validity for investigating 
relationships that are virtually impossible to evaluate during an actual recall event.  Essay 
2 also contributes to the extant literature by providing insights into “indirect” recall costs.  
Extant literature supports the notion that indirect recall costs are larger than direct recall 
costs (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Rupp, 2003).  Indirect costs of recalls include market 
share, shareholder value and reputational impacts to the firm.  Direct recall costs include 
more tangible and easily measured impacts such as reverse logistics, warranty, 
replacement, and repair costs, as well as product liability (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; 
Rupp, 2003).   
We believe it is important to examine the link between operational and supply chain 
dimensions of recalls and selected indirect costs (as we do in Essay 2), which are 
predicated on consumer repurchase behavior, in part because indirect costs are difficult to 
measure and potentially hidden to practitioners.  While understanding recalls costs is of 
obvious relevance to firms seeking to minimize the impacts of product recalls on their 
operations and profits, it is equally important for policy-makers, because it sheds light on 
how regulations could be structured to motivate firms to act in a way that is consistent 
with the objectives of human health and safety. 
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1.4  DISSERTATION CONTRIBUTIONS 
To examine the recall strategies used by FDA-regulated food firms, we apply two 
different theoretically-based lenses (i.e., the firm and the consumers) and empirical 
approaches (i.e. secondary data and a behavioral experiment).  The first study2
                                                 
2 The proposal for Essay 1 was the recipient of the 2011 Joseph M. Juran Center for Leadership in Quality 
Doctoral Dissertation Fellows Award (Carlson School of Management University of Minnesota). 
, “An 
Econometric Analysis of Product Recall Strategies and Time to Recall in the Food 
Industry,” subjects firms’ product recall strategies to rigorous empirical scrutiny by 
examining the effect of proactive and reactive strategies, complexity factors and supply 
chain recall detection competencies on time to recall, a proxy for recall effectiveness 
(Chapter 2, Essay 1). Secondary data is employed for the analyses. In the second study, 
“Consumer Perceptions of Product Recall Strategies:  The Effect of Attribution on Recall 
Responsibility, Recall Satisfaction and Repurchase Intent,” we apply a vignette-based 
experiment to examine the effect of recall communication strategies on consumer 
perceptions, including recall satisfaction, attribution of responsibility for the product 
recall and repurchase intent (Chapter 3, Essay 2). Together, these two studies make 
contributions to academia, industry, and policy-makers, by offering several insights. 
First, Essay 1 suggests how firms may allocate resources to supply chain and process 
monitoring and improvement activities to reduce the need for recalls in the first place, as 
well as to improve defect detection capabilities within the supply chain.  Essay 1 also 
examines the operational and supply chain factors that influence time to recall, and 
benchmark recall speed for various types of products and recalling entities. Essay 2 
suggests how recall communications can be managed to minimize negative impacts to the 
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recalling firm, contingent upon sufficient supply chain capabilities.  Finally, this 
dissertation’s findings are equally relevant to policy, since reducing time to recall can 
reduce consumer exposure to defective products and because recall announcement 
content is dictated, in part, by regulation.  
Taking the mixed evidence for market incentives (e.g. impacts to shareholder value 
caused by the product recall) for firms to reduce recalls by avoiding external quality 
failures (Chu et al., 2005; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011), together with the potential for 
publically traded firms to benefit from delaying recalls (Chen et al., 2009), we argue that 
there is a critical need for research that examines multiple performance aspects of product 
recalls as well as tradeoffs between different recall strategies. Furthemore, research is 
needed which provides implications and recommendations not only for the firms that 
must manage this issue, but also for policy-makers charged with protecting public health 
and safety.   
Together, these two empirical essays add to the existing body of literature regarding 
product recalls while extending quality management theory (Essay 1), examining recall 
strategy in a novel context (Essay 1) and adapting attribution theory to the operations and 
supply chain management context (Essay 2).  We summarize our findings in the context 
of the larger stream of literature and suggest potential future research directions based on 
this work in Chapter 4 (Conclusions).  In summary, these two essays take two different 
views of recall outcomes (i.e. time to recall and consumer perceptions) and, in doing so, 





AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF PRODUCT RECALL 
STRATEGIES AND TIME TO RECALL 
IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
We investigate supply chain and complexity factors associated with time to product 
recall in the context of the US food industry, specifically those products regulated by the 
FDA. The FDA is responsible for the regulation of 80% of all food sold in the US with 
the remainder being regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
(Institute of Medicine and National Research Council of the National Academies, 2010).  
Over the past decade, public awareness of all product recalls—from cars to toys to 
batteries to pharmaceuticals to food—has been on the rise.  Consequently, policy-makers 
have responded with concern, some of it specific to US food quality systems (GAO, 
2000; 2004ab), and the effectiveness, (specifically the speed) of food recalls and 
incentives for firms to act in the best interests of public health, as evidenced in the 
following excerpt from a Government Accountability Office study (GAO, 2004a):   
“USDA and FDA do not know how promptly and completely companies are 
carrying out recalls.  Neither agency’s guidance provides time frames for 
companies on how quickly to initiate and carry out recalls.  Consequently, 
companies may have less impetus to notify downstream customers and remove 
potentially unsafe food from the marketplace” (GAO, 2004a, p. 4)3
                                                 
3 While some FDA policies have changed since this GAO report (2004), the FDA  position on recall time 
frames remains the same:  it is expressed in guidance, rather than regulation (guidance is not enforceable).  
It is stated as follows “Issuance of a press release should be the highest priority and it should be issued 
promptly” (FDA, 2009a, emphasis in the original). 
.   
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Recalls emanate from quality failures detected after products have been released for 
distribution and consumption.  The extant quality and operations management literature 
terms such failures as external quality failures, because the defects are detected after the 
product leaves the control of the supply chain entity, where the problem first occurred 
(Gryna, 1999; Juran, 1992). In turn, one or more entities in the supply chain must 
participate in the response.  Accordingly, given that all recalls are external failures, we 
propose that it is preferable, in terms of recall effectiveness, for a business-to-business 
(B2B) supply chain entity to detect the defect before a consumer or regulatory agency 
does and acts upon this information.  
We introduce the term supply chain recall detection competence (SCRDC) to connote 
superior operational monitoring, integration and coordination systems across B2B supply 
chain partners, including suppliers, manufacturers, and channel partners, which, in part, 
allow for the earlier detection of external failures. In this sense, while product recalls are 
the manifestations of external quality failures, the effectiveness of recall processes 
depend, in part, on the complex relationships between the firm announcing the recall and 
its supply chain partners.  In our study, we use time to recall to represent one important 
dimension of recall effectiveness, positing that SCRDC is an important factor in reducing 
the amount of time which elapses between the end of production of a specific item to 
when the recall is first announced to the public.   
We note that, for perishable consumables, such as food and pharmaceuticals (which 
are also not completely testable (Roth et al., 2008ab)), the window of opportunity for 
mitigating consumer risk is further limited to the shelf life of the defective product. Since 
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shelf life begins at the end of a batch, or production run, our definition of time to recall 
captures the risk that a contaminated or inappropriate food product4
From the perspective of the firm conducting the recall (henceforth, referred to as the 
recalling firm), arguably, reducing the time to recall poses tradeoffs in incentives (Chen 
et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011).  On the one hand, the sooner the public announcement is 
made, the more potential consumer exposure is reduced, therefore limiting firm liability; 
furthermore, lost sales may be minimized by early and responsive communication 
(Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994). On the other hand, longer time to 
recall may reduce the number of units subject to reverse logistics processes, because the 
product has expired. Furthermore, given the great difficulty in attributing illness to a 
specific defective food, longer time to recall may actually benefit the recalling firm if the 
timing of the recall further confuses the attribution of actual illnesses to the recalled 
product (Mead, Slutsker, Dietz, McCaig, Bresse, Shapiro Griffin & Taux, 1999). It is less 
clear how recall timing will affect brand equity and shareholder value in this sector (Chen 
et al., 2009; Chu et al., 2005; Teratanavat et al, 2005; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011; 
Thomsen & McKenzie, 2001). 
 will be consumed 
before the public is made aware of the problem. As such, the consumer-level reverse 
logistics process typically only begins with the FDA announcement.  
Prior empirical research is almost exclusively confined to examining the product 
recalls of durable products and largely examines demand or shareholder value impacts 
                                                 
4 Contaminated food products are those with pathogens known to be harmful or otherwise adulterated (e.g., 
greater than allowable levels of toxins or heavy metals), whereas inappropriate products refers to products  
not fit to be consumed by a group of people, but the consumer does not have enough information to make 
this determination (i.e., either the information is not available or it is mislabeled; for example, snack foods 
with undeclared allergens, such undeclared peanuts or shellfish on the label). 
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via event history studies (Chen et al., 2009; Chu et al., 2005; Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; 
Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Rupp, 2003). Only a handful of studies investigate factors 
influencing the relative speed of the current industry and regulatory systems to handle 
recalls (Hora et al., 2011; Roth et al., 2008ab; Lyles et al., 2008). With the notable 
exception of Marsh, Schroeder & Mintert (2004), Thomsen & McKenzie (2001), and 
Thomsen et al. (2006), perishable products, and specifically food product recalls, have 
not been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny. Moreover, despite the importance of 
food safety to public well-being and the need to understand how to improve supply chain 
systems to increase recall effectiveness, these studies neither address time to recall nor 
incorporate operations and supply chain management issues.  Consequently, we begin to 
fill this void by theoretically and empirically addressing the following question:  how 
does the SCRDC, in addition to complexity factors relate to time to recall in the FDA 
regulated food sector?  
We offer the following contrasting examples of actual food product recalls to 
contextualize our research:   
Example 1:  On June 17, 2008, a concentrated beverage was recalled from a 
facility in Montana due to potential contamination with Clostridium botulinum, 
a pathogen that can cause serious illness or death.  At the time of the recall, the 
product was already in distribution at retailers and being used in coffee shops in 
Montana and Arizona.  The expiration dates of the products affected by the 
recall were given as September 23, 2009 through May 22, 2010.  At the time of 
the recall, no illnesses had been reported as a result of consuming this product.  
The defect, which was due to a processing issue which rendered the product 
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vulnerable to contamination, was discovered through an internal records audit of 
processing records (See Appendix 2A for the complete press release). 
 
Example 2:  On October 20, 2010, all packaged fresh produce   (e.g., 
prepackaged chopped celery) processed between January 1, 2010 and October 
19, 2010 was recalled from a manufacturing facility in Texas.  At the time of the 
recall, the product was in use in restaurants and institutional kitchens in Texas.  
The recall was initiated based on a state health department investigation of an 
outbreak of Listeria monocytogenes, which was linked to ten illnesses, including 
five deaths, which occurred over an eight month period.  After the state agency’s 
investigation implicated products from this particular facility, an inspection 
conducted by the state agency confirmed contamination with Listeria which 
matched the outbreak (See Appendix 2A for the complete press release).   
 
These two examples underscore several important elements of US food product 
recalls:  1) whether or not illnesses were associated with the defective product at the time 
of the recall; and 2) which organization detected the defect (in this case, an internal audit 
versus an agency investigation of an outbreak of the illness) and 3) recall timing (clearly, 
the concentrated beverage product had a substantial amount of remaining shelf life at the 
time of the recall, increasing the chances that all the recalled product had not yet been 
consumed, while the fresh produce recall affected months’ worth of production, which 
had already expired).  Our study explores aspects of all of these elements to rigorously 
investigate factors that affect recall timing. As we develop our conceptual framework, we 
will return to these examples, to illustrate factors included in our research.  
The cornerstone of the US food safety initiatives and regulations is to keep the 
nation’s food safe from both unintended and deliberate contamination. Unfortunately, 
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contaminated food products continue to reach distribution channels and, ultimately, 
consumers.  For example, in the first quarter of the year 2012 alone, there were 142 food 
recalls, initiated by more than 130 companies (with 9 of these companies having multiple 
recalls) (FDA, 2012).  With nearly 7 million units affected and 46 consumer illnesses 
attributed5
Total recall time can be decomposed into three stages: 1) Stage 1:  end of production 
to time of defect detection, 2) Stage 2:  time of defect detection to public notification, and 
3) Stage 3:  public notification to the closure of recall activities, including reverse logistic 
processes, by the recalling firm and recall monitoring by the regulatory agency.  In this 
research, we use the term time to recall to reflect the combined effectiveness of first two 
stages of the total recall process; speeding up the time from the end of production to the 
 to these recalls nationwide, managing these events poses substantial 
challenges to supply chain systems.  Such challenges – involving issues of defect 
detection, tracing affected units and reverse logistics – suggest that the concept of recall 
effectiveness has multiple dimensions.  In addition to the public health considerations of 
preventing or minimizing illnesses and issues related to managing firm liability and 
impacts to brand equity, reputation and sales, we propose that recall effectiveness could 
be evaluated in a number of different ways, including the speed of defect detection, 
timeliness of recall announcements (particularly relative to product shelf life for 
perishable products), and the volume of the product recovered.  Our study focuses on the 
timing aspects of food product recalls. 
                                                 
5 Clearly, there may be much larger numbers of consumers with undiagnosed or undetected health 
consequences  related to the contaminated products; the underreporting of foodborne illness associated with 
pathogens, for example, is well-established (Mead et al., 1999). 
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public announcement results in less consumer exposure to potentially harmful products 
(Hora et al., 2011).  Furthermore, the exact timing of Stage 1 is unobserved in our 
sample.  We operationalize time to recall as the number of days between the end of 
production and the date of the first FDA recall announcement for a particular product. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the three stages of total recall time and the focus of our study, time 
to recall.   
Figure 2.1  Total Recall Time (Unit of Analysis = Recall Announcement) 
 
 
The quality of food products and the timing of food product recall announcements 
have profound implications for supply chain and operations management research and 
practice, impacting consumer safety and public health, in part, due to the nature and 
ubiquity of product consumption. Foodborne pathogenic illnesses impose an estimated 
$77.7 billion dollars of healthcare costs (Scharff, 2012), up to $1.4 trillion in terms of 
total societal cost annually (Roberts, 2007). However, due to the challenges of linking 
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foodborne illnesses to specific products, as well as the underreporting of these illnesses, 
recalled food products only represent a fraction of the conformance quality failures that 
actually reach US consumers (Mead et al., 1999).   
Based on Center for Disease Control (CDC) research, foodborne illnesses are 
underreported by an estimated factor of 20 to 38, depending on the organism; accounting 
for underreporting, an estimated 48 million persons are made ill annually in the US by 
foodborne illness; 9.4 million of these illnesses are attributed to “known” pathogens 
(Scallen, Hoekstra, Angulo, Tauxe, Widdowson, Roy, Jones & Griffin, 2011).  This 
occurs, in large part, because persons suffering from mild cases of foodborne illness do 
not seek medical treatment, as well as limited laboratory diagnoses for mild cases (Mead 
et al., 1999).  Based on the limited testability of food products, which complicates defect 
detection, as well as the difficulty in tracing back the source of the outbreaks (even when 
outbreaks are detected by authorities), as well as the gross underreporting of foodborne 
illness to regulatory agencies, we infer that the total number of food products in 
distribution which violate federal standards for pathogens or other contaminants greatly 
exceeds the number of products recalled.6
While the consumption of food is, of course, unavoidable, there is evidence that food 
safety issues are difficult to avoid:  the CDC estimates that 1 in 6 US residents contracts a 
foodborne illness annually due to a pathogen (Scallen et al., 2011)
  
7
                                                 
6 The most recent CDC data indicates that 1,034 outbreaks were investigated in 2008, with 579 of these 
outbreaks (56%) failing to be traced back to a specific food product source. 
.  Furthermore, food 
7 Not all foodborne illnesses are attributable to production defects: food preparation in commercial, 
institutional and homes are responsible for a portion foodborne illnesses, however difficulty in monitoring 
the source of foodborne illness make estimating the proportion of illnesses attributable to production versus 
other settings extremely difficult (FDA, 2010). 
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quality failures have profound spillover effects on businesses, including farms, 
restaurants, retailers and distributors (for examples of firm failures that may be 
attributable to food recalls, see Yousuf (2010) for reports of Topps Meats, the Peanut 
Corporation of America, and AP Military which ceased operations and filed for 
bankruptcy subsequent to recalls of ground beef, peanut products and spinach, 
respectively).   
Underscoring the importance of studying recalls in this context, it is anticipated that 
trends towards increasing numbers of food product recalls are unlikely to reverse in the 
near future.  This expectation is based on several factors, including  trends in the food 
industry to increasingly source products from countries with low manufacturing costs, 
poorly established quality systems and less regulatory enforcement, the relatively low 
level of inspection and testing activities that US agencies are currently able to offer for 
both foreign and domestic products and ingredients, and the highly concentrated nature of 
food commodity manufacturing, which lends itself to high volume, broad recalls 
affecting many different firms and products (FDA, 2011a; Gray et al., 2009ab; Roth et 
al., 2008ab).  
Prior characterizations of recall strategies as proactive, or reactive, have focused on 
the timing of recall announcements with respect to whether injuries or illnesses have 
occurred prior to the announcement (Chen et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011; Siomkos & 
Kurzbard, 1994).  Proactive recall strategies are indicated when no injuries or illnesses 
have been reported to the regulatory agency prior to the recall. In contrast, reactive recall 
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strategies are indicated when injury or illnesses have been reported to the regulatory 
agency prior to the recall.   
We contend that simply characterizing recall strategies as proactive or reactive is not 
specific enough for recalls of perishable products for several reasons.  Firstly, we observe 
that product recalls in these sectors, in contrast to durable products, are predominantly 
proactive – in other words - illnesses have not been attributed to the recalled products at 
the time of the recall announcement.  We suggest that there are several factors which 
contribute to this important difference.  Second, due to the difficulty in attributing 
foodborne illness to a particular food, we suspect that many food recalls only appear to 
be proactive because illnesses have not been traced back to a specific defective product 
(Buzby, Frenzen, & Rasco, 2001; Buzby, 2003; Mead et al., 1999). Third, food recalls are 
almost exclusively the result of conformance quality failures—which, in this context, 
implies that the quality failure is considered to be regulatory non-compliance, triggering 
mandatory reporting, which may contribute to recalls occurring before illnesses are 
attributed to the recalled product (FDA, 2010).  Finally, since the nature of the quality 
issue is non-conformance, multiple failures are typically not necessary to confirm the 
existence of a quality issue – one confirmed positive test result for a pathogen in a 
product already in distribution, for example, is enough to trigger reporting to a regulatory 
agency (89.5% of the defects in our final sample are pathogenic in nature).  This can 
again be contrasted with quality issues in durable products frequently associated with 
design issues; typically multiple instances of a failure (e.g., accidents or injuries) occur 
prior to a product harm issue being recognized (Hora et al., 2011).  
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To illustrate the difference between the types of failure routinely associated with food 
product recalls, as compared with more durable products, we return to our prior 
examples.  In both of our examples, the defect which caused the recall is a pathogen, the 
presence of which, in either of these recalled products, is considered inconsistent with the 
product specifications and violates federal law.  If we compare this situation to a 
defective durable product, such as a toy, we find that while a toy might be recalled due to 
a conformance quality failure (e.g., the use of paint exceeding federal standards for lead 
content), it is far more likely for the toy to be recalled due to a design failure (e.g., the use 
of small, powerful magnets in such a way that they are readily accessible to small 
children, and consequently, may be ingested and cause injury (Hora et al., 2011)).  
Similarly, if we examine the types of failures for which other types of durable products 
are recalled, we find that design issues are far more common than conformance quality 
issues (Bapuji & Beamish, 2008).   
The predominance of design failure issues for durable product recalls shifts detection 
away from a laboratory test, or a facility audit or inspection, to consumer use and injury, 
which, when reported to the firm and the agency, eventually results in an investigation, 
and, if a reasonable potential for harm within the scope of the law is found, requires a 
product recall.  We propose that this difference between the failure modes for perishable 
versus durable products has important implications for the tendency for recalls to be 
proactive or reactive.   
In the case of durable products with design flaws, the consumer’s injury by a product 
can be a part of the detection process, and therefore, contributes to the propensity for 
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such recalls to be reactive, rather than proactive.  For foods, the difficulty in attributing 
an illness to a particular defective product compounds this difference, resulting in very 
few confirmed reactive recalls in that sector.8
We propose a theoretical framework that explores an alternative view of recall 
effectiveness by considering the time to recall between the end of production and the 
recall announcement (See Figure 2.1, where the unit of analysis is the press release 
announcing the recall). More specifically, we argue this: the entity detecting a defect that 
results in a product recall affects time to recall, and consequently, time to recall captures 
one salient aspect of the recalling firm’s realized outcome.   The recalling firm is the firm 
that makes the recall announcement.  The detection entity is operationalized in terms of 
where the quality problem is first detected within the supply chain and reflects SCRDC. 
We define an internal detection entity as being an upstream B2B supply chain entity
 
9
Using the dominant logic from quality management, internally detected recalls, 
controlling for other factors, are posited to have a shorter time to recall than those  
externally detected; and hence, the SCRDC will be higher if the detection is internal, 
rather than external. The logic of our analogy is this:  in traditional quality management 
theory, external failures, as compared with the   internal failures, will result in higher 
 
(i.e., supplier, manufacturer, distributor, or retailer), whereas an  external detection entity 
is the consumer or regulatory agency.   
                                                 
8 In our final sample of 258 food recalls, 12.4% are reactive, rather than proactive.  In Hora et al., 2011, the 
proportion of reactive recalls in a sample of toy recalls over a 15 year period was as follows: 38% of recalls 
were reactive and 76% were related to design flaws. 
9 We note that different food products, even from the same company, may have different supply chains; 
therefore, the relative degree of integration and coordination among B2B partners to monitor and 
communicate well when a problem occurs is posited to be as important as any individual firm in the chain. 
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costs to the firm due to lost sales, reputational damage, warranty costs, reverse logistics, 
and product liability.  Alternatively, internal failures lead to costs related to investigating 
failure, scrap and rework (Gryna, 1999).   As a result, while firms have incentives to 
reduce both internal and external failure costs by investing in prevention and appraisal, 
minimization of external failures are typically considered the highest priority in terms of 
quality management.   
We propose that the association of lower costs and higher performance associated 
with internal B2B supply chain failures applies to detection entity, meaning that higher 
performance – in terms of recall timing -- will be the outcome, on average, for internal 
detections, as compared with the   external detections. Thus, SCRDC is a reflection, in 
part, of supply chain design, monitoring systems, communications, feedback 
mechanisms, and integration strategies that exist among supply chain entities that provide 
them the absorptive capacity to recognize quality problems in the first place; in addition 
to collectively resolving them faster (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Tu, Vonderembse, Ragu-
Nathan, & Sharkey, 2006).   
We evaluate the concept, in a sample of food recalls, for the detection of the 
underlying defect which results in a recall (and not resolution of the underlying defect or 
completion of the recall processes, including reverse logistics). We suggest that the 
SCDRC is an important factor in time to recall and may be more broadly applicable to 
other contexts. In addition, time to recall is a function of other supply chain factors, 
including complexity (i.e., the downstream “reach” of the recalls  and “magnitude,” 
represented by the number of different product specifications included in the recall) and 
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the recalling firm’s relative quality process maturity (QPM), as indicated by the period of 
the production time (in days) affected by the recalls.  Figure 2.2 depicts our conceptual 
model and the relationships between the primary constructs used in this study, as well as 
our control variables.  The hypotheses labeled in this figure are developed in Section 2.2. 
Figure 2.2  Hypothesized Model 
 
We test our framework using duration analysis methods applied to a database of 
recalls of FDA-regulated food products occurring between 2008 and 2010.   We find that, 
in contrast to prior work examining recalls of durable products (Hora et al., 2011), 
proactive and reactive recall strategies have no direct effect on time to recall. Consistent 
with our expectations and the quality management literature, SCRDC matters (Gryna, 
1999; Juran, 1992). Internally detected defects are associated with a shorter time to recall, 
ceteris paribus, than externally detected defects (Gryna, 1999; Ittner, 1992).   These 
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results have implications for firms seeking to improve performance by improving internal 
supply chain detection capabilities through supply chain design, monitoring, 
communications and integration choices, and for policy-makers seeking to develop 
regulation and guidance that minimizes consumer risk.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first provide the motivation 
for our model, grounding our hypotheses in the extant literature and providing causal 
logic for relationships between detection entity, a proxy for SCRDC, complexity factors 
and QPM, in addition to other firm and product-level characteristics and the dependent 
variable, time to recall.  We then describe the data collection process and empirical 
testing of our hypotheses.  We follow with a discussion of the results of the empirical 
modeling, and finally, we provide implications for firms, as well as policymakers, and 
potential future research directions. 
2.2  MOTIVATION & MODEL  
 
2.2.1  Background 
There are substantial differences between durable products and perishable products, like 
food, when such products are recalled.  These differences are relevant, not only to the 
study of recall effectiveness as measured by recall timing, but also because differences 
between these categories of recalls influence the strategies which firms may employ to 
manage the recalls in terms of durable and perishable products when recalls occur.  Table 
2.1 summarizes some of these differences, which we discuss further in this section. 
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Table 2.1  Comparison of Durable and Perishable Products  
with Respect to Product Recalls 
 Durable Products Perishable Products 
Example Products Consumer products,  medical devices, 
and automobiles 
Food, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics 
Product Attributes High testability, relatively long product 
life10
Low testability, relatively short product 
life  
Failure Modality More likely to be design-related than 
manufacturing-related (Bapuji, 2011; 






Moderate to high attribution of failure 
by consumer to specific product.   
Liability can be very high, largely 
depending on the severity of the injury. 
Low attribution of failure by consumer to 
specific product.   
Liability is high only when illness or 
death can be attributed to a product 
through investigation of an outbreak by 
the FDA/USDA/CDC. 
 
Recall Strategy More likely to be reactive than 
proactive 
More likely to be proactive than reactive.   
Detection Entity Internal or External.  Design flaws 
often first detected by consumers. 
Internal or External 
 
Reverse Logistics 
Significant effort, particularly for 
products which must be returned for 
repair. 
Some effort for pharmaceuticals which 
must be destroyed. 
Limited for food products, which are 
typically discarded at the consumer, 







Repair is common for high-value 
durable products such as automobiles.  
Replacement or a retrofit kit (where 
safety modification is performed by the 
consumer) is also common for items 
such as consumer electronics and toys.  
Refunds occur as well, but less so for 
high-value durable items. 
Patients must coordinate with 
pharmacists or physicians to obtain 
alternative or replacement medical 
appliances. 
Typically, refunds are provided for food 
products at the retail level. 
For pharmaceuticals, patients must 
coordinate with pharmacists or physicians 
to obtain alternative medications.  Refund 
process may involve insurers when 
prescription medication is implicated. 
                                                 
10 Disposable items such as alcohol preps (medical device) or batteries (consumer product), for example, 
might have a product life of a few years.  Many durable items can be expected to have a much longer 
product life and may be resold (e.g., cribs, strollers, automobiles, toys).  Pharmaceutical shelf lives for 
tablets average about 3 years.  Sterile injectables typically are tested for a 1 year shelf life.  Food products 
may have shelf lives from a few days (fresh fish) to a few years (canned high acid foods). 
11 When a pharmaceutical product is withdrawn from the market due to aftermarket safety issues (e.g., 
Vioxx), this is classified by the agency as a market withdrawal, not a product recall, and is governed by 
different regulatory processes. 
 29 
In addition to the differences we discussed previously with respect to testability, 
failure modality, attribution of injury or illness to a specific product and recall strategy, 
whether it be proactive or reactive, and the nature of defect detection, a number of other 
distinctions exist between durable and perishable products. We suggest that these 
differences are important considerations for both product recall management and quality 
improvement.  
First, as noted in Table 2.1, many durable products have a useful life that exceeds that 
of perishable products.  Some products have extremely long potential useful lives and 
may be traded in the aftermarket (i.e., cribs, strollers, appliances, and automobiles).  In 
contrast, perishable products can have extremely short to intermediate shelf lives (i.e., a 
few days for bean sprouts and up to 5 years or more for canned goods).  This product life 
cycle has significant implications for the recall process since, as mentioned previously, 
delaying a recall announcement may actually reduce a firm’s exposure to liability if it is 
difficult to trace illness back to the defective product.  An automobile, on the other hand, 
may have a useful life extending into decades and multiple aftermarket owners, 
prolonging the firm’s exposure to potential defects. 
We next turn our attention to two interrelated issues of product recalls which contrast 
sharply between these types of products.  Reverse logistics processes, as well as the type 
of reparation made to the consumer (repair, replacement, retrofit or refund), vary 
significantly, depending on the type of the product.  For many durable products with 
significant value, some type of repair or replacement is typically undertaken; in some 
cases, finding a suitable “fix” for a defect is one factor in delaying the recall.  In some 
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cases, a safety hazard is corrected by providing the consumer with a retrofitting kit which 
is self-installed.  For more technically complicated failures, the reverse logistics could be 
extremely intensive:  for example, when millions of laptop batteries overheated and had 
to be replaced, logistics costs were high due to the need to return defective batteries for 
reclamation, as well as the need to rapidly replace batteries to minimize consumer impact 
(Marks, 2006).   
Scheduling and capacity to repair or replace is also an issue:  for automotive recalls, 
the time to implement a remedy includes the design, manufacturing and distribution of 
new parts or  the development of new procedures and scheduling with authorized 
dealerships,  contingent on the capacity of dealership service departments (Anderson, 
2010).  In the medical device industry, firms must work with physicians and insurers to 
help achieve acceptable outcomes for patients with a potentially faulty pacemaker or 
other type of medical implant – a task complicated by the availability of replacement 
devices and underlying patient medical conditions.   
For perishable products, reverse logistics are typically much less intensive, since for 
many recalled products at the consumer level, there is no provision for any return, only a 
refund.  Furthermore, based on a recent survey related to food recalls, despite being 
generally aware of food recalls in the recent past, only 59% of respondents reported ever 
having looked for a recalled food in their home and only 9% reported returning the food 
or seeking a refund from a retailer (Hallman et al., 2009).  In some cases, while products 
are still in the distribution channels, reverse logistics may be undertaken as part of the 
“take-back” and refunding process between producers, distributors and retailers. 
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However, in contrast with durable products, the recalling firm to consumer contact 
regarding the reparation is likely to be minimal for food.  For pharmaceuticals, the issue 
of return and refund is complicated by the need to provide an appropriate substitute 
medication. For over the counter products, this may be a simple refund situation where 
the consumer selects a substitute without assistance. Nevertheless, in the case of a 
prescription medicine, insurers, physicians and pharmacists will be involved in the 
process.  Again, the consumer to recalling firm contact is likely to be low, since the 
transaction is intermediated by insurers and healthcare providers. Still, the reverse 
logistics processes are significant, because recalled drugs are recovered and destroyed to 
the extent possible. 
For the remainder of this paper, we will concentrate on the processes, regulations and 
factors affecting FDA-regulated food product recalls, specifically those factors which 
influence our dependent variable, time to recall. 
2.2.2 Food Supply Chains & Product Recalls 
While the US produces high volumes of food domestically, increasingly finished food 
products and ingredients for products manufactured in the US are sourced from around 
the world and handled in complex and far-flung supply chains involving numerous 
intermediaries (Institute of Medicine and National Research Council of the National 
Academies, 2010; Nestle, 2003; Roth et al., 2008ab).  Globalization and consolidation are 
two factors known to drive the escalating number of food recalls.  
Globalization,  characterized by the involvement of global supply chain participants, 
as well as the import and export of finished products and ingredients, results in high 
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levels of supply chain complexity, in addition to challenging monitoring systems and 
reducing traceability and transparency (Bozarth et al., 2009; Choi & Krause, 2006; FDA, 
2011a; Jerardo, 2008; Roth et al.,  2008ab).   On the other hand, consolidation of food 
production has arisen due to a combination of market pressures which have resulted in 
increasingly vertically integrated supply chains and the creation of very large public or 
private commercial entities which control large portions of specific market segments 
(Martinez, 2007; Nestle, 2003; Roth et al., 2008ab). Such consolidation concentrates the 
sourcing and production of food products, magnifying the potential consequences of a 
quality failure due to the high volumes of products that may be implicated (Institute of 
Medicine & National Research Council, 2010; Nestle, 2003; Osterholm, 2011; Roth et 
al., 2008ab).    
Finally, as a result of both globalization and consolidation, food products have 
become increasingly commoditized and undifferentiated (Nestle, 2003; Roth et al., 
2008ab).  While food producers of processed finished products compete to add value in 
the form of convenience, taste or nutritional attributes to earn market premiums, 
commoditization increasingly occurs, not only at the ingredient level, but also at the 
finished product level, facilitated in many cases by increasing levels of contract 
manufacturing (Hughes, 2004).  As an example, consider the common practice of 
retailers carrying “private label” branded goods, such as canned vegetables or soups 
labeled under their own brand name.   
To achieve the economies of scale necessary to compete in the low margin food 
industry, it is now typical for a contract manufacturer, whose name remains largely 
 33 
hidden to end consumers, to manufacture dozens of brands of similar products in the 
same facility with largely equivalent processes.  The potential for this manufacturing 
model to result in widespread quality failures is illustrated in Roth et al. (2008ab), in their 
examination of pet food recalls starting in the year 2006, which resulted in the recall of 
hundreds of different brands of pet food, produced by the same contract manufacturer, 
using the same basic ingredient which was contaminated with melamine.  
There is some evidence that contract manufacturers may pose a specific type of 
quality risk, based on the results of Gray, Roth and Tomlin (2012). These authors use a 
sample of FDA regulated pharmaceutical plants, demonstrating significantly higher levels 
of quality risk in contract manufacturers than in company-owned internal plants, on 
average.  
Figure 2.3 depicts a generic and simplified single-ingredient food supply chain.  As 
illustrated, the general structure flows from farm production, including suppliers to farms, 
which would include animal feed, fertilizers, seeds and other inputs, towards the end 
consumer.  As a food product moves downstream, towards the customer, there are 
multiple opportunities for imported inputs to enter the supply chain, or for intermediate 
goods to be exported.  Differentiation of more complex foods, such as convenience meals 
(frozen entrees, for example), increases as the food product moves through the supply 
chain towards the consumer.  Despite the seemingly hierarchical nature of the supply 
chain depicted in Figure 2.3, upstream producers can directly reach the consumer (e.g., a 
farmer can directly reach a consumer or restaurant owner through a farmer’s market).  
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The need to create economies of scale has driven supply chain players at both ends of 
the supply chain to vertically integrate and occupy more than one niche within the supply 
chain depicted in Figure 2.3.  The Kroger Company, for example, while known 
predominantly in the US as a grocery retailer, owns 38 manufacturing and processing 
facilities which produce 40% of the private label goods sold in Kroger stores, including 
dairy, meat, beverages and shelf stable convenience foods (The Kroger Company, 2012).   
Many large scale food production companies also occupy more than one niche within 
the supply chain depicted in Figure 3.  Dean Foods, for example, both processes and 
distributes milk and dairy products, in addition to licensing its brand name to other firms.  
Additionally, large scale food producers often interact directly with retailers. General 
Mills, for example, supplies Wal-Mart directly, with Wal-Mart accounting for 23% of 
General Mills’ annual revenue (Platt & Duronio, 2012).   
 












As indicated previously, in the US, the FDA regulates approximately 80% of food 
products sold, which comprises an estimated 75% of consumer food expenditures (GAO, 
2004).  FDA regulatory scope with respect to food products includes seafood, fruits, 
vegetables, dairy products, in-shell eggs and infant formula.12
Because the focus of this study is on a sample of FDA-regulated recalled food 
products, we concentrate on FDA processes in the remainder of this paper; however, it is 
important to note that our findings may be generalizable to USDA-regulated products due 
to the similarity in regulatory systems, the structure of the industry and supply chain 
design. 
   Egg products, meat and 
poultry are regulated by the USDA with enforcement and inspection activities, including 
recalls administered through the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS).  
Memorandums of understanding between the FDA and USDA attempt to harmonize 
requirements for recalls and the reporting of food safety issues.  The CDC, working with 
both the FDA and the USDA, gathers data on foodborne illnesses, leads investigations of 
potential outbreaks of foodborne illness, and monitors trends and the effectiveness of 
prevention and control initiatives (FSIS, 2012).   
Consistent with other agencies that regulate and recall products due to potential safety 
issues, the FDA classifies recalls with respect to the potential for creating a health hazard.  
Class I recalls are the most serious; they are considered to present a “reasonable 
probability that the use of, or exposure to, a violative product will cause serious adverse 
                                                 
12 While the division of responsibility for regulating individual products can be non-intuitive (FSIS is 
responsible for liquid, frozen and powdered egg products, but the FDA is responsible for shell eggs.   
Mixture products, such as meat & cheese pizza versus cheese pizza may fall under different jurisdictions.), 
it is estimated that 85% of foodborne illnesses (due to foodborne pathogens) are attributed to FDA-
regulated products (GAO, 2004a; Nestle, 2003). 
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health consequences or death” (US 23 Code of Federal Regulations 7.3(m)).  Class II 
recalls are associated with product safety issues which “may cause temporary or 
medically reversible adverse health consequences or where the probability of serious 
adverse health consequences is remote” (US 23 Code of Federal Regulations 7.3(m)), 
while products subject to Class III recalls are considered unlikely to cause adverse health 
consequences.   
Press releases are issued for Class I recalls and, in some cases, for Class II recalls 
when the defective product has been distributed to consumers. Our sample is comprised 
of all food recalls associated with a press release.13
2.2.3  Time to Recall 
  Press releases are written by firms 
and published via the FDA website and other media outlets, as deemed appropriate; in 
rare instances where the FDA deems the firm response to be inadequate, the agency will 
issue a press release.  The following sections describe the dependent and independent 
variables used in this study and the causal logic for our hypotheses.  Appendix 2A 
includes a detailed description of all constructs and definitions.  Section 3 describes the 
data sources and data collection methods. 
Recent operations management research investigating a sample of toy recalls 
indicates that recall speed (time to recall), as measured by the time from the market 
introduction of a specific product until the recall announcement, is related to whether the 
recall strategy is proactive or reactive, the type of product defect, and the part of the 
supply chain that issues the recall (Hora et al., 2011).  This research suggests that, 
                                                 
13 In the full sample of food products (N=434), 13 recalls are Class II or Class III recalls.  The majority of 
the sample consists of Class I recalls. 
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consistent with the prior evaluation of shareholder value impacts associated with product 
recalls,  proactive recalls take longer than reactive recalls, in part, because firms have 
substantial incentives to delay recall notices (Hora et al., 2011).   
For perishable products, we contend that it is more appropriate to study time to recall 
as the difference between the production date (beginning of shelf life) and the date of the 
recall announcement instead of the prior conceptualization using time to market 
introduction.  This operationalization more closely reflects the time to recall construct 
with the nature of perishable products which have a finite shelf life which, in most cases, 
will be far more limited than the useful life of a durable commercial product.  Part of the 
intent of a recall is to limit consumer exposure to an unsafe product (Hallman et al., 2009; 
Marsh, Schroeder & Mintert, 2004; Roberts, 2004, US Code of Federal Regulations 
21.1.7.40(a)).  As such, recall timing is arguably of even greater importance when the 
potentially hazardous product is perishable, or in other words, has a limited shelf life, 
since the more time that passes before a recall is announced, the more likely it is that the 
product will already have been consumed. 
Time to recall can be calculated based on the date of the recall press release, product 
shelf life and product-specific information provided in the recall press release, indicating 
the date that the product will be considered “expired”.  In this context, expiration dates, 
sometimes known as “best by” or labeled as “guaranteed fresh until” dates, are 
determined by the manufacturer.  There are no federal standards for how these dates 
should be determined or applied to products, although many states require that some sort 
 38 




Ti* = Shelf Lifei - (Expiryi – Recalli)    (Equation 1)  
where: 
i represents the individual recall announcement (press release); 
Ti* is the number of days from the end of production to the date of the recall 
announcement; 
Shelf Lifei is the shelf life for the recalled product; 
Expiryi is the expiration date of the product; and 
Recalli is the date of the recall announcement. 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the beginning of shelf life at t=0 (end 
of production) and time to recall.  Earlier recall announcements are preferred with respect 
to recall effectiveness, because potential consumer exposure is reduced when time to 
recall is shorter.  This view of recall effectiveness is consistent with the perspective of 
consumers and policy-makers (reduced risk).  Assuming that product failure is attributed 
to a specific product, shorter time to recall is also consistent with reducing the recalling 
firm’s exposure to liability, due to a hazardous product (Packman, 1998). 
2.2.4  Supply Chain Recall Detection Competence (SCRDC) and Detection Entity 
The central proposition of this study is that our dependent variable, time to recall, is 
influenced by detection entity, which we argue is a proxy for the realized outcomes of 
superior SCRDC.  SCRDC reflects a competence which resides within the recalling 
firm’s internal systems, as well as between the recalling firm and its supply chain 
                                                 
14 For the purposes of our study, we use the shelf life and date of expiration of the “earliest” expiring 
product in a specific recall announcement.  The rationale for this choice is that the first product to expire 
within a given list of recalled products in a single announcement is most indicative of the relative timing of 
the recall announcement in terms of minimizing consumer exposure to potentially hazardous products. 
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partners.  This multi-dimensional competence includes the manufacturing process, raw 
materials and finished goods monitoring systems, process auditing, and the integrative 
and coordinating mechanisms between supply chain partners.   
The primary mechanisms for ensuring product quality are embedded within 
production processes (e.g., process design, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and 
testing, which occur prior to products being released for distribution).  After a product is 
released for distribution, these mechanisms continue to operate, and, in some cases, 
identify a problem which implicates not only current production, but also prior released 
finished goods.  Auditing production records, for example, can identify issues with 
temperature control, packaging, pH, and other critical process attributes which can affect 
production over a series of days, months or longer. 
While the aforementioned detections may occur within a firm, there are also instances 
where systems between supply chain partners contribute to defect detection.  In the 
previously described instance, where auditing production records uncover a defect, if the 
finished product were an input to another manufacturer’s process, notification from the 
supplying firm to the purchasing firm would minimize the amount of downstream 
production volume affected.  As a different example, in our sample, we observed 
anecdotal evidence of this competence being shared between different levels of the 
supply chain.  In one product recall involving mislabeling, which resulted in allergens 
being present in a product without appropriate warning, the retailer notified the 
manufacturer of a potential problem when the product scanned incorrectly in the retailer’s 
point of sale system.  In this instance, in part because of the retailer’s identification of a 
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potential problem and subsequent communication to the manufacturer, the mislabeled 
product lot was traced and recalled prior to any reports of consumer ill effects.   
In summary, we propose that SCRDC is the cumulative outcome of a series of 
choices by purchasing  and supplying firms and relationships and systems between 
supply chain partners.  Detection entity is therefore an outcome, in part, of the level of 
SCRDC that exists between purchasing  and supplying firms, including processors, 
distributors and retailers.   
Detection entity is operationalized as the entity that detects the defect which results in 
a product recall (internal detection indicated by defect detection by the recalling firm or 
its supply chain partners; external detection indicated by defect detection by a regulatory 
agency or a consumer).  Consistent with the dominant logic of extant quality management 
theory, we would expect that defect detection that occurs further upstream in the supply 
chain would be preferable in terms of overall cost and other supply chain performance 
dimensions (Gryna, 1999; Ittner, 1992; Juran, 1992). 
We, consequently, propose that more timely recalls (those recalls associated with a 
shorter duration or time to recall, controlling for other factors) will more likely be 
associated with upstream (internal) detections than by downstream entities (such as 
consumers or a regulatory agency, for instance, a state health department or the FDA).  







Figure 2.4  Continuum of Detection Entities:  Supply Chain Partners, Consumers 














Consistent with the quality management literature, product recalls, regardless of 
product type, are typically characterized as conformance quality or fitness for use issues 
(Juran, 1992).  Notably, for durable products, there is evidence that design flaws, rather 
than manufacturing defects, make up the majority of defects causing recalls (Bapuji, 
2011; Beamish & Bapuji, 2008; Hora et al., 2011; White & Pomponi, 2003).  In contrast, 
food product recalls are almost exclusively due to defects that occur in manufacturing, 
storage or distribution.15
                                                 
15 In our examination of FDA food recalls, we  noted one exception to the source of the defect, 
manufacturing, rather than design. In some cases, supplements are manufactured with harmful levels or 
fraudulent ingredients.  These failures may be related to design defects, rather than manufacturing defects. 
 Typical  quality management programs have the objective of 
investing in prevention (quality planning, new product reviews, process planning & 
control, audits, supplier evaluations, and training) and appraisal (inspections, testing of 
inputs, work in process, and finished goods) activities  to reduce the occurrence of 
internal and external failures.   
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Internal and external quality failures are typically evaluated in the literature in terms 
of the cost of quality (COQ) (Crosby, 1979; Crosby, 1984; Juran, 1972).  While internal 
failures cause costs related to scrap, rework, missing information, failure analysis, 
reinspection, retesting and redesign, external failures cause costs  related to warranty 
claims, complaint resolutions, returned goods, reverse logistics, refunds, future discounts, 
and – most importantly – lost sales due to customer defection and reputation damage 
(Gryna, 1999).  Because external failures are so costly, even more so than internal 
failures, quality management programs typically prioritize the minimization of external 
failures.   
Consequently, quality theory prioritizes external failures over internal failures based 
on the logic that external failures are more damaging to the enterprise in the long term 
than internal failures (Gryna, 1999; Ittner, 1992; Juran, 1992). Furthermore, evidence 
from the economics literature suggests that the indirect costs associated with product 
recalls (lost sales, shareholder value losses, brand equity losses) are greater than the 
direct costs associated with warranty work, logistics of returns, complaint investigations 
and legal liability (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Rupp, 2003).  This notion is consistent with 
the commonly held view that COQ are often “hidden” or difficult to measure or reliably 
quantify (Cokins, 2006; Crosby, 1979; Gryna, 1999; Juran, 1992). 
As further support for our hypothesis, we offer logic grounded in information 
processing theory literature (Galbraith, 1974).  When failures are detected externally, the 
information processing and coordination that must occur for the recalling firm to first, be 
notified, and to second, organize their response, is greater than the information 
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processing required by internal detections.  Recalls are handled by exception; in contrast, 
the communication of quality issues between B2B and within firms is routinized.  
However, when detection comes from a consumer, or the agency, non-routine processes 
are involved.   More specifically, whether a consumer reports a defect to a producer or a 
regulatory agency, a process of investigation and verification must occur prior to action. 
Therefore, we associate consumer detection with a longer time to recall.    
We also argue that agency detections require a level of information processing within 
the agency prior to communication with the firm.  While the agency, by policy and 
design, is intended to act quickly to protect public health, a positive test result is the first 
step towards potential enforcement action. Consequently, the agency may be more 
methodical and slower in their actions, than internal firm communications or 
communications between a buyer and supplier with coordinated information sharing.   
We contrast this with an internal detection, where a positive test result or an internal 
inspection that finds a problem. Routines exist to process internal detection quickly and 
efficiently, even between firms assuming that effective contractual and relational 
governance systems are in place.  While this logic is relatively intuitive when applied to 
detection by the recalling firm, we argue that it is also applicable to detection by suppliers 
to the recalling firm, since the barriers to coordination between a supplier and buyer will 
be less than those between a recalling firm and consumer or regulatory agency. 
We propose that recalls detected by external entities (detentbinary=1) are reflective 
of lower levels of SCRDC and will have a longer time to recall, on average, than recalls 
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detected by internal entities (detentbinary=0), which are reflective of higher levels of 
SCRDC.  More formally:  
HYPOTHESIS 1  Higher levels of supply chain recall detection competence are 
associated with shorter time to recall, ceteris paribus. 
 
Appendix 2A describes the operationalization of the detection entity in detail. Appendix 
2A also contains a detailed description of the coding protocol and provides examples of 
press release statements which correspond to each detection entity categorization. 
2.2.5  Proactive & Reactive Recall Strategies 
Recall strategies, as conceptualized in the product recall literature, have been 
characterized relative to whether or not illness or injury has been associated with the 
defective product at the time of the recall (Chen et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011).  
Proactive recall strategies are indicated when no injuries or illnesses related to the 
defective product have been confirmed prior to the recall. In contrast, reactive recall 
strategies are indicated when injury or illnesses have been confirmed as being related to 
the defective product prior to the recall.  Proactive recall strategies have been associated 
with delays in recalls in prior studies (Chen et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011). 
Hora et al. (2011) argue that the time to recall (as measured by the difference between 
the time of the product introduction and the recall announcement date) will be greater for 
preventative recalls than reactive recalls.  Their reasoning includes firms having 
incentives to delay recalls to preserve the stock price (Chen et al., 2009) and because a 
preventative recall occurs in the absence of concrete information about injury or illness 
attributed to the product defect.   
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However, as discussed previously, foodborne illnesses are greatly underreported and 
rarely attributed to a specific defective product.  As a result, we suggest that the numbers 
of food recalls announced with illnesses attributed to them are also underreported.   We 
also suggest that the theoretically predicted effect of proactive/reactive recall strategies 
(reactive=1; proactive=0) might be smaller in the food sector than in many durable 
product categories. We believe this, since failures that cause food recalls are considered 
to be potential regulatory violations and required to be reported to the FDA within 24 
hours of detection.  Nevertheless, the incentives attributed to firms in prior studies which 
might drive the delay of recalls also apply in this context.  Being consistent with the 
literature, we now hypothesize that: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2  Proactive recalls will be associated with a greater time to recall than   
reactive recalls, ceteris paribus.   
 
2.2.6  Quality Process Maturity (Affected Production Period) 
Whether a recalled food product is produced in small, crafted batches (e.g., handmade 
chocolate) or in large volumes (e.g., nearly continuous production runs, such as canned 
goods), when the product is recalled, it has an affected production period associated with 
it.  This affected production period represents the time frame of production affected by 
the underlying defect which caused the recall.  Figure 2.5 depicts the concept of the 
affected production period,  bounded by quality monitoring information that defines 
when the problem began (or when it can be reasonably assured to have been absent) and 
when the problem ended.   
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Where the monitoring of processes for defects is particularly infrequent and 
production is semi-continuous and occurring in large volumes, the affected period could 
stretch into years (e.g., Setton Pistachios recalled nearly two years worth of pistachios 
after issues at its production facility and contaminated finished products triggered a 
recall).  Alternatively, when the defect is highly discrete, such as the application of 
incorrect labels missing allergen information, the affected production period might be as 
small as one day’s worth of manufacturing.  As affected production periods grow longer, 
the number of days between the first affected product and the last becomes longer.  As a 
result, the longer the affected production period, the greater we would expect the time to 
recall to be for a specific product.   
We propose that the affected production period is a proxy for the QPM of the 
recalling firm, because longer production periods affected by defects are indicative of 
less robust quality systems, both in terms of prevention and appraisal (Crosby, 1979).  
This analogy is consistent with the Quality Management Process Maturity Grid proposed 
by Crosby (1979), which contains five stages of maturity:  uncertainty, regression, 
enlightenment, wisdom and certainty.   The latter three stages, enlightenment, wisdom 
and certainty, mark an organization’s transition from identifying and resolving quality 
problems routinely to defect prevention to processes that are consistently zero defect and 
operate with a consistently high level of conformance quality (Crosby, 1979). 











2.2.7  Supply Chain Complexity 
Increasing product and supply chain complexity and trends towards increased 
outsourcing, rather than vertically integrated manufacturing, have diffused the 
responsibility for initial component quality (that is, the initial quality of an individual 
component or ingredient of a larger product or mixture) across multiple organizations and 
geographic regions (Gray et al., 2009a; Gray et al., 2011b; Lyles et al., 2008; Roth et al., 
2008ab).   This diffusion has a perverse multiplier effect in that it simultaneously renders 
the detection of potential defects more difficult, creates incentives among supply chain 
members for deception and shirking, and increases the complexity of product recall 
implementation and product recovery.       
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In our study, we identify three different “complexity factors” which represent aspects 
of supply chain complexity that affect time to recall.  These factors are:  recall magnitude 
(number of different product specifications included in a single recall announcement), 
recall reach (extent of downstream distribution of the recalled product) and recall 
breadth (an indicator of the association of the recall with a broad failure that impacts 
many downstream firms).  These factors are consistent with extant conceptualizations of 
supply chain complexity; principally, the idea that “the distinct number of components or 
parts that make up a system” (Bozarth et al., 2009, p. 79), is a starting point for 
recognizing increasing levels of complexity. 
2.2.7.1  Moderating Effects of Recall Magnitude  
When products are recalled, it is not unusual for more than one size, formulation, or 
variety of a product to be included in the same recall announcement.  This is particularly 
true for food products, where the nature of processes and inputs is such that a single 
defect (e.g., salmonella contamination, either in the processing equipment or introduced 
by an input) can easily affect multiple products.  In some cases where a single contract 
manufacturer produces multiple brand names, the recall announcement may contain 
multiple brand names, sizes, packaging and specification of affected products.   
We conceptualize the number of products recalled as a proxy for one possible 
dimension of the amount of information processing a recalling firm must perform to 
announce, with some reasonable level of certainty, what products are affected by a 
specific defect.  In food recalls, the recall announcement contains a list of products 
 49 
affected.  The number of products in a recall announcement is readily determined from 
each press release. 
When a recall is detected, either by an internal or external entity, the known 
information about the defect (e.g., what type of problem, which product the defect was 
detected in, how the defect was detected – by testing, inspection) is communicated within 
or to the recalling firm.  We propose that the level of information processing required to 
coordinate determining which products, lots, batches and production dates are affected is 
a function of both the detection entity and the number of products recalled. We believe 
this since the number of products recalled introduces a level of complexity that must be 
managed for the recall to be announced.   
Due to regulatory requirements demanding that recalls be announced within days of 
the discovery of a defect, information processing must be conducted with on-hand 
resources. In other words, there is no time for adjustments to the organization’s structure 
or information processing resources after the defect is detected (Galbraith, 1974).  We 
believe that, because recalls are rare events, it is unlikely that slack resources are 
dedicated to handling them.  This issue is analogous to the concept of “complicatedness,” 
introduced by Vachon & Klassen (2002), to describe situations where required 
information exists within the organization, but the volume of information may 
overwhelm processing capabilities.   
Vachon & Klassen (2002)  provide evidence that product variety (as captured by the 
number of products recalled), can have negative effects on supply chain performance, 
including inventory levels, lead time and delivery performance (Bozarth et al., 2009; Lee, 
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Padmanabhan & Whang, 1997; Vachon & Klassen, 2002).  Consequently, we would 
expect, on average, for the number of products to influence the effect of detection entity 
on time to recall.  More specifically, we expect that higher numbers of products within a 
recall announcement will positively moderate the effect of SCRDC on time to recall, 
rendering detections by internal or external entities less effective, on average, in terms of 
time to recall. 
HYPOTHESIS 4a  The effect of SCRDC on on time to recall is positively moderated by 
the recall magnitude. 
 
2.2.7.2  Moderating Effects of Recall Reach (Downstream Distribution) 
Product recall announcements, used to inform the public as to where affected 
products are expected to be found, makes a note of the states in which an affected product 
was distributed.  Within the US, we characterize the distribution of finished goods as 
local (1-3 states), regional (4-20 states) or national (>20 states).  Appendix 2A contains 
the details of how this variable was coded. 
Similar to the number of products recalled, we expect that the extent of the 
distribution of recalled products will have an amplifying effect on the relationship 
between the detection entity and time to recall.  As with increasing numbers of recalled 
products, we would expect that a more widespread distribution of finished goods will 
increase the information processing burden on the recalling firm to determine where the 
affected products were sold (Galbraith, 1974).  This logic is consistent with Bozarth et al. 
(2009) and Vachon & Klassen (2002), who established the negative effects of the 
increasing levels of supply chain echelons, and broader geographic spans of customers, as 
negatively affecting the supply chain performance.   
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Downstream distribution may be a proxy for the geographic extent of the distribution 
and the complexity introduced when the number of downstream supply chain partners 
increases.  More specifically, we expect that more broadly distributed products within a 
recall announcement will positively moderate the effect of SCRDC on time to recall, 
rendering detections by internal or external entities less effective, on average, in terms of 
time to recall. 
HYPOTHESIS 4b  The effect of SCRDC on time to recall is positively moderated by 
recall reach. 
 
2.2.7.3  Recall Breadth 
The third complexity factor included in our study is conceptualized as a control 
variable.   Recall breadth is an indicator of the size of the recall with respect to the 
number of firms impacted.   In 2008, the FDA began designating recalls which affected 
many different products and many different firms with the term “major”.  While this term 
has no regulatory meaning, the FDA has used this term to categorize recalls which 
require additional communication measures due to the breadth of products and firms 
impacted (FDA, 2009).   
There have been, to date, a total of five FDA-designated “major” recalls, all of which 
occurred between 2008 and 2010.  These include:  powdered milk (2008), peanuts 
(2009), pistachios (2009), shell eggs (2010), and hydrolyzed vegetable protein (2010) 
(FDA 2009b).   
We operationalize recall breadth as a binary indicator (recallbreadth=1, associated 
with a major recall; recallbreadth=0, not associated with a major recall) which indicates 
whether a particular recall announcement is linked to a major recall.  We expect that a 
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greater recall breadth, which involves recalls that affect dozens, or even hundreds, of 
firms and up to thousands of different products, will be associated with a longer time to 
recall. This is due to the cascading notifications and coordination between firms 
supplying a defective ingredient, regulatory agencies, heavily involved in “major” recalls, 
and the firms conducting the recalls.    We are also interested in determining if our model 
is robust to estimation using recalls that are not associated with “major” recall events, by 
including a model which only examines non-major recalls (recallbreadth=0).   
2.2.8  Additional Control Variables 
We control for multiple variables that we expect will influence time to recall.  Due to 
the wide variation in shelf lives, we expect that a large proportion of the variability in 
time to recall will be attributable to the product type.  We control for product type by 
developing three categories:  refrigerated, frozen and shelf stable (cat0_refridge, 
cat1_frozen, cat2_shelfstable, respectively).  These categories capture the attributes of 
the products themselves, including variability in shelf life and the aspects of the 
underlying processing and storage characteristics.  We also include several variables 
which reflect the aspects of the recalling firm, including the public or private status of the 
firm (public=1, private=0) and two indicators of firm size:  annual revenue and number of 
employees (firmrev and firmempl).   
Publically traded firms, due to requirements for reporting various aspects of 
operations, and due to the transparency of such operations to shareholders and the wider 
public, may also be more systematic in their monitoring of processes and suppliers.  
Larger firms typically have more resources; hence, larger firms might be expected to 
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improve performance with respect to recall timing (longer remaining shelf life).  
However, consistent with prior studies, publically traded firms may have incentives to 
delay recall announcements, therefore reducing the remaining shelf life.  We also control 
for defect type (0=non-pathogen; 1=pathogen) and the year the recall was announced 
(yr_2008, yr_2009, yr_2010) (Hora et al., 2011).    
2.3  RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.3.1  Sample Frame and Data Sources 
This study uses secondary data collected from publically available sources to 
construct a database of recall events for FDA-regulated food products over a three year 
period (See Table 2.1A, Appendix 2A for details of individual variable definitions and 
data sources).   
The unit of analysis in this study is a recall event.   A recall event (henceforth referred 
to as a recall) is defined as an individual press release announcement of a recall of one or 
more affected products.  The sample frame for this study is the set of product recalls for 
food products regulated by the FDA over the period of 2008 through 2010 for which firm 
press releases were made and published on the FDA website.  Due to our focus on 
perishable foods subject to common recall administration systems, infant formula,  
subject to separate recall requirements, was excluded. 
The time period covered by this study includes a period of relatively consistent policy 
and regulatory enforcement by the agency with respect to these types of product recalls. 
This time period includes the sharp increase in the total number of food products 
beginning in 2009 (Lister & Becker, 2010).  This time frame also includes the beginning 
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of the FDA’s use of the designation “major” for recalls which, for a variety of different 
reasons, may lead to the agency conducting expanded communications.   
FDA policy dictates communication of product recalls through two different 
mechanisms: 1) a weekly agency-issued enforcement report which lists all product recall 
actions for the past week; and 2) firm-issued communications to the public, downstream 
customers, distributors and retailers.  According to FDA guidance, when the product has 
already been distributed to the consumer level and there is a potential for a significant 
health hazard, a press release is considered appropriate.  The FDA publishes these press 
releases on their website and has archived press releases for recall events from the year 
2004 through the present time (see Appendix 2A for examples of press releases and 
enforcement reports). 
Enforcement reports summarize recalls by week and by recall class.  These reports 
include the recalling firm name, a description and list of the recalled products (size or 
weight, packaging, any labeling as to lot codes, expiration, production or distribution 
dates), a reason for the recall (defect type, also sometimes confirms detection entity), 
volume of the product in commercial distribution, states in which the product has been 
distributed, and the status of the recall as of the date of the enforcement report. 
Press releases are made by the recalling firm and published on the FDA website in 
addition to being released to other media outlets.  The FDA has issued guidance 
regarding the content of the press release; however, the actual content of the press 
releases varies substantially in terms of the level of detail provided.  Agency guidance 
recommends that the announcement include the recalling firm name, location (city and 
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state), product identification information (including any codes, expiration dates, lot/unit 
numbers), a description of what is currently known about the problem and any health 
hazard associated with the defect, the number of illnesses associated with the defect that 
have been confirmed at the time of the recall, information on what consumers should do 
with the recalled product, and where to find additional information. 
2.3.2  Data Collection 
Data were collected by accessing the FDA’s online archives of weekly enforcement 
reports and press releases for food products for the years of 2008 through 2010.  
Enforcement report information was merged with press releases to develop an initial set 
of 1,602 press releases for consideration.  Because the dependent variable is a measure of 
recall timing, we exclude any press releases which do not contain enough information 
about the production, distribution or expiration dates necessary to calculate the dependent 
variable.  This reduces our sample to a total of 846 press releases. 
The remaining press releases and enforcement reports were coded by three different 
persons using a set of scales developed during a pilot analysis of 100 press releases, and 
refined over time, to ensure internal consistency and external validity.  Approximately 
20% of the total sample was coded by more than one person in order to check for 
consistency.  Inter-rater reliability was high (>97%) and all cases where disagreement 
occurred were readily resolved through discussion among the raters.   
The central independent variable for this study, detection entity, is not reported in all 
press releases.  This omission further reduces our sample to 434 food product recall 
cases.  After the inclusion of all specified regressors and control variables, the final 
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sample consists of 258 product recall announcements.  Appendix 2A summarizes all 
constructs and measures used in this study and provides additional detail regarding data 
collection and coding.   
2.3.3  Calculation of Time to Recall and Sample Descriptives 
Time to recall ) is measured in days and is calculated based on the shelf life of the 
earliest expiring individual product specified in a given recall announcement and the date 
of the recall announcement relative to the expiration date of the product, consistent with 
Equation 116
Example 1:  Concentrated beverage 
.  We illustrate the calculation of time to recall for our prior examples: 
Ti* = 732 days – (June 17, 2008 – September 23, 2009) 
Ti*= 732 – 463 = 269 days from the end of production to the recall 
announcement date 
Example 2:  Cut, fresh, packaged produce 
Ti* = 21 days – (October 20, 2010 – January 22, 2010) 
Ti*= 21 – (- 271) = 292 days from the end of production to the recall 
announcement date 
Table 2.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the variables included in our 
model.   We note that, consistent with our expectations of duration data, there is a strong 
skew    in  the   dependent  variable  (timetorecall).     Appendix 2A  provides  additional 
descriptive information for the sample. 
                                                 
16  
 (Equation 1) 
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Table 2.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Construct Variable Label1 Description Mean Standard 
Deviation 





Firmrev Recalling firm revenue in millions 
of dollars 
4,097.235 15,464.0 
Firmempl Recalling firm employees 13,951.59 51,583.79 
Recall Breadth Recallbreadth 0/1 non-major/major status of 
recall, as designated by the FDA 
.814 .390 








Detentbinary Detection entity 0/1 indicates 






















cat0_refridge 0/1 dummy for fresh/refrigerated 
products 
.097 .296 
cat1_frozen 0/1 dummy for frozen products .116 .321 
cat2_shelfstable 0/1 dummy for shelf stable products .787 .410 






local 1-3 distribution states .198 .399 
regional  4-20 distribution states .240 .428 
national  >20 distribution states .562 .497 
Time to Recall 
(days) 
timetorecall Days from the beginning of the shelf 






yr_2008 Year dummy for recalls occurring in 
2008 
.081 .274 
yr_2009 Year dummy for recalls occurring in 
2009 
.864 .343 
yr_2010 Year dummy for recalls occurring in 
2010 
.054 .227 
1.  Variable label as it appears in Stata.  
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2.3.4  Model Specification 
Our study examines factors which influence time to recall, a dependent variable (Ti*) 
which captures the time, in days, between the beginning of the shelf life and the date of 
the recall announcement.  Because our dependent variable is a span of time, we propose 
to use a duration (survival) model  to address several aspects of our data which may 
render an estimation by the ordinary least squares (OLS) model inappropriate (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2005; Harhoff & Wagner, 2009; Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 2008; 
Kalbfleish & Prentice, 2002; Terwiesch, Ren, Ho, & Cohen, 2005).  Duration data is 
often skewed, which violates the standard OLS assumption that the dependent variable is 
normally distributed, conditional on the independent variables.  Furthermore, an OLS 
model does not bound the predicted value of time to recall, which could result in 
predicted values of time to recall  negative, and consequently, infeasible.  Finally, 
duration analysis provides the flexibility to explicitly model unobserved heterogeneity 
which, if significant and unaccounted for, could produce erroneous or biased results.  


















Model 1a None Log-normal None Examine models 
for the consistency 
of direction & the 
significance of the 
results.  Check for 
relevance of higher 
order terms  not 
explicitly 
hypothesized. 
Model 1b None Log-logistic None 
Model 1c None Weibull None 











estimates will be 
preferred.  Choose 
Model 1 or Model 
2 to use for 
robustness checks. 
Model 3 Limited to 
recalls that 







with Model 2 
results 
Consistent with the 
results of Model 2 
Examine model for 
consistency 
between major and 
non-major recalls 
(Compare Model 
1b and Model 3). 
 
The analyzed models are single-spell continuous time duration model, meaning there 
is only one transition event: 
Product Not Recalled  → Product Recalled 
This is a duration (survival) analysis where all cases within the sample experience the 
event of interest (a product recall announcement).  In addition, a shorter time to recall 
(i.e., shorter survival time), or, in other words, a greater hazard rate, is preferable over a 
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smaller hazard to reduce consumer risk and minimize firm liability due to consumer 
illness.   Analysis time is equal to the duration in our model (Ti*), the time to recall 
measured from t=0, defined as the end of production for the earliest expiring product 
within a given product recall announcement (beginning of shelf life).  Time to recall is 
strictly positive.  There is no censoring in our sample and the regressors do not vary over 
time (i.e., they are time-invariant over the duration of a specific case which results in a 
recall).   
Duration models are specified in terms of survival and hazard functions.  A survival 
function is the cumulative proportion of the sample that does not experience the transition 
event (in this case, the recall announcement), or the probability that the duration to the 
transition event is equal to at least t.  Conversely, the hazard function represents the 
probability that the duration to the transition event is t or less.   
The conditional density is a function of t, conditioned on X and θ, where: 
X = time-invariant regressors  
Θ = a parameter vector 
Using a maximum likelihood estimation, the contribution to the likelihood is found to be 
the conditional density.  The density for the ith observation (where i is an individual 
product recall announcement) can be written as: 
                                               (Equation 2) 
The maximum likelihood estimator maximizes the log likelihood: 
ln L(θ) =                      (Equation 3) 
assuming independence over i. 
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In terms of the integrated hazard function, this can be written as: 
ln L(θ) =                     (Equation 4) 
More specifically, the model can be formulated as a proportional hazards (PH) model 
or an accelerated failure time (AFT) model.  A PH model is written as: 
(t)exp( βx)                      (Equation 5) 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard and is assumed to follow a distribution based on the 
conceptualization of the underlying hazard.  Alternatively, an AFT model is 
parameterized as: 
                                  (Equation 6) 
where a distribution is assumed for exp(Xjβx),  also known as the acceleration parameter.  
When the acceleration parameter is greater than zero, failure becomes increasingly likely 
with time, ceteris parabus.  Accordingly, when the acceleration parameter is one, time 
passes at a “normal” rate. When the acceleration parameter is less than one, failure 
becomes less likely with time, ceteris parabus.  We use the AFT model specification, in 
part, because it enables us to directly compare all three of our conceptually-justified 
distributional assumptions. 






2.3.4.1  Distributional Assumptions 
Based on our understanding of recall processes and monitoring for defects and 
illnesses associated with defects in food products, we would expect that, over the shelf 
life of a given product, the distribution of recall announcements could be expected to 
increase or be relatively constant early in the shelf life, and to decrease later in the shelf 
life period.  We base this on the rationale that process monitoring and auditing closer to 
the end of production for a given product is arguably more relevant to detecting a defect 
than later monitoring.  In addition, our assumption is generally supported by the shapes of 
the survival curves developed by the non-parametric estimation of the detection of 
defects in meat and poultry processing plants by Teratanavat et al. (2005).  Our assumed 
distribution could be represented with a log-normal, log-logistic or Weibull distribution.  
Parametric estimation of duration models can be sensitive to specification of the 
density function (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). Therefore, we estimate a series of 
parametric duration models using these three distributional assumptions which we 
consider conceptually justified.    Models 1a, 1b and 1c estimate time to recall using the 
AFT specification and log-normal, log-logistic, and Weibull distributions, respectively.  
We find consistent results in terms of the direction and significance of the coefficients.  
As such, we conclude that the specification is not sensitive to distributional assumptions 
within the three distributions considered.  Appendix 2B contains the results for all 




2.3.4.2  Unobserved Heterogeneity (Frailty) 
Duration models, like other types of statistical models, are vulnerable to 
misspecification, including the inadvertent omission of relevant predictor variables 
(Cleves, Gould, Gutierrez, & Marchenko, 2010; Hosmer et al., 2008; Kalbfleisch & 
Prentice, 2002).    To guard against misspecification, we test for the relevance of a variety 
of higher order terms, in addition to estimating a model which incorporates unobserved 
heterogeneity, also known as frailty.    The hazard for an unshared frailty or unobserved 
heterogeneity model can be written as: 
                                       (Equation 8) 
where is an unobserved case-specific effect.  The survival function can, consequently, 
be written as: 
                                     (Equation 9) 
where  is the parametric survival function.  Modeling explicitly for this 
unobserved heterogeneity accounts for differences between cases not captured in the 
variables included in the model.  Consequently, if we find evidence of a significant frailty 
effect, we would conclude that there are factors that significantly affect time to recall that 
are unobserved, and therefore omitted, from our model.  The estimation of the frailty 
effect, however, allows the model estimates to account for this unobserved heterogeneity, 
if necessary (Hosmer et al., 2008).   
  To estimate the model expressed by Equation 9, a distribution is assumed for  
For the purposes of tractability, typically a gamma distribution or an inverse-Gaussian 
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distribution are assumed (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Cleves et al., 2002).  When is 
assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a mean of 1 and a variance equal to ϴ, the 
survivor function can be written as: 
                                (Equation 10) 
Alternatively, if the inverse-Gaussian distribution is assumed, the survivor function can 
be written as: 
       (Equation 11) 
Consequently, if unobserved heterogeneity is negligible, ϴ goes toward zero and the 
model estimation without the unobserved heterogeneity term is preferred (Cleves et al., 
2010). 
Because the results of the three conceptually-based distributional assumptions are 
largely consistent, the choice of the estimated models is irrelevant.  We proceed with an 
additional estimation and interpretation using the log-logistic assumption.  Incorporating 
unobserved heterogeneity results in a preference for the model without frailty, since the 
unobserved term is not statistically significant under either gamma or inverse Gaussian 
distributional assumptions (χ2 = 0.00 p<1.00, see Appendix 2B for full results).    In 
Section 4, we interpret the results of the final models. 
2.4  RESULTS 
2.4.1  Model 1b Estimates 
Table 2.4 illustrates the results of the final estimated models, while Table 2.5 
summarizes the results of our hypothesis testing.  Model 1b is the log-logistic AFT model 
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which includes all the hypothesized relationships, in addition to the higher order term 
Recall Breadth X Affected Production Period, which, during misspecification checks, 
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Table 2.4  Model Estimates:  Unstandardized Coefficients  




Full Sample  
Model 3 
Recall Breadth=0 
  Coefficient AME2 Coefficients AME2 
Public/Private Public -.439* -107.949* .006 .494 




Firm Revenue 4.31 X10-6 .018 .00003 .069 
[6.57 X 10-6] [.027] [.00004] [.078] 
Firm Employees -1.90 X 10-6 -.019 -4.13 X 10-6 -.035 
[2.72 X 10-6] [.027] [.00001] [.129] 
Recall Breadth Recall Breadth 1.538** 378.458** -- -- 
[.293] [87.595] -- -- 
Recall Strategy Reactive .078 19.168 .091 8.146 
[.207] [50.894] [.339] [30.405] 
SCRDC Detection Entity 1.304** 320.921** .372 33.405 
[.529] [132.907] [.406] [36.652] 
QPM Affected Production 
Period 
.003** .624** .003** .277** 






.006 1.427 .009** .830** 




Cat1_frozen 1.802** 443.507** 2.146** 192.436** 
[.554] [147.549] [.678] [77.162] 
Cat2_ShelfStable 2.079** 511.717** 1.024** 91.862** 
[.421] [113.427] [.422] [36.542] 
Defect Type Pathogen -.002 -.402 -.316 -28.362 




Regional (Reach) .187 45.986 -.269 -24.102 
[.301] [73.890] [.526] [47.455] 
National (Reach) .034 8.484 -.723** -64.844** 
[.267] [65.677] [.328] [34.410] 
Year Yr_2009 .188 46.204 .355 31.861 
[.422] [103.982] [.407] [37.997] 
Yr_2010 .023 5.591 -.020 -1.764 






-.808 -- .077 -- 
[.545] -- [.613] -- 
Detection X 
National 
-.530 -- .435 -- 






-.002 -- .011 -- 
 [.014] -- [.012] -- 
Recall Breadth 
X QPM 
Recall Breadth X 
Affected Production 
Period 
-.002** -- -- -- 
 [.001] -- -- -- 
 Constant 1.796** -- 2.892** -- 
  [.655] -- [.399] -- 
(*significant at p<.10, **significant at p<.05) 
Note 1:  Robust standard errors specified are reported below each estimate in parentheses.  Robust standard errors 
were estimated using firmcluster, an indicator assigned to each unique firm present in the sample.  This allows for 
the correlation of error terms across clusters of recall announcements conducted by the same firm.  There are 201 
unique firms in our sample of 258 product recalls. 
Note 2:  Average marginal effects (AME) reported as dy/dx for all values except for Firm Revenue and Firm 
Employees,  reported as elasticities. 
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was determined to be significant. Model 3 mirrors Model 1b, except that the sample has 
been restricted to those recalls  not associated with a FDA-designated “major” recall 
(recallbreadth=0)  to check for the robustness of the model.     
Positive coefficients are indicative of longer durations with increasing values of that 
regressor.  For categorical regressors, a positive coefficient is indicative of longer 
durations, as compared with the reference category.   In our conceptualization, a longer 
survival time corresponds to a longer time to recall, which is less desirable than a shorter 
time to recall for a similar product in terms of reducing consumer exposure to potentially 
defective products.   
In Model 1b, SCRDC as measured by the proxy, detection entity, is significant and 
positive, providing support for Hypothesis 1, and indicating that externally detected 
(consumer or agency) failures have a longer time to recall, on average, than internally 
detected (supplier or recalling firm) failures.  Greater recall breadth (recallbreadth=1), as 
expected, is associated with greater time to recall, controlling for other factors.  Product 
categories are significant predictors of time to recall.  As expected, refrigerated products 
have a much shorter time to recall than frozen or shelf stable products, on average, due to 
their shorter shelf lives.   
For the purposes of visualizing the differences between internal and external 
detection, we compare survival curves graphically.  Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 depict the 
survival curves for internal and external detection entities and refrigerated, frozen and 
shelf stable product categories, respectively.  The y axis of the survival curve is the 
probability that the product recall has not occurred by time t.  The x axis is the analysis 
 68 
time, the duration in our model; t=0 represents the end of production for each recall 
event.  Refrigerated products, consistent with their shorter shelf lives, have very steep 
survival curves which begin to flatten out towards 0 at t~365 days.  In each case, when 
comparing internal and external detection entities for each product category, we note a 
flatter survival curve for the external detection entity (which is more pronounced for 
frozen and shelf stable products than for refrigerated products), which demonstrates that 
the internal detection entity, consistent with higher levels of SCRDC, is preferred. This 
result is consistent with quality theory, relative to time to recall performance. 
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Figure 2.9 presents a comparison of the survival curve for different values of 
detection entity and recall breadth.  As expected, time to recall occurs at a faster rate for 
internal/non-major (recallbreadth=0) events than for external/major (recallbreadth=1) 
events.  This is consistent with our understanding of the primary effect of detection entity 
and the nature of greater recall breadth.  Greater recall breadth (FDA designated “major” 
recalls) is indicative of broad impacts across many different products and firms.  We 
suggest that recall breadth negatively impacts time to recall due to issues with 
coordination between regulatory entities and recalling firms.  When an upstream supply 
chain entity is responsible for a defect that leads to recalls in many different downstream 
products across multiple firms, the downstream product recalls are delayed by the 
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notification process between the original recalling firm and the downstream recipients of 
the defective material.  When the breadth of the recall is sufficiently large, such that the 
FDA designates a need for special communication efforts, time to recall is significantly 
impacted, as is evidenced by the flattening of the two uppermost survival curves in 
Figure 2.9. 
















Survival Curve:  Detection Entity & Recall Breadth
 
 
Public/private status was used as a control variable (public=1, private=0). Model 1b 
results indicate that there is a negative effect of public status on time to recall (significant 
at a p<.10 level).  While our firm size controls of firm revenue and the number of firm 
employees are not significant, the nearly significant result of public status may be 
indicative of more sophisticated traceability systems in larger, publically traded firms.   
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The estimated effects of defect type (pathogen=1, non-pathogen=0), direct effects of 
recall reach (downstream distribution - Local, Regional or National), year dummies and 
recall magnitude (number of products - noproducts) included in the recall announcement 
were not significant in Model 1b. 
We do not find significant effects of the interaction between detection entity and 
recall magnitude or recall reach.  Consequently, Hypotheses 4a and 4b are not supported.    
This may be indicative of what has been reported to be the relatively high level of 
downstream traceability present in the US food system.  In other words, when recalls 
happen, the number of products recalled and the breadth of downstream distribution do 
not affect time to recall because downstream traceability is well developed.  It is 
noteworthy to mention, however, that upstream traceability, or the ability to trace inputs 
back to their point of origin, particularly with respect to imported ingredients, is not 
similarly well developed, and consequently, quality systems for the US food supply are 
vulnerable to undetected upstream defects. As such, US producers may need to adjust 
their monitoring systems accordingly. 
Contrary to prior work in the context of toy (durable product) recalls, we do not find a 
significant affect of proactive/reactive recall strategies on time to recall, indicating that 
Hypothesis 2 is not supported (Hora et al., 2011).  As discussed previously, the nature of 
food quality issues lends itself to the under-attribution of illness to specific products. As 
such, the traditional proactive/reactive recall strategy characterization may be of limited 
usefulness for food products.   
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Prior work has suggested that publically traded firms may have substantial incentives 
to delay recalls until more information is available (reactive strategy) (Chen et al., 2009).  
While we do not find a significant effect in our sample of proactive/reactive strategies on 
time to recall, we note that similar incentives are likely to exist for both public and 
private food producers, and that, furthermore, the limited ability of the current systems to 
attribute illness to specific products could encourage firms to hide defects until external 
detections force a recall. 
We find a significant and positive effect of QPM as measured by the proxy, affected 
production period (prodperiod), indicating, in support of Hypothesis 3, that as defects go 
on for longer periods of time, the corresponding time to recall is extended.    Figure 10 
illustrates the survival curves for selected values of the affected production period (1 day, 












Figure 2.10  Survival Curves for Selected Values of  
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If we plot the survival curves for the same values of QPM (affected production 
period=1 day and 500 days) for low and high recall breadth (recallbreadth=0, non-major 
recall; recallbreadth=1, major recall), we can note the steep survival curve for high QPM 
(1 day) combined with low recall breadth as compared with the much flatter survival 
curve for low QPM (500 days) combined with high recall breadth (Figure 2.11).  The 
steeper curve indicates a shorter time to recall, controlling for other factors and is, 





Figure 2.11  Survival Curves for Selected Values of QPM (Affected Production  
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2.4.2  Model 3 Robustness Check for Recall Breadth 
Due to the recent prevalence of very broad recalls with extensive effects on many 
products and firms (e.g., FDA-designated major recalls), a large proportion of the sample 
is associated with “major” recalls.  We are interested in determining if our estimates are 
sensitive to eliminating that portion of the sample related to major recalls.  We conduct 
an additional analysis for the subset of recalls not designated as major (Model 3; 
recallbreadth=0) to check the robustness of our results. Table 2.4 summarizes a 
comparison of the coefficients and average marginal effects across the full sample 
(Model 1b) and sample restricted (Model 3) models.    
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Due to sample size restrictions (N=48), our ability to make an inference from Model 
3 is limited, however, the results, in general, are consistent with Model 1b, with a few 
exceptions.  We discuss these exceptions, as follows.  The effects of firm size (firm 
revenue & number of firm employees), proactive/reactive recall strategy, affected 
production period, product category, defect type (pathogen), year dummies and 
interaction terms are consistent between Models 1b and 3.   Model 3’s estimates do not 
include a significant result for publically traded firms; however, we are limited not only 
by the sample size for Model 3, but also by the limited presence of public firms in that 
sample (5 firms out of 48 are publically traded).   Model 3 indicates a statistically 
significant direct effect between nationally distributed products (recall reach) and time to 
recall.  This result lends some support to the finding that nationally distributed products 
are recalled more quickly than regionally or locally distributed products, possibly because 
national distribution networks are accompanied by well developed traceability 
capabilities which enable for the quicker identification of affected products.   
The number of products recalled (recall magnitude) has a significant and positive 
effect on time to recall in Model 3, indicating that, as the number of products in recall 
announcement increases, time to recall increases.  This may indicate that, for low recall 
breadth, the recall magnitude has significant effects due to the higher information 
processing and coordination requirements of managing a recall with more affected 
products (Galbraith, 1974).   
Finally, Model 3’s estimate of the effect of SCRDC (detection entity) on time to 
recall is not statistically significant (z=.80 p<.421).  We suspect that this result is due to 
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the limited sample size and number of regressors included in the estimation.  When we 
drop the interaction terms and re-estimate Model 3, we find the SCRDC coefficient to be 
positive and significant (at p<.08), which is consistent with Model 1b.  Because we can 
find no compelling conceptual or theoretical explanation for the effect of SCRDC to be 
different in a sample of recalls not associated with a major recall, we suggest that  Model 




Table 2.5  Hypothesis Testing & Results Summary 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Hypothesis Statement Results Basis 
 
H1 
Higher levels of SCRDC 
are associated with shorter 
time to recall. 
 
Supported 
Detection entity is positive 
and significant in Models 1a, 
1b, 1c and 2. Detection entity 
is positive and significant at 
p<.08 in Model 3, when 
interaction terms are dropped 
due to the limited sample size. 
H2 Proactive recalls will be 
associated with a greater 




Reactive is not significant in 
Models 1a,1b, 1c, 2 and 3. 
H3 Quality process maturity is 
positively associated with 
longer time to recall. 
Supported Detection entity is positive 
and significant in Models 1a, 
1b, 1c, 2 & 3. 
H4a The effect of SCRDC on 
time to recall is positively 




Interactions are not significant 
in Models 1a, 1b, 1c, 2 & 3.   
H4b The effect of SCRDC on 
time to recall is positively 




2.5  DISCUSSION 
2.5.1  Contributions 
In aggregate, the extant literature reflects the recall timing paradox which firms 
conducting product recalls and public policy-makers charged with ensuring an acceptable 
level of public safety face.  This paradox indicates that while the corporate crisis 
communications and marketing literature support the idea of conducting recalls 
proactively to manage consumer opinion and influence customer loyalty (Dawar & 
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Pilluta, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 2006), publically traded firms may face substantial and 
prolonged market penalties as a result of the product recalls, and may, in fact, benefit 
from delaying the recall until more information is available (Chu et al., 2005; Chen et al., 
2009).  Overall, however, the results are mixed regarding the extent to which market 
forces (in the form of short-term abnormal shareholder returns) provide incentives for 
firms to act in a manner which promotes a desirable level of public safety (Chu et al., 
2005; Chen et al., 2009; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011, Thomsen & McKenzie, 2001).  In 
short, the evidence is unclear as to what strategies and policies are best suited to balance 
tradeoffs between direct and indirect impacts to firms due to product recalls and to ensure 
that the public is appropriately protected from the physical and financial losses due to 
unsafe products. 
This study examines factors that influence recall timing in a context which has not 
been studied previously – the FDA-regulated food sector.  Time to recall is an important 
dimension of recall effectiveness, to the extent that more timely recalls reduce consumer 
risks, firm costs including liability, and costs to society.   
Our first hypothesis regarding SCRDC is supported.  This result suggests that, 
consistent with quality theory, directing prevention and appraisal activities towards 
internal detection of defects contributes to one dimension of recall effectiveness – recall 
timing.  We argue that SCRDC as reflected by detection entity is a realized outcome of a 
priori supply chain design and monitoring choices made by the recalling firm and its 
supply chain partners.  To the extent that these choices build a superior ability to detect 
and resolve quality issues within each firm and across supply chain partners, we suggest 
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that the resulting competency benefits supply chain partners by enabling a shorter time to 
recall.  This competence, which we do not fully explore here, may have other benefits; 
supply chains with high levels of SCRDC may also perform well against other measures 
of recall effectiveness, including liability minimization, reverse logistics costs and 
volume recovered.   
Prior operations management proactive/recall strategy characterizations, although 
hypothesized to be consistent with the prior literature (Hora et al., 2011), do not have an 
effect on time to recall in this study’s context.  This result, which conflicts with prior 
findings (Chen et al., 2009; Hora et al., 2011), is an indication of the very different nature 
of quality failure and product recalls in the food product context, as compared with 
durable products.  In addition, the difference in the proportion of recalls reactive in the 
food sector, as compared with the durable product recalls, highlights how the true 
impacts of food quality issues are largely obscured, particularly from the point of view of 
the consumer.  While this study focuses on product recalls as observable external quality 
failures in this particular industry, we suggest that our findings, particularly with respect 
to SCRDC and QPM, may be generalizable to other contexts, including durable products.  
2.5.2  Managerial & Policy Implications 
We suggest that firms seeking to improve both recall effectiveness and reduce the risk 
of external quality failures examine their supply chain design and monitoring systems, 
since these choices will ultimately affect their ability to prevent or detect failures before 
they leave the control of the firm.   We propose that monitoring system design should be 
considered holistically across supply chain partners, rather than being confined internally 
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to a single firm.  The significant and positive effect of QPM (affected production period) 
on time to recall underscores what quality theory would suggest:  that impacts of 
uncontrolled, undetected defects become increasingly severe over time with respect to 
recall effectiveness.  This finding, coupled with the significance of SCRDC, reinforces 
the importance of evaluating monitoring systems in light of their internal single-firm 
processing characteristics and the processing and monitoring systems of their suppliers.   
We suggest that, with respect to pathogenic contamination, which is the current 
leading cause of product recalls, this recommendation is particularly relevant for firms 
that receive high volumes of bulk ingredients or intermediates from other firms and 
further process them into finished goods in semi-continuous processes (Golan, Krissoff, 
Kuchler, Calvin, Nelson & Price, 2004; Hughes, 2004; Kumar & Budin, 2006; 
Teratanavat & Hooker, 2001).  Furthermore, this study provides evidence that the quality 
monitoring associated with a specific product unit may include ongoing quality 
monitoring activities after the release of the product for distribution. In addition, these 
“after the fact” activities, including document review, process testing and supplier 
communication, play a role in recall effectiveness as defined by time to recall. 
Because we expect that recalls will continue to be an unfortunate necessity, firms that 
wish to differentiate themselves in the otherwise highly commoditized food industry may 
find that improved recall effectiveness and, eventually, recall prevention through 
conscious supply chain design and monitoring choices, including increased testing, 
auditing and cooperative relationships with suppliers, may increase their value 
proposition.  This aspect of quality system implementation could be considered a form of 
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corporate social responsibility, since product recalls impose health hazards on consumers 
and costs to consumers individually and society as whole (Roberts, 2007; Scharff, 2011). 
Our findings regarding SCRDC support the effectiveness, in the context of product 
recalls, of industry self-monitoring. This is the central principle of many regulatory 
enforcement systems, including that of the FDA.  In the case of food product recalls, the 
industry’s own monitoring is more effective than detection by a regulatory agency or a 
consumer with respect to recall timing.  In other words, while regulatory agency 
oversight is critical to holding firms accountable, it is not timely; consequently, 
incentives need to be aligned to promote internal monitoring.  Policy-makers may need to 
consider regulations and policy which can provide incentives to firms to conduct more 
internal monitoring and to focus on enforcement and compliance support efforts based on 
the risk of contamination, compliance risk and the likelihood of affecting downstream 
facilities.   
In addition, the severity of impacts across firms and poor time to recall performance 
of high recall breadth events (FDA-designated “major” recalls) highlights the importance 
of targeting enforcement towards upstream commodity providers.  However, in addition 
to these findings (that agency enforcement activities are not as effective as supplier or 
recalling firm monitoring with respect to time to recall), FDA and similar agencies will 
continue to be challenged by resource constraints.  As a result, the development and 
implementation of regulations which improve incentive alignment in this industry and 
other product safety contexts is critical to public health and safety. 
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2.5.3  Limitations & Future Research 
Our study is not without limitations.  We are limited by the nature of the available 
data in several ways.  Secondary data require that the researcher identify the constructs of 
interest and then determine if the data or suitable proxy measures are available to match 
those constructs.  Inevitably, there are constructs of interest that are not available, and 
proxies, which while justified, are imperfect measures of the underlying construct (Roth, 
Gray, Shockley & Weng, 2009).  In some respects, we avoided some of these issues by 
defining specific constructs, such as detection entity, a priori, and then coding the press 
releases according to the specified definition.  Some of our measures can be considered 
objective (e.g., number of products recalled).  In other respects, however, our data could 
be criticized due to the use of potentially imprecise measures of shelf life, approximated 
measures (firm revenue, firm employees) and, in some cases, the restricted sample size 
due to missing data.  Furthermore, the nature of product recalls is such that we cannot 
construct a true panel dataset with repeated measures for firms over a number of years, 
which restricts our analysis to time invariant predictors.   
This analysis is conditioned on the population of food products that were recalled 
over the time period of our sample; we do not observe food products that were not 
subjected to recalls, which could be considered a form of right censoring. Nevertheless, 
we believe that this model makes an important contribution with respect to disentangling 
some of the firm, product and supply-chain related factors that influence time to recall 
when a food product recall occurs. 
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2.6  CONCLUSIONS 
This study provides new and contrasting findings regarding the nature of factors that 
influence time to recall in the context of food products.  This work is relevant to 
academia, industry, and policy-makers.  Given the ongoing trends towards increasing 
levels of disintermediation, complex, long supply chains, contract manufacturing, 
importation and concerns about terrorism and counterfeiting, it can be argued that new 
sources of safety issues will continue to arise (Lyles et al., 2008; Roth et al., 2008ab). As 
a result, conducting effective product recalls will continue to be of interest to consumers, 
industry and policy-makers. 
In addition to the ubiquitous nature of food, the conformance quality attributes of 
food products are largely credence attributes and are difficult, or impossible, for 
consumers to verify prior to purchase (Darby & Karni, 1973; Nelson, 1970; Roth et al., 
2008ab).  Consequently, the industrial and regulatory systems that ensure quality in these 
product categories are the primary safeguard against product harm due to conformance 
quality failure.  As a result, understanding the effectiveness of these systems in removing 
potentially harmful products from the hands of consumers is an important societal issue. 
Both industry and governmental agencies have responded to this trend, both by 
increasing traceability and testing systems and regulatory requirements and enforcement 
activities (FSIS, 2010; FDA, 2011a).  Nevertheless, more work is necessary to ensure that 
scarce resources are directed towards areas where the most benefit can be realized (FDA, 
2011b). 
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This study is part of a larger program of research and suggests multiple directions for 
additional study.  We believe that additional insights could be gained by applying the 
framework of detection entity to other product contexts, including pharmaceuticals, 
which can also be considered perishable products.  As detailed in Appendix 2A, we 
identified four distinct potential detection entities:  regulatory agencies, consumers, 
recalling firms and suppliers, to recalling firms.  We believe that an investigation which 
parses out the relationship between different types of detection entities and recall timing 
in a variety of perishable and durable product contexts would be useful for generating 
additional insights into differences between durable and perishable products and quality 
failure issues.   
Our study does not delve into issues between the recalling firm and suppliers, 
although we recognize that there are likely to be principal-agent issues with respect to the 
supplier reporting of quality issues. Additionally, food producers face particular 
challenges with respect to appraising quality and preventing external failures, since 
quality attributes cannot always be tested or inspected (Roth et al., 2008ab).   
The limits of “testability” in food and pharmaceutical products have become painfully 
obvious in recent years due to the delayed discovery of substitute ingredients in pet food 
(melamine) and heparin (oversulfated chondroitin sulfate) (FDA, 2010a).   In light of the 
well-known limitations of testability and increasing threats to food safety, there is an 
urgent need to investigate which monitoring and governance structures are most effective 




CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF PRODUCT RECALL 
STRATEGIES:  THE EFFECT OF ATTRIBUTION ON 
REPURCHASE INTENT, RECALL SATISFACTION,  
AND RECALL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
This research explores how firm statements about the operational and supply chain 
characteristics of product failure influence consumer perceptions and repurchase intent 
when a product is recalled.  A product recall is the publically announced removal from 
the market of a product due to quality issues which constitute a potential safety hazard to 
consumers, particularly if the quality issue constitutes a violation of applicable product 
safety laws (CPSC, 2012a; FDA, 2011b; FSIS, 2012; 2012; NHSTA, 2006).  Our study, a 
vignette-based experiment, focuses on the context of recalled food products regulated by 
the FDA, which regulates approximately 80% of the food products in the US, 
representing an estimated 75% of consumer expenditures on food (Institute of Medicine 
and National Research Council of the National Academies, 2010). Essay 2 investigates 
FDA-regulated food recalls from the perspective of the consumer, aiming to answer the 
following research question: how does information provided regarding operational and 
supply chain management aspects of quality failure affect consumer perceptions and 
repurchase intent when a product is recalled? 
While the operations and supply chain management literature has not specifically 
addressed the consumer side of product recalls, the marketing, communications and crisis 
management literature suggests that firms that respond earlier and unambiguously take 
 87 
responsibility for product failures, when appropriate, will minimize reputational and 
market share effects (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Pearson & Clair, 
1998; Smith, Thomas, and Quelch, 1998).   
The marketing literature has also established that consumers make spontaneous 
evaluations of responsibility when products fail to meet their expectations; however, this 
literature has not specifically addressed perceptions of the operational or supply chain 
related information provided during a product recall (Folkes, 1984).  In other words, 
while the literature has, to some degree, evaluated how consumers respond to product 
performance and quality issues and, in turn, how those responses relate to behavioral 
intentions, we know very little about how consumers interpret information during a 
product recall about the cause of a defect and the possible prevention of a future 
recurrence.  Consequently, the literature does not, with regard to recall communication, 
indicate if it is preferable to communicate directly and candidly about the circumstances 
of the product failure or to communicate only such information as is required by law.   
Product recalls are conducted, in part, to reduce the level of consumer exposure to 
potentially harmful products (Packman, 1998).  Product harm issues occur when a 
product does not perform according to accepted safety standards. For consumer products 
(e.g., electronics, toys, sporting equipment, furniture, and appliances), unsafe products  
are associated with 32,000 deaths and 35 million injuries annually in the US and have 
been demonstrated to impose costs in excess of $900 billion on the public (CPSC, 
2012b).  Product recalls can impact short-term demand across entire market segments 
(Chu et al., 2005; Crafton et al., 1981; Marsh et al., 2004; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983; 
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Thomsen et al., 2006),  negatively influence share prices (Hoffer et al., 1988; Jarrell & 
Peltzman, 1985; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011; Thomsen & 
McKenzie, 2001), damage brand equity and influence consumer behavior with respect to 
repurchase intent (Cleeren, Dekimpe, & Helsen, 2008; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994). In 
some cases, they also impact firm survival (Chen et al., 2009).   
Recalls of all types of products have received attention from the media, policy-
makers, and industry, in part due to a recent upward trend in the total number of recalls 
occurring in the US and due to the tremendous costs which defective, and potentially 
hazardous, products impose on consumers, firms, and society as a whole (Bapuji, 2011; 
FDA 2011b; Nestle, 2003; Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council of the 
National Academy, 2010).  This attention has been reflected by the academic community; 
however, to date, the linkage between consumer perceptions of operational and supply 
chain aspects of quality failures and indicators of future purchase behavior has not 
explicitly been studied.   
The initial public communication of a product recall is typically handled via a recall 
announcement constructed by the firm conducting the recall.  While some of the 
information included in these announcements is prescribed by regulation or agency 
guidance, firms have the freedom to provide discretionary information which can shape 
consumer impressions of the recall event. For example, when the Peanut Corporation of 
America (PCA) recall of various peanut-based products cascaded throughout the US food 
supply chain in 2009 and 2010, it affected firms that had used PCA products as 
ingredients. These affected firms then conducted their own product recalls, often citing 
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the cause of the recall as contamination introduced by a supplier (Wittenberger & 
Dohlman, 2010).   
We propose that this type of statement is a form of impression management used by 
firms when accounting for negative events publically (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Folkes, 
1988a).  We use attribution theory to explain how consumers react to specific aspects of 
operational and supply chain information provided in product recall announcements.  
Attribution theory has been used extensively to explain how individuals ascribe causation 
to everyday events, particularly when the events are perceived to be important, unusual, 
and disconfirm a prior expectation (Folkes, 1988; Weiner, 2000).  In other words, this 
research focuses on what firms communicate about the failures that cause product recalls 
and, in turn, how consumers react.   
Our investigation is tied to the operations and supply chain management field in two 
ways:  first, details of defects, including where and how they occur and how they will be 
prevented in the future, are supply chain attributes.  Second, only those firms with the 
requisite operational capabilities will have the opportunity to choose to disclose 
discretionary information in the event of a product recall.  To the extent that consumers 
respond to information provided by the firm, their future behavior regarding the purchase 
of the same or similar products and brands may be influenced (Folkes, 1984; 1988ab; 
Folkes & Kotsos, 1986; Siomkos & Kurzbad, 1991; Weiner, 2000).   
This study advances the understanding of consumer behavior relative to operational 
and supply chain information under product recall conditions, which is important for two 
reasons.  First, firms conducting recalls need concrete evidence of how consumers react 
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to these events; such reactions are difficult, if not impossible, to measure during actual 
product recall events. Indirect recall costs, which include reduced market share and 
reputational effects, are difficult to measure and believed to be significantly greater than 
the more easily measureable direct costs, such as warranty, litigation, product 
replacement and reverse logistics (Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Rupp, 2003).  As such, we 
argue that studying consumer perceptions and behavior in response to product recalls is 
of particular importance.  If, in fact, managing consumer impressions through specific 
types of communication can minimize negative market share effects, firms not only have 
incentives to potentially be more transparent in their recall announcements, but to also 
develop the necessary capabilities so that the relevant causal information is available at 
the time of the recall announcement.   
Second, policy-makers need to better understand consumer reactions to recall 
announcements under a variety of conditions.  Such understanding is critical to the design 
and implementation of effective regulations, particularly with respect to aligning firm 
incentives for reducing external quality failures and conducting product recalls 
responsibly.     
Figure 3.1 depicts a framework of factors which influence the consumer perceptions 
of product recalls, ultimately resulting in behavioral outcomes.  In our behavioral 
experiment, we manipulate the factors of locus, controllability, and corrective action 
(defined in Section 3.2) in product recall announcements, holding other factors, such as 
product type, recall timing and recall severity, constant.  
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Figure 3.1  Conceptual Framework:  Product Recall Announcements 
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3.1.1  A Behavioral Framework of Consumer Perceptions of Product Recalls 
We posit that consumer behavior is influenced by the perceptions of the recall event.  
Consumer reactions to a product recall are expected to include assessments of 
responsibility for the recall (e.g., recall responsibility) and an orientation towards future 
purchases of the same product (e.g., repurchase intent).  In addition to the notions of 
recall responsibility and repurchase intent, we add the concept of recall satisfaction to 
indicate the consumer’s level of satisfaction with the recalling firm’s handling of the 
recall event.   
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Other consumer behaviors, which may be influenced in this framework, include 
complaining behavior or negative word-of-mouth (Folkes, 1984), temporary withdrawal 
from purchases of products similar to that recalled (Bougie et al., 2003; Zeelenberg & 
Peters, 2007), in addition to whether the consumer responds to the recall by checking for 
the recalled product in their home and, if found, whether the consumer ignores the 
warning and consumes the product, discards the product, or seeks a refund for the product 
(Hallman et al., 2009).  Our study focuses on perceived recall responsibility, repurchase 
intent, and recall satisfaction, specifically on the effects of manipulating communication 
of locus (internal to or external to the firm conducting the recall), controllability (under 
the volitional control of the firm conducting the recall or its supply) and corrective action 
(a corrective action for the defect is given or withheld) on these dependent variables. 
We develop theoretical constructs and operational definitions, tentatively validate 
measures, and then conduct a pilot study using a fractionated factorial experimental 
design with a single food product type.  Our experiment uses vignettes based on actual 
firm announcements of product recalls to collect responses from a sample of students and 
non-student participants.  We use our pilot data (179 subjects) to construct measurement 
models for multi-item dependent and covariate scales and then test our hypotheses using 
multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA).   
In this exploratory study, we find support for effects of locus, controllability and 
corrective action on recall satisfaction and responsibility, consistent with the directions 
indicated by attribution theory.  In other words, when a firm explains that a supplier was 
the source of a contamination, on average; consumers are more satisfied with the 
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handling of the recall and attribute responsibility to the supplier more so than the 
manufacturer.  Uncontrollable causes, which might be believed to be more excusable that 
controllable causes, are associated with higher levels of repurchase intent and recall 
satisfaction.  Corrective actions are, as expected, associated with higher levels of recall 
satisfaction. While these initial findings are intriguing, we propose further modifications 
to the measures and scenarios and suggest future applications of this experiment with an 
expanded design in a more demographically heterogeneous sample.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section 3.2 we provide background 
on product recalls, and more specifically, food product recalls, and then develop a 
hypothesized model of how the content of firm communication lead to consumer 
perceptions and behavior based on attribution theory.  We then develop our hypotheses 
based on the proposed conceptual model (Section 3.3).  We explain our research design 
(Section 3.4), including the preliminary development of scenarios and measures, and a 
process of measurement validation, which concludes with the collection of the pilot data.  
Next, we analyze the pilot data using latent variable methods to validate measurement 
models and MANCOVA to test our theoretically-based hypotheses (Section 3.5).  
Finally, we discuss our results and implications and propose further measurement 
modifications for the future deployment of this study (Section 3.6). 
3.2  CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
3.2.1  Product Recall Announcements 
When a product is recalled, firms construct a response which includes communicating 
with regulatory agencies, informing the public and managing returns, replacements, 
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repairs or refunds.  Typically, the first official public indication of that response is a 
product recall announcement which, in the US, is usually issued by the firm conducting 
the recall under the guidance of the regulating agency, such as the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (toys, electronics, sporting goods and other consumer products), the 
FSIS (meat, poultry and egg products), the National Highway and Traffic Safety 
Administration (automobiles) or the FDA (food products including in-shell eggs, dairy, 
fruits, vegetables, and seafood and pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and medical devices).   
Regardless of the product type or agency involved, product recall announcements 
share common features, including descriptions of the products affected, the nature of the 
defect and the hazard, where the product was sold, contact information for the firm 
conducting the recall, and instructions for handling the recalled product.  Other types of 
information, specifically where (locus), how and why (indicating controllability) the 
defect occurred and any information regarding corrective actions (stability) intended to 
prevent future occurrence of the same defect are suggested by agency guidance, but not 
required.  This study focused on the effectiveness and outcomes of providing 
discretionary operational and supply chain information about the nature of the product 
quality issue, specifically in the context of food product recalls regulated by the FDA. 
3.2.2  Attribution Theory  
Attribution theory, originally developed by Heider (1958), has been used to explain 
how consumers make causal inferences when experiencing life events, products and 
services (Heider, 1958; Folkes, 1988ab).  The underlying premise of this theory is this: 
although individuals’ attribution of causality is not without error or bias, the process is 
 95 
relatively logical, and, ultimately, affects future behavior (Folkes, 1988).  Furthermore, 
the dimensions of attribution theory have been found to have particularly high predictive 
validity when the situation involves unexpected and negative outcomes, which matches 
the product recall context (Coombs, 2007).   
Attribution theory has been studied relative to self-perception, motivation (Kelley, 
1972; Weiner & Kukla, 1970), and in the marketing literature, perceptions of product 
quality failures or product harm events (Folkes, 1984; Klein & Dawar, 2004).  We adapt 
this theory to operationalize the three dimensions of causal attributions with respect to 
operational and supply chain characteristics of product quality failures.  Table 3.1 
describes how each of the three dimensions of attribution theory corresponds to our 
operational definitions in the operations management and supply chain context. We 
suggest that communications by the firm are subsequently interpreted by the audience 
receiving the message. In this case, it is the consumer receiving the message (Coombs & 
Holladay, 1996).  Attribution theory predicts that consumer causal attributions regarding 
product quality issues would fall along three dimensions:  locus, controllability, and 
stability (Folkes, 1984; Weiner, 2000).  We adapt the theory to the context of the 
operational and supply chain aspects of the defect, defining locus as internal or external, 
corresponding to defects that occur inside or outside the boundaries of the operations of 
the firm conducting the recall (Klein & Dawar, 2004).   
Following prior use of attribution theory, controllable causes exist when the firm 
conducting the recall, or its supplier, has a higher degree of volitional control over the 
cause of the defect.  Uncontrollable causes reflect an inability to influence the occurrence 
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of a defect, based on the procedures and policies in place at the time the defect occurred.  
As an example, if a pathogen is detected by a food producer in their raw materials or 
finished goods and the test result is not reported or acted upon, the defect is characterized 
as controllable.  In other words, the firm had the necessary information to prevent the 
defect from passing on to the consumer, but failed to do so.  Alternatively, a temporary 
refrigeration failure not detected by the food producer prior to the product being 
distributed, but which causes a quality problem that results in a recall, would be 
considered an uncontrollable cause.    
It could be argued that the producer has the responsibility to monitor their operations 
more closely, and therefore, should have detected the refrigeration failure. Nevertheless, 
from the perspective of attribution theory, this type of failure is considered 
uncontrollable, while the deliberate non-reporting of a defective quality test result is 
controllable.  Controllable/uncontrollable defects, as such, occur along a continuum from 
deliberate contamination by the producing firm to events that a producer has little to no 
control over, such as the unanticipated quality impacts of a natural disaster.   
Finally, the causal attribution dimension of stability is mapped to our construct of 
corrective action.  Stable causes are those that consumers can reasonably expect to 
happen again in the future (Dawar & Klein, 2004; Folkes, 1984; Weiner, 2000); 
consequently, firms that provide information in the recall announcement describing 
corrective actions which will minimize the likelihood of recurrence of the same defect are 
signaling that the cause is unstable.  We propose that corrective action is a proxy for one 
dimension of stability, acknowledging that other aspects of stability may be salient, 
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including firm reputation, compliance and product recall history and other past actions.  
Table 3A.1 provides operational definitions for all of the constructs used in our study 
(See Appendix 3A). 
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Table 3.1 Causal Attribution Dimensions and Operations Management/Supply  








INTERNAL LOCUS occurs when a defect that causes a product 
recall occurs INSIDE the manufacturing firm. In other words, the 
defect is because of something that happened within the 
manufacturer's operations. 
 
EXTERNAL LOCUS occurs when a defect that causes a product 
recall occurs OUTSIDE the manufacturing firm. In other words, the 
defect is because of something that happened at a supplier or 




CONTROLLABILITY is the degree to which the occurrence of the 
defect is under the volitional control of the firm conducting the 
recall or their supplier.  Consequently, a defect that is more highly  
 
UNCONTROLLABLE would be one which would be unanticipated 








A STABLE DEFECT is a product defect that the consumer could 
reasonably expect to occur again in the future.  STABLE DEFECTS 
are indicated by a lack of communication regarding any potential  
 
CORRECTIVE ACTION which would minimize the risk of 
recurrence of that particular defect in the future. 
 
An UNSTABLE DEFECT is a product defect that the consumer 
could reasonably expect NOT TO OCCUR in the future.  
 
UNSTABLE DEFECTS are indicated communication regarding 
potential CORRECTIVE ACTION which would minimize the risk 
of recurrence of that particular defect in the future. 
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3.2.2.1  Product Recall Announcements and Supply Chain Capabilities 
When product recalls are announced, firms have the opportunity and often choose to 
include types of information not required by regulation.  For example, during the pet food 
recalls, which occurred due to melamine contamination (Roth et al., 2008ab), and the 
recalls which occurred due to the use of salmonella-contaminated peanut products from 
the Peanut Corporation of America, suppliers were identified as the source of the defect 
when the individual firms announced the recalls.  In making these statements, firms may 
attempt to deflect blame from their own processes, which is one way to defend against 
customer backlash due to product harm.  
Blame deflection is only possible if the firm has relevant and reliable information 
(i.e., where the failure occurred, the nature of the failure and possible future prevention) 
on hand at the time the recall is announced.  Such information, even if available, takes 
time to confirm and  configure into an appropriate statement which satisfies agency 
requirements, internal stakeholders (e.g., legal counsel) and external stakeholders (e.g., 
suppliers, distributors and retailers).  In this way, we argue that operational competencies, 
derived from monitoring systems, supply chain design, and relationships with channel 
partners, have a direct bearing on the type of impression management options available to 
a firm conducting a recall. 
Similar to providing information about the locus of a defect, firms may provide 
information about the level of volitional control associated with the cause of the defect.  
A controllable cause may be relatively straightforward to explain in terms of preventing 
future occurrences, for example, by explaining the corrective actions which the firm will 
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take to remedy the defect’s cause.  Conversely, an uncontrollable cause may not be as 
amenable to a corrective action, but may be better tolerated by the consumer.  
Communicating a corrective action, regardless of the underlying nature of the defect’s 
cause, may be undertaken to signal the firm’s intentions to correct the situation that 
allowed the defect to occur.  By communicating the unstable nature of the cause (i.e., it is 
unlikely to reoccur), firms can reassure consumers of their good intentions, in addition to 
influencing the consumer’s perception of the risk of the product.   
As with locus, we argue that the firm’s ability to communicate information about 
controllability and corrective actions is limited by the competence of the firm conducting 
the recall and its supply chain partners relative to rapidly communicating, investigating 
the underlying cause of the defect, and developing a suitable remedy.  Given the short 
time frame available to firms when constructing a recall announcement (once a defect is 
confirmed), we suggest that only firms with superior capabilities in these dimensions will 
have the option to manage consumer impressions along all three attribution dimensions.   
By investigating the effect of these dimensions on consumer perceptions and 
behavioral intentions, we aim to offer firms a prescription which 1) distinguishes when 
higher levels of transparency may be preferred, 2) links the development of the supply 
chain competencies with the opportunity to manage risk in the event of a product recall, 
and 3) suggests what type of policy interventions might be necessary to align firm 
incentives with the desired action.  To this end, we argue that the current regulatory 
systems may allow firms to inappropriately deflect blame (e.g., to suppliers) and that the 
required content of a product recall announcement could influence firm actions to prevent 
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recalls (i.e., because the information required in the recall announcement will impact 
consumer impressions negatively) and impose consequences via the recall announcement 
(i.e., because required information provides consumers with a clearer picture of the 
nature of the failure).   
Before offering our hypotheses which address the relationships between attributions 
and consumer perceptions and behavioral intentions, we fully develop our conceptual 
basis for our dependent variables:  perceived recall responsibility, perceived recall 
satisfaction, and repurchase intent. 
3.3  MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
3.3.1  Perceptions of Recall Responsibility 
Attributions have been linked to the assessment of blame or responsibility in multiple 
contexts; forming a judgment about accountability for a situation is a precursor to 
forming an intention to change behavior (Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995).  We propose that 
perceived recall responsibility, defined as the degree to which the consumer holds the 
supplier, or the firm, conducting the recall responsible for the recall event, is a key 
dependent variable, because making justifications regarding the underlying cause of the 
defect is intended, in part, to diffuse responsibility (Laufer, 2002; Laufer et al., 2005).   
The crisis management literature, in particular, has focused on attributions which lead 
to the assignment of responsibility, since higher levels of responsibility are related to 
negative reputational effects, in this context (Bülow-Moller, 2010; Coombs, 2004; 
Coombs & Holladay, 2002).  To return to the example of the hundreds of recalls related 
to the Peanut Corporation of America salmonella contamination, many of those recalls 
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included a statement explaining that the supplier was the source of the contamination. In 
some cases, the supplier was named.   
We distinguish three separate types of responsibility assignment which correspond, 
respectively, to the degree of responsibility attributed by the consumer to 1) the supplier, 
2) the manufacturer, and 3) being shared by both the supplier and the manufacturer.  We 
find this to be appropriate to our research context, because our extensive review of food 
recalls indicates that recall announcements commonly include information which cue 
attributions of responsibility to either the manufacturer or an upstream supplier.  Because 
the manufacturer (e.g., the purchasing  organization) is the producer of the finished good 
in our context, we include the concept of shared responsibility to capture the idea that 
recall responsibility resides within supply chain partners, to some degree, when the defect 
originates with the supplier. 
3.3.2  Perceived Recall Satisfaction 
Recall announcements are a medium which conveys multiple types of information, 
including the affected product specifications, the nature of the hazard, details about the 
defect and its cause, and remedies (e.g., refund, repair, replacement).  Based on consumer 
preferences for specific types of information, and analogous to the construct of purchase 
satisfaction (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004), we propose that recall satisfaction is defined as 
the degree to which the consumer’s expectations regarding the handling of a product 
recall are met by the firm announcing the recall.   
Studies investigating consumer response to recall announcements with respect to risk 
reduction have found that consumers have definite preferences for the amount and type of 
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information provided regarding a recall (Hallman et al., 2009). Among the types of 
information considered “very important”, consumers included hazard information, any 
confirmed illnesses, a description of the affected product, what to do with the affected 
product, what is being done to fix the problem which caused the recall, and how the 
defect occurred.  Of these types of information, the latter two (what is being done to fix 
the problem and how the defect occurred) are recommended; however, they are not 
required for inclusion in the announcement. The preceding items are required and appear 
in every press release announcing a food recall.   
Purchase satisfaction has been studied extensively as a predictor of repurchase intent 
and brand loyalty (Oliver, 1993; Oliver & DeSarbo, 1988; Oliver & Swan, 1989; 
Westbrook & Oliver, 1991; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004).  The commonly used definition 
is phrased in terms of expectation confirmation or disconfirmation:  purchase satisfaction 
occurs to the degree that a consumer’s expectations regarding a product are met or 
exceeded (Oliver, 1993).   Analogously, we argue that recall satisfaction is an important 
dependent variable in our research context, because it is an indicator of consumer’s 
perceptions of the adequacy of firm response and remedies. 
3.3.3  Repurchase Intent 
Repurchase intent, defined as a consumer’s intent regarding the future purchase of a 
product that they have already purchased at some time in the past, has long been studied 
as an outcome variable, particularly in the marketing literature.  In studies specific to 
consumer reactions to product harm and recall events, repurchase intent has been linked 
to corporate social responsibility statements, brand equity (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Klein 
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& Dawar, 2004), and perceived risk (de Matos & Rossi, 2006; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 
1994).  In the product harm context, repurchase intent has not been hypothesized as a 
direct outcome of consumer’s causal attributions, in part due to the mediating influence 
of purchase satisfaction (dissatisfaction)  theorized, and has been demonstrated to account 
for significant variance in repurchase intent in more general consumer contexts 
(Anderson & Mittal, 2000; Mittal & Kamakura, 2001).  Nevertheless, due to the 
prevalence of studies examining the demand impacts of product recalls, both for the 
recalling brand and for other brands (Chu et al., 2005; Crafton et al., 1981; Marsh et al., 
2004; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983; Thomsen et al., 2006), we argue that it is important to 
consider the potential direct effects of attributions on repurchase intent. 
3.3.4  Effects of Causal Attributions 
We hypothesize that locus and controllability have direct effects on each of our 
dependent variables:  perceived recall responsibility (e.g., supplier, manufacturer, and 
shared responsibility), recall satisfaction and repurchase intent.  Our construct of 
corrective action, which maps to attribution theory’s stability dimension, is hypothesized 
to have a direct effect on recall satisfaction and repurchase intent.  This exploratory study 
is limited by the use of a fractionated factorial experimental; main effects and interaction 
effects are aliased with each other and therefore cannot be separately tested.  The logic 
and theoretical basis for the hypothesized main effects are developed in the following 
sections.  Figure 3.2 depicts the hypothesized relationships tested in this exploratory 
study. 
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3.3.4.1  Locus  
Locus is operationalized in our study, consistent with the literature, as internal 
(corresponding to defects that originate within the recalling firm’s organization) or 
external (corresponding to defects that originate within a supplier’s organization).  In our 
review of food product recalls, we observed that where such information is applicable, 
firms tend to include information regarding a supplier’s role in contributing to a defect 
that results in a recall.  This type of impression management would seem to attempt to 
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shift blame for a recall and any resulting negative consequences, such as injury or illness, 
away from the firm conducting the recall.   
Consistent with attribution theory, we hypothesize that, as blame is focused away 
from the firm conducting the recall (external locus), both the repurchase intent for the 
recalled item and recall satisfaction will be higher, as compared with the   recalls with an 
internal locus (Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 2000)..  Thus, a reduction in actual repurchase 
intent would be represented by a positive coefficient (e.g., towards a higher agreement 
with statements that indicate that the recall has negatively affected intentions to 
repurchase).  This wording is consistent with prior work in the product harm context 
(Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994).  
Similarly, we hypothesize that external representations of locus would have the effect 
of increasing recall satisfaction, holding other factors constant, because consumers will 
approve of the recalling firm’s handling of the situation more when blame is shifted 
externally.  Recall satisfaction is operationalized as the degree to which the consumer’s 
expectations regarding the handling of a product recall are met by the firm conducting the 
recall.  Higher levels of recall satisfaction are associated with higher levels of agreement 
with our measurement items. In other words, repurchase intent and recall satisfaction will 
be more favorable for external locus causes than for internal locus causes. 
More formally, these two hypotheses are stated as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1a  External locus is associated with higher levels of repurchase intent 
as compared to internal locus causes. 
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HYPOTHESIS 1b  External locus is associated with higher levels of recall satisfaction 
as compared to internal locus causes. 
 
When the recall announcement describes the source of a defect as external to the 
recalling firm (i.e., in our context, the defect source is the supplier), the announcement 
provides a cue to the consumer that responsibility is associated, at least in part, with an 
entity other than the firm conducting the recall.  As such, we hypothesize that external 
locus will be associated with higher levels of supplier responsibility and lower levels of 
manufacturing responsibility.  Furthermore, while we hypothesize that consumers will 
shift the attribution of responsibility towards the supplier, in these situations, the firm 
conducting the recall (e.g., the purchasing  firm, in this instance) will be perceived as 
sharing accountability for the defect with the supplier.  If supported, the implication of 
this hypothesis is that while describing the supplier as the source of a defect has the effect 
of shifting some responsibility away from the purchasing firm, it does not absolve the 
purchasing firm completely.  Consistent with this logic, we hypothesize that: 
HYPOTHESIS 1c  External locus causes is associated with lower levels of perceived 
manufacturer responsibility, as compared with internal locus causes. 
HYPOTHESIS 1d  External locus causes is associated higher levels of perceived 
supplier responsibility as compared with internal locus causes. 
HYPOTHESIS 1e  External locus is associated higher levels of perceived shared 
responsibility as compared with internal locus causes. 
3.3.4.2  Controllability 
Controllability captures the volitional role of entities involved in causation.  A 
controllable defect is one in which the supplier or manufacturer has volitional control 
over the circumstances that allowed the defect to happen or pass on to the consumer.  For 
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example, in a study which explores consumer reactions to product failure using 
attribution theory, the example is given of a weight loss supplement which does not 
perform as expected (e.g., the consumer does not lose weight when using it).  A failure 
scenario controlled by the consumer included not following the diet prescribed to 
accompany the weight loss supplement.  Conversely, a failure scenario  not controllable 
by the consumer was related to an illness which required a prescription medication which 
interfered with the active ingredient in the weight loss supplement.  The consumer, in this 
instance, was unaware that the medication would interfere with the supplement (Folkes, 
1984).  The key difference between these two situations, with respect to attribution 
theory, is the consumer’s volition with respect to the failure.  By not following the 
recommended diet, even while aware of the potential adverse effect on the weight loss 
program, the consumer has exercised volition which affects the outcome.  In the case of 
the illness, which required a prescription medication, there is an absence of volition due 
to the illness and the consumer’s lack of awareness of the potential for the prescription to 
affect the outcome (Folkes, 1984).  In an experiment based on similar scenarios, and a 
survey-based study, Folkes (1984) linked controllability to anger responses related to 
product failure. 
We argue that controllability of the underlying cause of a defect which causes a 
product recall will influence consumer perceptions for how the recall is being handled 
(recall satisfaction), assessments of responsibility for the recall, and repurchase intent.  In 
our operationalization of controllability, we distinguish between causes under the 
complete volitional control of either the recalling firm or their supplier (i.e., a quality test 
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result is ignored by the recalling firm or their supplier), as compared with less volitional 
causes (i.e., a lightning strike causes a power failure which leads to loss of refrigeration 
and contributes to contamination, but the loss of refrigeration goes undetected).  While 
we might argue that all manufacturing circumstances are, to some extent, under the 
supervision, and consequently, control, of the recalling firm or their supplier, the 
scenarios which include the undetected loss of refrigeration are comparatively less 
controllable (i.e., being due to an extreme event, such as a lightning strike, and 
undetected, indicating, since it was unknown, that the failure was not a result of 
deliberate or volitional action).  As a result, we expect consumer perceptions of these 
failures to differ, based on the idea that controllable failures, to some degree, demonstrate 
a willful neglect of potential adverse effects for consumers.  Therefore, we would expect 
consumers to, on average, respond negatively, with correspondingly lower levels of 
repurchase intent and recall satisfaction.    In other words, repurchase intent and recall 
satisfaction will be more favorable for uncontrollable causes than for controllable causes.  
More formally, these hypotheses are stated as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2a  Controllability is associated with reduced repurchase intent. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2b  Controllability is associated with reduced recall satisfaction. 
 
Because controllability is understood to incorporate volition, it follows that an 
individual or organization that has control over an outcome or situation can also be held 
accountable.  We argue that this provides the rationale for a direct linkage between 
controllability and perceived responsibility in our research context.  Assignment of 
responsibility is a key feature of attribution theory, since determining a responsible party 
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reduces the uncertainty associated with a negative situation (Weiner, 1995).  As a result, 
we hypothesize that consumers seeking to reduce the uncertainty regarding the safety of a 
specific product – and food products, in general – will have a strong need to assign 
responsibility, and that cues as to the controllability of the defect will increase 
attributions of responsibility to entities involved in the recall.  We expect to observe the 
effects of controllability on each of our perceived responsibility constructs, resulting in 
higher levels of responsibility attributed to manufacturers and suppliers individually, and 
higher levels of shared responsibility when the defect is controllable. These hypotheses 
are stated as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2c  Controllability is positively associated with perceived manufacturer 
responsibility. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2d  Controllability is positively associated with perceived supplier 
responsibility. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2e  Controllability is positively associated with perceived shared 
responsibility  
 
3.3.4.3  Corrective Action (Stability) 
Stability relates to the permanence of the cause of the defect (Folkes, 1984).  A stable 
defect is one that a consumer could reasonably expect to occur again in the future.  An 
unstable defect is one that the consumer can reasonably expect will not occur again in the 
future (Folkes, 1994).  Stability is called corrective action and is operationalized by 
providing (unstable) or withholding (stable) information regarding a corrective action.  
Typically, quality management systems include procedures for investigating the 
underlying cause of failures, including environmental, health and safety and quality 
failures.  Once a root cause is determined, the organization can determine what type of 
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remedy, or corrective action, to put in place to minimize the risk of the same problem 
occurring in the future.   
The FDA requires that firms report corrective actions to the agency as part of the 
process of closing out a product recall event (FDA, 2009a).  While FDA guidance 
suggests that product recall announcements include information regarding corrective 
actions, such information is not required by regulation. In our review of food product 
recall announcements, we find that less than 2% of recall announcements provide any 
information regarding the investigation of root cause or corrective action.  We speculate 
that firms may be reluctant to provide corrective action information due to liability 
concerns (i.e., describing the corrective action implies what could have been done to 
prevent the defect in the first place, which could contribute to liability) or, simply, that 
due to the pressure of needing to announce a recall quickly after a defect is detected, 
firms do not have the time to adequately determine the appropriate corrective action 
(Packman, 1998). 
Prior research has indicated that, in a product recall context, consumers consider 
information related to how a quality problem will be remedied to prevent recurrence 
“very important” (Hallman et al., 2009).  Attribution theory would predict that unstable 
causes (i.e., those causes for which a corrective action is stated in the recall 
announcement) create less concern for consumers with respect to repurchase intent, in 
part because the danger, or risk, associated with the product would be considered smaller, 
because the probability of recurrence is lower than that of a stable defect cause.  
Furthermore, by providing a cue that the cause is unstable, the recalling firm can convey 
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a sense of urgency in remedying the problem and influence consumer perceptions that the 
recall is being managed appropriately.  We, therefore, hypothesize that omitting 
information regarding a corrective action has a negative effect on repurchase intent and 
recall satisfaction; in effect, when recall announcements contain information regarding a 
proposed corrective action, consumers have more positive perceptions of recall handling 
(recall satisfaction) and higher levels of repurchase intent.  In other words, repurchase 
intent and recall satisfaction will be less favorable when no corrective action is 
communicated than for when a corrective action is communicated. 
More formally, we propose the following: 
HYPOTHESIS 3a  Corrective action communications are associated with higher levels 
of repurchase intent. 
HYPOTHESIS 3b  Corrective action communications are associated with higher levels 
of recall satisfaction.   
 
3.3.4.4  Covariates 
Consistent with other studies that evaluate consumer perceptions of a product harm 
issue, we include a number of covariates (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; de Matos & Rossi, 
2006; Jolly & Mowen, 1985; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Mowen, 1980; Mowen, Jolly & 
Nickell, 1981; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1991).  The purpose of the covariates is to parcel 
out the variance in our dependent variables that is related to the plausible control 
variables, rather than the hypothesized relationships of interest.  We control for perceived 
purchase risk, purchase dissatisfaction, several demographic covariates, including gender, 
age and education level, and several experience-related variables (e.g., relevant work 
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experience, recall awareness, and illness experience).  The following sections describe 
the nature and purpose of the covariates in more detail. 
3.3.4.4.1  Perceived Purchase Risk 
Perceived purchase risk is the consumer’s assessment of potential adverse 
consequences associated with a purchasing goal (Cox & Rich, 1964; Bettman, 1973; 
1979; Dowling & Staelin, 1994).  Increasing the probability and severity of adverse 
consequences increases the perceived risk.  In evaluating risk, consumers consider 
various types of loss which could result from the purchase decision, including poor 
product performance, loss of social status, physical loss, financial loss, time, 
psychological losses and frustration (Taylor, 1974).  Higher levels of perceived risk with 
respect to a purchasing decision lead to a variety of risk-reduction behaviors among 
consumers, including extensive searching behaviors, evaluation of larger amounts and 
more varied types of information, and product trials (Dowling & Staelin, 1994; 
Gemunden, 1985).    
We adopt perceived risk as a subjective assessment of risk from the consumer’s 
perspective, rather than an objective measure of risk (Bauer, 1960; Mitchell, 1999).  
Perceived risk is defined as consisting of two components:  some level of probabilistic 
belief about the likelihood of a negative outcome and a belief regarding the level of 
consequences (loss or harm) associated with a negative outcome (Cunningham, 1967; 
Kogan & Wallach, 1964; Mitchell, 1999).   
Because one component of perceived risk includes an assessment of the probability of 
a negative consequence, we expect that providing evidence of a negative consequence 
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will increase perceived risk, regardless of any attributional manipulations (Bettman, 
1973; 1979; Taylor, 1974; Dowling & Staelin, 1994; Mitchell, 1999).  Our study is 
specifically designed to offer evidence of potential physical loss by revealing the 
potential hazard associated with the product under recall.  We control for the level of 
perceived purchase risk present prior to the experimental treatment to parcel out variance 
that is due to individual level differences in the baseline perceptions of risk. 
3.3.4.4.2  Perceived Purchase Dissatisfaction 
Purchase satisfaction occurs to the degree that a consumer’s expectations regarding a 
product are met or exceeded (Oliver, 1993).   This concept can be extended to encompass 
dissatisfaction and incorporating negative expectation disconfirmation.  Dissatisfaction 
has been linked to evaluations of product quality; we expect that by manipulating the 
experimental scenario to indicate poor product quality, and specifically a potentially 
hazardous product, that significant levels of purchase dissatisfaction will result.  This is 
consistent with the notion that a food product recalled due to a safety issue does not meet 
the most basic expectations for quality.  We operationally define purchase dissatisfaction 
as occurring when a consumer’s expectations about a product’s performance are not met 
(Oliver, 1993; Oliver & DeSarbo, 1988; Oliver & Swan, 1989; Westbrook & Oliver, 
1991). 
The relationship between purchase dissatisfaction and repurchase intent has been 
demonstrated to be stronger than that of satisfaction and repurchase intent (Anderson & 
Mittal, 2000).   We consequently argue that controlling for the effects of purchase 
dissatisfaction on our dependent variables is appropriate and necessary. 
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3.3.4.4.3  Demographics, Recall Awareness and Relevant Experiences 
Individual level characteristics may influence satisfaction levels, assignment of 
responsibility and repurchase intent (Mittal & Kamakura, 2001).  Therefore, we control 
for gender, age and level of education.  The prevalence of food recalls over the past few 
years may have altered individual perceptions of food recalls, in general. Consequently, 
we control for recent personal experiences with foodborne illness (perceived) and the 
awareness of recalls occurring within the past year.  Because subjects with work 
experience in areas related to food (food service or food manufacturing) or healthcare 
may have specialized knowledge that influences their perceptions of food recalls, we 
control for the presences of these types of experiences. 
3.4  RESEARCH DESIGN 
We use a 23 experimental design (two levels each for locus, controllability and 
corrective action) with a random assignment to test our hypothesized model (Table 2.2).  
Randomization of the treatment assignment minimizes the possibility that effects are due 
to a form of selection bias.  For this exploratory study, we use a fractionated factorial 
design, consisting of four treatment combinations. This design allows us to test the 
effects of locus, controllability, and corrective action on our dependent variables.  Table 






Table 3.2  Treatment Combinations & Coding 
Scenario 
Number 
Locus Control Corrective Action 
1 External – 
High = 1 
Controllable – 
Low =0 
Corrective Action – 
Low = 0 
2 Internal – 
Low = 0 
Uncontrollable – 
High =1 
Corrective Action – 
Low = 0 
3 Internal – 
Low = 0 
Controllable – 
Low =0 
No Corrective Action 
– High = 1 




No Corrective Action 
– High = 1 
 
3.4.1  Vignettes and Measures  
Our experiment is administered as a framed field experiment which consists of 
exposing participants to a written scenario, or vignette, to provide the stimulus for the 
treatment (Rungtusanatham, Wallin & Eckerd, 2011).  A vignette-based experiment is 
appropriate for several reasons.  First, it is not possible to cause a product recall to 
measure consumer reactions, nor is it possible to pre-test consumer perceptions prior to a 
product recall.  Second, vignettes have been successfully used in the marketing literature 
to test various hypotheses regarding brands and product harm events, as well as in the 
operations management literature (Gürhan-Canli & Batra, 2004; Jolly & Mowen, 1985; 
Mowen et al., 1981; Rungtusanatham et al., 2011; Tsiros & Mittal, 2004).  The vignettes 
describe a purchase scenario followed by the discovery that the purchased item has been 
recalled.  Pre-test items were administered after a brief set of experimental instructions, 
followed by the purchase and recall scenario, post-test items and manipulation checks. 
To ensure appropriate measurement validity and reliability, we developed 
measurement items and the experimental vignettes following an iterative process that 
combines elements of recommended scale development practices (Churchill, 1979; Roth, 
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Schroeder, Huang, & Kristal, 2007) and an experimental vignette design (Hall, 2012; 
Rungtusanatham et al., 2011).  The combined measurement development process is 
depicted in Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3  Vignette and Measurement Development (Adapted from Roth, et al., 
2007 and Rungtusanatham et al., 2011) 













Purify & Pretest Items
• Item Sorting
• Subject Feedback
Specify Theoretical Domain & 
Operational Definitions of Constructs
• Research Context






After reviewing the literature to develop our research context and factors of interest, 
we developed a set of tentative constructs and operational definitions.  Our literature 
review included relevant government regulations, guidance, and reports from the 
Government Accountability Office, which studies recall systems, and the content and 
format of all press releases issued for food product recalls from 2008 through 2010, in 
addition to marketing, operations and supply chain management literature.  Our 
measurement and vignette development process consisted of the following steps:  1) a 
pen and paper exercise using a preliminary vignette and open ended questions in an MBA 
class; 2) item sorting exercises; 3) vignette pre-testing to assess clarity, readability, time 
required to complete the exercise and comprehension of the manipulation checks; and 4) 
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final measurement item and vignette refinement prior to administering the experiment to 
a pilot group of student and non-student participants. 
3.4.2  Vignette Development 
3.4.2.1  Pen & Paper Exercise – MBA Students  
A pen and paper pilot exercise was conducted with 15 MBA students as a 
preliminary assessment of vignettes and measurement items.  This exercise provided 
confirmation of the realism of the vignette and a sense of the amount of time subjects 
would need  to complete this type of exercise, in addition to providing preliminary 
feedback on the effectiveness of the manipulations.  Appendix 3B contains the four sets 
of vignettes and questions used in the pen and paper exercise.  We also noted that the 
participants:  1) in general, attributed responsibility to the manufacturer or supplier 
consistent with the manipulation of locus, 2) responded to the use of the word 
“voluntary” in the recall announcement as a positive statement regarding the firm’s 
handling of the recall, 3) responded to the product recall announcement with reduced 
repurchase intentions and 4) had stated preferences about what type of information they 
were interested in seeing in a recall announcement consistent with prior studies (Hallman 
et al., 2009).  As a result of this exercise, we chose to exclude the word “voluntary” from 
our vignettes, since nearly all food recalls are considered voluntary (i.e., “voluntary” in 
terms of FDA recall announcements simply means that the recall is being conducted by 
the firm and not as part of a formal enforcement action by the FDA) and the concept does 
not convey substantive information about the responsiveness of the firm conducting the 
recall.  See Appendix 3B for additional details regarding this exercise and its results. 
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3.4.2.2  Common Module 
As recommended by Rungtusanatham et al. (2011), we built our vignettes after 
determining the factors of interest for manipulation and the general format of the vignette 
around a common module.  The common module consisted of the format of the vignette 
(instructions, introductory statement, press release, and follow-up statement) and all 
aspects of the vignette held constant over all treatments.  The type of defect (salmonella), 
description of symptoms and possible outcomes of illness, number of illnesses (121 
illnesses), product type (frozen cheese pizza), product description (batch numbers, 
packaging, distribution area) and the name of the recalling firm, were the same 
throughout all four scenarios.  In addition, each scenario contained the same introductory 
paragraph setting up the vignette and the same follow-up paragraph concluding the 
vignette.  The format of the press release was taken from actual FDA press releases and 
consistent with FDA guidance regarding required information and standard hazard 
language.  The warning regarding the symptoms and possible outcomes of salmonella, for 
example, was taken exactly from FDA guidance.   
3.4.2.3  Experimental Cues 
After developing the common module, we developed tentative experimental cues for 
our manipulated factors:  locus, controllability and corrective action (stability).  We pre-
tested a version of the vignette with cues for an external locus, controllable failure with a 
corrective action included.  We selected this version for pre-testing, because it represents 
the extreme case for our three factors, and since we were interested in determining 
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whether participants would comprehend the scenario, as intended (Hall, Roth & 
Rungtusanatham, 2012).   
Pre-testing was conducted by deploying the vignette and a set of follow-up questions 
to a group of undergraduate students at Clemson University.  Students received extra 
credit for completion of the exercise, which was deployed by on-line survey.  Questions 
asked as part of the exercise included comprehension checks (e.g., “a number of people 
were made ill by this product”), intended to assess whether or not participants understood 
the scenario as intended, potential measurement items for perceived responsibility and 
recall satisfaction, opportunities for free text responses to comment on the clarity of 
wording, and a question which asked participants to estimate the amount of time spent on 
the exercise.  Responses were recorded on a five point agreement scale with a sixth 
choice included for “don’t know”.  The full text and results of the pre-testing exercise are 
included in Appendix 3B.   
The results of the vignette pre-test are reported in Appendix 3B.  The pre-test results 
indicate that the overall comprehension of the preliminary vignette was high for salient 
aspects of the scenario, including the type of defect, defect severity, illnesses associated 
with the product, supplier involvement (locus), controllability and corrective actions.  In 
addition to this pre-test, the measurement item sorting exercises, discussed in the next 
section, included a variety of items intended to act as experimental cues for the high and 
low levels of each attribution dimension.  The results of the item sorting guided the 
writing of the manipulation check items and the final vignette design.  Sorting results for 
these cues/manipulation check items are included in the measurement items sorting 
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procedure.  In finalizing the vignettes, we made a few changes:  the supplier involved in 
the external locus vignettes is domestic, rather than foreign, and the vignettes were 
simplified slightly to concentrate the cues, as shown in Table 3.3 , which illustrates the 
final experimental cues for each of the four scenarios used in the pilot study. 
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Table 3.3  Vignettes & Treatments Cues 
Scenario Locus Control Corrective 
Action 




“The source of the 
contamination was 
cheese supplied by 
Robert’s Dairies, Inc.” 





Inc. prior to sale to 
Chef Milo.” 




third party testing 
of incoming raw 
materials.” 





supply to refrigeration 
units at Chef Milo’s 
manufacturing facility, 
causing products to be 
exposed to higher 




failure was not 
detected by the 
Chef Milo 
Corporation prior to 
distributing the 
frozen pizzas.” 














“The source of the 
salmonella 
contamination was the 
processing equipment at 




multiple units had 
failed internal 
quality tests 
conducted by Chef 












supply to refrigeration 
units at Robert’s Dairies  
manufacturing facility, 
causing products to be 
exposed to higher 
temperatures, leading to 
contamination with 
salmonella.” 
Neither the Chef 
Milo Corporation, 
nor Robert’s 
Dairies, Inc., were 
aware of the 
refrigeration failure 







3.4.3  Measurement Item Development 
From the literature we developed a tentative set of 15 items representing 3 constructs 
and 18 experimental cues representing the three dimensions of attribution at the high and 
low levels of each dimension.  Perceived purchase dissatisfaction (Oliver, 1993; Oliver & 
DeSarbo, 1988; Oliver & Swan, 1989; Westbrook & Oliver, 1991), perceived purchase 
risk (Mitchell, 1999; Siomokos & Kurzbad, 1994), and repurchase intent (Siomokos & 
Kurzbad, 1994) have been studied extensively. Consequently, the proposed scales only 
reflected slight modifications to our context.  We conducted an item matching exercise 
using an online survey tool which also provided respondents with an opportunity to 
provide open-ended responses regarding the clarity of the items.   To maintain a 
reasonable number of items for each sort, we split the constructs into three groups, 
sorting the most similar constructs together.  In addition to sorting the proposed 
measurement items, we included items representative of treatment cues for the three 
dimensions of attribution theory.  The purpose of these exercises was to establish 
preliminary content, convergent and discriminant validity, and tentative reliability (Roth 
et al., 2007).  See Appendix 3B for the complete lists of items included in each of the 
three sorting exercises.   
The degree of agreement in item sorting was assessed to establish tentative validity 
and reliability.  Moore & Benbasat’s (1991) item placement ratio calculates the 
proportion of judges that selected the targeted construct (i.e., a “hit”) and the total 
number of potential item placements.  This ratio can be used to provide a measure of the 
proportion of judges selecting the target constructs and, by examining “off-diagonal” 
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placements, provides information about the potential discriminant validity issues (Menor 
& Roth, 2009).  For the three different sorts, the overall hit ratios ranged from 51.79% 
(stable/unstable) to 82.3% (repurchase intent, internal locus, external locus, purchase 
dissatisfaction).  We anticipated that participants would have some difficulty in 
distinguishing controllable causes versus uncontrollable causes, and consequently, were 
seeking cues which provided the most separation between these two concepts.  Similarly, 
stable/unstable was difficult to match, in part, due to the nature of the experimental cue:  
stable was related to defects for which no corrective action was proposed.   
The results of sorting manipulation check items with their intended experimental cue 
definition were further confirmed by the vignette pre-test.  Individual measurement scale 
hit ratios (e.g., repurchase intent, perceived purchase risk and purchase dissatisfaction) 
exceeded the 75% recommended cutoff (Roth et al., 2007).  See Appendix 3B for 
detailed reporting of item placement ratios.  
Collectively, the literature review and sorting exercises provide tentative support for 
the reliability and validity of the constructs and the measurement items.  The results of 
these exercises were used to further refine the measurement items.  In addition, between 
the sorting exercises and the pilot study, we added two constructs:  recall satisfaction 
(i.e., patterned after purchase satisfaction, as discussed previously) and perceived recall 
responsibility (i.e., single item measures of manufacturer, supplier and shared 
responsibility).  These constructs, and the associated items, were not part of the sorting 
process conducted prior to the pilot study.  The final measurement items are included in 
Appendix 3B. 
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3.4.4  Implementation 
3.4.4.1  Sample Frame and Experimental Procedure 
The sample frame for this experiment includes consumers of convenience food 
products living in the US.  The experiment was administered through an online survey 
which randomized the assignment of treatments across four scenarios.  Undergraduate 
and MBA classes were solicited in-class, where possible, to increase participation.  A 
combination of in-class cash prizes and on-line gift certificates were used as incentives 
for participation.  In-class incentives were offered at the rate of $20 per 10 participants 
with awards made based on a random lottery.  On-line incentives were offered in the 
amount of $100 gift certificate randomly awarded at the end of the exercise.  The 
Facebook solicitation of participants used an on-line drawing of a gift certificate as an 
incentive.  Of the valid responses, frequency of the administration of each of the four 
scenarios was roughly equivalent (see Appendix 3A for details).   
3.4.4.2  Subjects 
Our sample consists of university students recruited from classes offered in the 
College of Business and Behavioral Sciences at Clemson University and a convenience 
sample of non-student adult participants solicited via Facebook.  A total of 210 responses 
were collected over a period of fourteen days.  The original sample of 210 cases was 
reduced to 180 cases by listwise deletion when one or more predictors, covariates or 
dependent variable measures were missing. 
 Approximately 65% of the useable sample was male; 35% was female.  Over 97% of 
the sample had at least “some college” education.  Over two-thirds (68.5%) of the sample 
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was employed, at least part-time, and averaged six to ten years of work experience.  More 
than three-quarters (78.8%) of the sample consisted of undergraduate or graduate 
students.  While upper age groups are not well-represented in this convenience sample, 
40.6% of the sample was aged 30 or older.  Complete demographic details of the sample 
are included in Appendix 3A. 
3.4.4.3  Sample Description 
Table 3.4 describes the variable minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviations.  
Table 3.4  Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Purchase Risk (Pre-Test) 2.00 7.00 4.79 0.93 
Purchase Dissatisfaction 3.33 7.00 5.58 1.00 
Repurchase Intent (Higher values 
indicate lower repurchase intent) 2.00 7.00 5.41 1.10 
Recall Satisfaction 1.00 7.00 4.42 1.09 
Manufacturer Responsibility 1.00 7.00 5.32 1.10 
Supplier Responsibility 1.00 7.00 4.77 1.37 
Shared Responsibility 1.00 7.00 4.60 1.44 
Gender (1=Male) .00 1.00 0.65 0.48 
Age 1.00 6.00 2.59 1.07 
Education 2.00 7.00 4.08 1.27 
Illness Experience 1.00 7.00 4.22 1.97 
Recall Awareness 1.00 7.00 5.34 1.64 
Food Service Work Experience (1=yes) .00 1.00 0.54 0.50 
Food Manufacturing Work Experience 
(1=yes) .00 1.00 0.06 0.23 
Healthcare Work Experience (1=yes) .00 1.00 0.17 0.37 




3.4.4.4  Covariates 
A pre-test question assessed the applicability of the vignette with the participant’s 
purchasing behaviors (How frequently do you buy frozen pizzas?  ; 7 point scale ranging 
from “never” to “nearly always”).  About 13.9% of the sample responded “never” with 
the balance of the sample reporting “infrequently” to “very often”.  Approximately 60.5% 
of the sample reported buying frozen pizzas “occasionally,” “sometimes,” “often,” or 
“very often”.  On the basis of these self-reported purchasing behaviors, we conclude that 
the product featured in our vignettes is relevant to the participants and that the 
participants can be considered as having sufficient knowledge of the product to 
participate and provide meaningful responses.  Over three-quarters (75.86%) of 
participants recalled hearing about at least one food recall within the past year and over 
half (52.8%) reported believing that they may have become ill from consumption of a 
food item within the past year.  Both of these awareness scales were collected from the 
post-test, and therefore, could be inflated due to the treatment. Over half (52.8%) of 
participants reported having work experience in the food service area, 5.6% reported 
having experience in food manufacturing and 16.7% reported having experience in 
healthcare.   
3.4.4.5  Manipulation Checks 
Manipulation checks were administered as part of the post-test and were intended to 
measure whether the participants comprehended the intended differences in the treatment 
levels for locus, controllability and corrective action.  Multiple manipulation check 
questions were included for each manipulated factor, in part to improve the robustness of 
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our manipulation checks, and in part, because we were concerned with the participants’ 
ability to recognize differences between defects and actions associated with the supplier 
versus the manufacturer.  A complete list of manipulation check items is included in 
Appendix 3B. 
We evaluated the manipulation checks for each treatment, comparing the responses 
for each item with the level of the treatment received.  One-way ANOVA indicates that 
we achieved the desired level of treatment comprehension for the locus for three of the 
four manipulation checks (p<.01).  One of the four manipulation check questions (“The 
salmonella contamination in the pizza came from the cheese supplied by Robert’s Dairies 
Inc.”) was not statistically different in the internal or external locus comparison.  We 
attribute this to measurement issues highlighted in our debriefing interviews with 
participants. 
The manipulation check for controllability indicates that we achieved acceptable or 
marginally acceptable treatment comprehension for three of the four manipulation checks 
(p<.0001, p<.085 and p<.123, see Appendix 3B for details).  As noted in our 
measurement development, we expected to have some difficulty in achieving 
discriminant validity for the controllability construct; nevertheless, the manipulation 
check results support cautious interpretation of our experimental results for 
controllability.  One-way ANOVA of the manipulation of stability provides evidence of 
directionally appropriate and statistically significant differences (p<.0001 for all three 
items).  In total, we conclude that our manipulation checks are supportive of the internal 
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validity of our experiment; however, we will seek to improve the manipulation of 
controllability in the final study.  
3.4.4.6  Realism  
Realism was measured with two seven point agreement scales ranging from “very 
strongly disagree” (1) to “very strongly agree” (7):   “The situation described in this 
exercise was realistic,” (mean=5.850, standard deviation=.906) and “I took my role in 
this exercise seriously,” (mean=6.256, standard deviation =.694).  Based on these results, 
we conclude that the experimental scenario was sufficiently realistic.  
3.5  RESULTS 
Our analysis consists of a validation of the measurement models for two sets of 
scales:  the dependent variables repurchase intent and recall satisfaction (Measurement 
Model 1) and the covariate scales purchase dissatisfaction and perceived risk 
(Measurement Model 2).  After demonstrating the reliability and validity of these scales, 
we use aggregated mean values for these scales, in addition to our other measures, in a 
MANCOVA model which tests for the primary effects of the three manipulated 
attribution dimensions, controlling for our covariates. 
3.5.1  Confirmatory Analysis of Measurement Models  
The final items for the four multi-item scales were used in the pilot study; the pilot 
sample has been analyzed to refine and confirm the measurement models for the two 
scaled dependent variables and two scaled covariates.  Roth et al. (2007) recommends 
that measurement models be evaluated to confirm validity and reliability in the second 
stage of measurement development.  The data used to validate these scales was collected 
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using seven point Likert scales anchored with “very strongly disagree” and “very strongly 
agree”.   
3.5.1.1  Reliability Analysis 
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to evaluate the composite 
reliability of the four multi-item scales.  In our assessment of these scales, we found that 
one item (RP5) in the repurchase intent scale did not adequately fit with the remaining 
items, or the construct definition, since it was more closely related to withdrawing from 
an entire category of purchases, rather than repurchase intent for the specific product 
being recalled.  This change reduced the repurchase intent scale from five to four items, 
but remains consistent with our definition, and consequently, ensures content validity.  
The Werts-Linn-Joreskog composite reliabilities for the four scales are reported in Table 
3.6; because each reliability is equal to, or exceeds, the .70 cutoff values, we have support 
for acceptable scale reliability (Bollen, 1989). 
Table 3.5  Measurement Scale Descriptives and Composite Reliability 
Construct Min Max Mean Items 
Standard 
Deviation Reliability1 
       Purchase Risk 
(Pre-Test) 2 7 4.79 4 0.93 0.70 
Purchase 
Dissatisfaction 3.33 7 5.58 3 1.00 0.88 
Repurchase 
Intent 2 7 5.41 4 1.10 0.90 
Recall 
Satisfaction 1 7 4.42 3 1.09 0.81 
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3.5.1.2  Unidimensionality Analysis 
Our CFA results provide evidence of unidimensionality based on goodness-of-fit 
indices.  We use Joreskog-Sorbom’s goodness-of-fit (GFI) and adjusted goodness-of-fit 
(AGFI), the Bentler-Bonnett normed fit index (NFI) and non-normed fit index (NNFI), in 
addition to the comparative fit index (CFI), to substantiate the unidimensionality of our 
scales.  For the goodness of fit indices, a value of 1 indicates a perfect fit and values 
exceeding .90 are considered substantive evidence of unidimensionality.  In addition, we 
report root mean-square residuals (RMR) and root mean-square errors of approximation 
(RMSEA) for both models; values approaching zero are desirable, however, a value of 
.06 is considered to indicate a good fit and .08 is a moderate fit (Bollen, 1989).  Table 3.7 
provides the fit index values for the two measurement models compared with the 
standard evaluation criteria.   







    
Repurchase Intent & 
Recall Satisfaction   
Perceived Risk 
and Purchase 




49.52 (13 d.f.) 
p<.000001 
 














































RMSEA   0.13   0.06   0.06 
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3.5.1.3  Convergent Validity Analysis 
We evaluate convergent validity by reviewing the magnitude and direction (sign) of 
the standardized path loadings of each item onto the designated construct.  Standardized 
path loadings occur in the direction expected and are statistically different from zero 
(p<.01).  Table 3.8 reports the standardized path loadings, critical ratios and p-values for 
each item.  The average variance extracted (AVE) is calculated for each scale; a value of 
.50 or greater is considered evidence of convergent validity (Bollen, 1989).  The 
perceived purchase risk scale has a marginal AVE value of .40; we conclude that this is 
acceptable for the exploratory nature of this study, but it will need to be addressed in a 
future implementation of this experiment.  Based on path loadings and average variance 
extracted,  we  conclude  that  the measurement  scales  adequately reflect the  designated  
constructs and exhibit convergent validity. 
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Table  3.7  Measurement Models: Standardized Path Loadings, Critical Ratios  
and Average Variance Extracted 
Construct 
Indicator 





Measurement Model  1       
  




This product recall has decreased the 
chance that I would buy a Chef Milo 
pizza in the future. 0.92 - 
 
RP2 
I would be less likely to purchase the 
Chef Milo brand in the future. 0.86 17.29 
 
RP3 
I would buy a different brand of pizza 
next time. 0.78 13.98 
 
RP4 
I would avoid purchasing the Chef Milo 
brand in the future. 0.89 18.51 
  
Average Variance Extracted = .59 
  Recall 
Satisfaction RSat1 
I feel satisfied with Chef Milo 
Corporation's statements about quality. 0.83 11.14 
 
RSat2 
I'm satisfied with how the Chef Milo 
Corporation handled this product recall. 0.74 10.16 
  RSat3 
The Chef Milo Corporation seems to 
have handled this problem responsibly. 0.85 - 
Measurement Model  2       
  
Average Variance Extracted = .40 
  Purchase Risk       
(Pre-Test) PR1 I'm concerned about food safety. 0.77 4.88 
 
PR2 
I'm worried about the quality of the food 
I consume. 0.77 - 
 
PR3 
I could get sick from eating food that has 
quality issues. 0.41 8.68 
 
PR4 
I feel like consuming frozen cheese 
pizza could be hazardous. 0.47 8.68 
  
Average Variance Extracted = .71 
  Purchase 
Dissatisfaction DIS1 
I am unsatisfied with the quality of this 
product. 0.82 6.31 
 
DIS2 
I feel dissatisfied with my purchase of 
this product. 0.79 6.95 
 
DIS3 
This product did not meet my 
expectations for quality. 0.87 - 
   1. The critical ratio (CR) for a one-tailed test of significance and the associated p-values are: CR=1.64, 
p<.05; CR=2.33, p<.01; CR=3.10, p<.0001. 
2. The items presented here were measured on a scale from 1 “very strongly disagree” to 7 “very strongly 
agree”. 
3. Average variance extracted (AVE) >.50 indicates convergent validity. 
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3.5.1.4  Discriminant Validity Analysis 
Discriminant validity is assessed by conducting a Χ2 difference test for each pair of 
scales.  This procedure includes a CFA, in which the paired constructs are allowed to 
freely correlate, and a CFA, in which the correlation between the constructs is 
constrained to equal one.  A significant Χ2 difference result provides evidence that the 
constructs are different, and consequently, supports discriminant validity.  Table 3.9 
reports the results of the Χ2 difference tests, indicating that, because the p-values for each 
test are less than or equal to .05, we have support for discriminant validity 
Table 3.8  Pairwise Tests of Discriminant Validity 






  χ2 d.f. χ2 d.f. 
 
test p value 
        Purchase Risk 
       Purchase Dissatisfaction 
 
49.52 13 154.35 14 
 
0.001 
        Repurchase Intent 
       Recall Satisfaction 
 
20.02 13 46.70 14 
 
0.001 
         
3.5.1 Hypothesized Model Analysis 
The data was analyzed using a 23 between-subjects multivariate analysis of 
covariance (MANCOVA) to allow for relationships between the dependent variables 
(recall satisfaction, responsibility and repurchase intent) and to test for the effects of the 
three dimensions of attribution (locus, controllability and stability/corrective action) 
while controlling for the covariates.  Data screening was conducted by first examining the 
distribution of the dependent variables for deviations from normality.  Skew and kurtosis 
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were mild for all of the dependent variables (largest skew = -.620; largest kurtosis = 
1.272).  The assumption of linearity between the dependent variables was checked by 
creating scatterplots of each dependent variable combination and examining the plots for 
signs of non-linearity.  No obvious non-linearity was detected.  MANCOVA assumes 
independence of observations.  Based on the way the experiment was administered using 
a random assignment of scenarios, via an online survey, or individually, in a classroom 
setting or via an emailed link, we have no expectation that this assumption will be 
violated.  Multivariate normality was tested by examining outliers based on Mahalanobis’ 
distance within each treatment group.  One outlier was detected above the critical value 
(Critical value= 24.322 α=.001 for 7 variables).  This case (Χ2 =25.125) was located 
within Scenario 2 and was deleted, resulting in a final sample of 179 cases.  Equality of 
covariance was evaluated using the very conservative Box’s M test (F=1.81; d.f. 45, 
72,517; p<.001), which indicates a violation of this assumption. However, our results 
should be robust to this violation, because of the ratio of cases to the number of variables 
and the nearly equivalent number of subjects in each treatment group (Tabachnik & 
Fidell, 2007).   
Levene’s test was used to evaluate equality of error variance; results indicate a 
violation of this assumption for repurchase intent, recall satisfaction, supplier 
responsibility, and shared responsibility.  Manufacturing responsibility did not violate 
this assumption.  F statistics and Pillai-Bartlett Trace statistics are robust to this violation 
when treatment group sizes are nearly equal (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).   
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3.5.2.1  Multivariate Tests of Significance 
 
Multivariate tests indicate that locus, control, stability, age, education, recall 
awareness (having heard about a food recall within the past year), purchase 
dissatisfaction, and gender are significant predictors of at least one of the dependent 
variables.  Power to detect effects is greater than .8 for locus, stability, and purchase 
dissatisfaction, indicating adequate power.  Power is between .6 and .76 for control, 
education, recall awareness, perceived risk, and gender, indicating moderate power to 
detect effects.  Tests of between subject effects (corrected model) indicate the overall 
model is significant for each of the dependent variables (repurchase intent:  F=10.87; d.f. 
13,165; p<.0001; recall satisfaction:  F=3.45; d.f. 13,165; p<.0001; supplier 
responsibility:  F=3.11; d.f. 13,165; p<.0001; manufacturer responsibility:  F=5.38; d.f. 
13,165;  p<.0001; shared responsibility:  F=3.78; d.f. 13,165; p<.0001). 
3.5.2.2  Covariates 
Applying the adjusted α=.01 criterion for the univariate F tests, we find the following 
significant covariate effects:  1) recall awareness affects shared responsibility (F=9.10; 
d.f. 1, 178; p<.003) positively, 2) food manufacturing work experience has a nearly 
significant positive effect on repurchase intent (F=5.38; d.f. 1, 178; p<.022), and 3) 
purchase dissatisfaction negatively affects repurchase intent (F=77.61; d.f. 1, 178;  
p<.0001), supplier responsibility (F=10.03; d.f. 1, 178;  p<.002) and manufacturer 
responsibility (F=13.57; d.f. 1, 178;  p<.0001).  Note that repurchase intent and purchase 
dissatisfaction are negatively worded scales (i.e., “I would buy a different brand of pizza 
next time” and “I feel dissatisfied with my purchase of this product” are rated on a 7 
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point agreement scale where lower scores indicate higher repurchase intent/lower 
dissatisfaction and higher scores indicate lower repurchase intent/higher dissatisfaction).  
Perceived risk (pre-test level) is marginally significant in its negative effect on repurchase 
intent (F=5.93 p<.016). 
3.5.2.3  Hypothesis Tests 
Specific hypotheses were tested with planned contrasts, univariate F tests and Roy-
Bargmann step-down analysis.   Table 3.9 summarizes the results of the univariate F 
tests, and step-down analysis. Table 3.10 illustrates each set of hypotheses and 
summarizes the evidence associated with each hypotheses test result.   
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Table 3.9  MANCOVA Summary Results:  Univariate and Stepdown Tests of 












F d.f. α 
        
Locus 
Repurchase 
Intent 3.83 1, 175 0.052 4.17 1, 175 0.052 
 
Recall 
Satisfaction 7.86** 1, 175 0.006 5.12** 1, 174 0.022 
 
Manufacturer 
Responsibility 20.04** 1, 175 0.0001 12.14** 1, 173 0.0001 
 
Supplier 
Responsibility 10.87** 1, 175 0.001 20.4** 1, 172 0.001 
 
Shared 
Responsibility 29.92** 1, 175 0.0001 26.34** 1, 171 0.0001 
        Controllabili
ty 
Repurchase 
Intent 13.34** 1, 175 0.0001 14.56** 1, 175 0.0001 
 
Recall 
Satisfaction 6.70** 1, 175 0.01 2.33 1, 174 0.12 
 
Manufacturer 
Responsibility 8.10** 1, 175 0.005 2.31 1, 173 0.12 
 
Supplier 
Responsibility 1.60 1, 175 0.21 0.62 1, 172 0.55 
 
Shared 
Responsibility 0.95 1, 175 0.33 0.80 1, 171 0.48 
        Corrective 
Action 
Repurchase 
Intent 3.46 1, 175 0.06 3.78 1, 175 0.06 
 
Recall 
Satisfaction 6.18** 1, 175 0.0001 12.37** 1, 174 0.0001 
 
Manufacturer 
Responsibility 8.09** 1, 175 0.005 2.69 1, 173 0.091 
 
Supplier 
Responsibility 0.41 1, 175 0.525 1.04 1, 172 0.439 
  
Shared 
Responsibility 0.49 1, 175 0.487 0.002 1, 171 0.968 
       ** p<.05 
        
 
 
Table 3.10  Hypothesis Testing Results Summary 
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Hypothesis Hypothesis Statement Results 
H1a External locus has a direct negative effect 
on repurchase intent as compared with the   
internal locus (Lower values of repurchase 
intent scale correspond to higher levels of 
repurchase intent). 
H1a not supported. 
 
H1b External Locus has a direct positive effect 
recall satisfaction as compared with the   
internal locus. 
H1b supported (Contrast 
Difference = .367; p<.02). 
H2a Uncontrollable causes have a direct and 
negative effect on repurchase intent as 
compared with the   controllable causes 
(Lower values of repurchase intent scale 
correspond to higher levels of repurchase 
intent). 
H2a supported (Contrast 
Difference =-.294 p<.027).  
However,repurchase intent and 
recall satisfaction are correlated at -
.357, so the variance explained may 
not be unique. 
H2b Uncontrollable causes have a direct and 
positive effect on recall satisfaction as 
compared with the   controllable causes.   
H2b supported (Contrast 
Difference =.383 p<.016).  
However, repurchase intent and 
recall satisfaction are correlated at -
.357, so the variance explained may 
not be unique). 
H3a Corrective action has a direct negative 
effect on repurchase intent as compared 
with the   no corrective action (Lower 
values of repurchase intent scale correspond 
to higher levels of repurchase intent). 
H3a not supported. 
 
H3b Corrective action has a direct negative 
effect on recall satisfaction as compared 
with  no corrective action. 
H3b supported (Contrast 
Difference = -.570 p<.0001). 
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Hypothesis Hypothesis Statement Results 
H1c, H1d, 
H1e 
Locus has a direct effect on attribution of 
responsibility.   
More specifically, external locus will be 
associated with lower levels of 
manufacturer responsibility, higher levels 
of supplier responsibility and higher levels 
of shared responsibility, as compared with 
the   internal locus. 
H1c, d and e supported. 
Manufacturer responsibility contrast 
difference=.715 p<.001 and shared 
responsibility contrast difference=-
.608 p<.0001.  
However shared responsibility has a 
within cell pooled correlation with 
recall satisfaction of .166, so 
variance explained may not be 
unique.   
External locus of control is 
associated with lower levels of 
manufacturer responsibility 
(Contrast difference=1.043, 
p<.0001). However manufacturer 
responsibility has a within cell 
pooled correlation of -.246 with 
recall satisfaction, therefore variance 
explained may not be unique. 
H2c, H2d, 
H2e 
Controllability has a direct effect on 
attribution of responsibility.   
More specifically, controllable causes will 
be associated with higher levels of 
manufacturer responsibility, higher levels 
of supplier responsibility and higher levels 
of shared responsibility as compared with 
the   uncontrollable causes. 
H2c  supported (Contrast 
difference=-.326 p<.032; however 
pooled within cell correlation 
between recall satisfaction and 
manufacturer responsibility = -.246, 
consequently, variance explained 
may not be unique).  




3.5.2.4  Assessment of Dependent Variables 
For the univariate F results, the effective alpha is adjusted by the number of 
dependent variables (5) to indicate that p<.01 could be considered acceptable for an 
overall p<.05 for the group. Univariate F results are reported in Table 3.9. 
Roy-Bargmann step-down F tests were conducted to assess the impacts of correlated 
dependent variables where there is theoretical support for the importance ranking of the 
dependent variables.  For the purposes of our analysis, repurchase intent was considered 
to be the most theoretically important, based on its implications for sales and market 
share, followed by recall satisfaction, manufacturer responsibility, supplier responsibility, 
and shared responsibility.  Each step-down test includes dependent variables as 
covariates, so, for example, the step-down test for recall satisfaction includes repurchase 
intent as a covariate.  The step-down test for manufacturer responsibility includes both 
recall satisfaction and repurchase intent as covariates, and so on.  The step-down tests, in 
addition to the univariate F tests of effects and pooled within-cell correlations among the 
dependent variables, is used to assess the unique contribution of a predictor to a specific 
dependent variable.  The interpretation of stepdown F tests are subject to the 
homogeneity of regression slopes assumption (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).  This 
assumption tests for the presence of interactions between manipulated experimental 
factors and covariates.  Homogeneity of regression slopes was supported by F tests which 
indicated that interactions of the covariates with each of the manipulated factors were not 




3.6  DISCUSSION 
Demographic variables, such as age, gender and education, were not significant 
predictors of any dependent variable; however, this should be retested in a study with 
more power, in addition to examining the potential interactions of these variables with 
other predictors.  Illness experience was also not a significant predictor of any dependent 
variable. 
Recall awareness, as measured by whether the subject recalls hearing about a recall 
within the past year, was significant and positive in its effect on shared responsibility, 
indicating that the more aware our subjects were of prior recalls, the more likely they 
were to attribute responsibility to both the manufacturer and the supplier.  This result 
leads us to conclude that the full study should more thoroughly examine the dimensions 
of recall awareness by developing a multi-item scale. 
Purchase dissatisfaction explains a significant amount of variance in repurchase 
intent, consistent with the literature.  Perceived risk is marginally significant.  As 
expected, higher baseline levels of perceived risk are associated with lower levels of 
repurchase intent.  Food manufacturing work experience has a nearly significant positive 
effect on repurchase intent, indicating perhaps that those who are more knowledgeable 
about the inner workings and processes of food production are more tolerant of the recall 
with respect to repurchase intent. 
Locus affects recall satisfaction, indicating that when firms communicate that a 
supplier is responsible for a defect, consumers respond accordingly in the recall 
satisfaction dimension. However, there is no direct effect supported for the repurchase 
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intent. Similarly, locus affects the perceived responsibility dependent variables as 
expected, with the external locus associated with higher levels of supplier responsibility 
and shared responsibility and lower levels of manufacturer responsibility.  The 
implication of this finding is that the tendency we observed for firms to communicate the 
involvement of a supplier in a defect that results in a recall may have a positive effect on 
consumer perceptions of the firm’s handling of the recall and the attribution of 
responsibility for the recall.  This finding is an example of how recall announcements 
may be structured favorably for firms, although this is not necessarily aligned with the 
objective of protecting consumers from exposure to unnecessary risks.  We argue that 
policy-makers should consider this finding and, at a minimum, ensure that when recall 
announcements cite a supplier as a cause of a failure that the recalling firm provides 
additional supporting information to counterbalance what might be a spurious attribution 
on the part of the consumer.  In other words, policy change with respect to the content of 
recall announcements may be necessary  to ensure purchasing  firms are held 
accountable, not only by the regulatory agency, but also by consumers. 
Uncontrollable causes are tolerated better with respect to repurchase intent than 
controllable causes and associated with higher levels of manufacturer responsibility and 
recall satisfaction.  Taken together, these results suggest that, consistent with attribution 
theory, consumers may expect firms to do more to prevent failures perceived as more 
controllable than those failures perceived to be uncontrollable.  This finding also supports 
a potential source of leverage if policy-makers pursue regulations that require more 
specific information to be supplied in the recall announcement, since firms with 
144 
 
controllable causes will arguably be penalized more by consumer perceptions.  
Alternatively, this finding is a cue to firms of the importance of understanding consumer 
awareness for, and tolerance of, supply chain failures that may be perceived to be 
reasonably preventable. 
Stability, or the communication of a corrective action to minimize the change the 
defect could reoccur, was, as expected, associated with higher levels of recall satisfaction, 
but did not have a significant effect on repurchase intent.  No effects were hypothesized 
between this dimension and perceived responsibility constructs and no significant 
relationships were found.  These results are of interest, in part, because the provision of a 
corrective action in the recall announcement is extremely rare, occurring in less than 2% 
of food recalls examined in our Essay 1 study over a three year period.  Recalling firms 
are required to provide some information to the FDA regarding a final planned corrective 
action prior to the regulatory conclusion of the recall. Therefore, if the “fix” to the 
problem is simple and something the firm can commit to at the time of the recall 
announcement, it may be beneficial, in terms of consumer perception, to do so publically.  
This consideration may be counterbalanced by liability concerns if the public 
announcement of a corrective action is considered a basis for the admission of culpability 
(Packman,1998). 
The use of MANCOVA provides robust support for effects of attribution dimensions 
(main effects aliased with interactions) and overall model significance, but does not allow 
us to test for mediating relationships, which may be present.  The estimation of unique 
contributions to explaining variance in the dependent variables was done using step-down 
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tests; such results are heavily dependent on assumptions of the relative importance of the 
dependent variables.  Similar to a stepwise regression, these results should be treated with 
caution due to this underlying assumption which governs which variables become 
covariates at each level of the step-down test.  As noted in Table 3.11, the pooled within-
cell correlations of specific dependent variables (e.g., repurchase intent and recall 
satisfaction) indicates that we cannot claim unique effects. In other words, the significant 
effects of each factor on each dependent variable (supported by univariate F tests and 
step-down tests) cannot be considered unique based on this analysis.  Nevertheless, 
contrast results and the pattern of significance in univariate F tests and step-down tests 
support a cautious interpretation of main effects, as represented in Table 3.10, with the 
understanding that interactions are aliased with the main effects.  The issue of mediating 
relationships and parceling out unique variance in dependent variables will be resolved in 
the final study by using structural equation modeling methods. 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Essay 2 evaluates the effect of manipulating three dimensions of causal attribution 
(i.e., locus, controllability and corrective action) on consumer perceptions including 
repurchase intent, recall satisfaction, and perceived recall responsibility while controlling 
for perceived risk, purchase dissatisfaction and other relevant individual characteristics.  
We believe the contribution of this study is relevant, particularly since, with increasingly 
extended supply chains and high proportions of outsourcing, externally-driven product 
failures are becoming more likely, because the majority of product value-add occurs 
outside the focal firm. 
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3.7.1 Contributions  
The marketing and crisis communications literature has contributed to our 
understanding of consumer reactions to product harm and other negative and disruptive 
events.  At the same time, the operations and supply chain management literature has not 
specifically addressed consumer perceptions of operational failures in the product recall 
context.  It is common for firms, when making product recall announcements, to identify 
the source of the effects of the recalling firm attributing product failure to a supplier 
(external locus).  This study provides the first evidence that locus operates not only in the 
“individual-other” context of traditional attribution studies, but also applies when the 
attribution choice is “other-other”.  In other words, consumers, on some level, distinguish 
between supply chain entities and assign responsibility based on the information provided 
to them. 
This study provides preliminary evidence of primary effects of attributional 
dimensions on important consumer perceptions of product recalls which, based on the 
literature, will lead to behavior.  Consequently, we begin with this work to establish: 1) 
what firms may be able to do  to effectively manage consumer impressions via a recall 
announcement; and 2) what policy-makers may need to consider when developing 
regulations regarding announcement content  to ensure that firms do not receive undue 
benefit from impression management and are incentivized to prevent product recalls (i.e., 
by ensuring that recall announcement information appropriately triggers consumer 
perceptions that impose consequences on the recalling firm).  
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Based on food industry trends with respect to the importation of inputs and products 
and the increased levels of outsourcing to low cost developing countries, we expect firms 
in this sector will continue to deal with failures that originate outside their internal 
operations.  As a result, when making a product recall, these firms have important 
choices to make regarding how to communicate the nature of the product quality issues 
that underlie the recall, including how they convey the source of the product failure and 
any potential corrective action which will reduce the chance of recurrence.   
Based on prior work, we content that these implications are relevant, in part, because 
indirect costs of product recalls related to consumer behavior are likely to be greater than 
more tangible, easily measured direct costs, such as repairs, replacements, refunds, 
reverse logistics and product liability (Jarrell & Pelzman, 1985; Rupp, 2003).  
Furthermore,  for firms to have the option to communicate discretionary information, 
such as how and why a defect occurred (controllability), and efforts to remedy the 
problem (corrective action), the recalling firm must have the communication and 
problem-solving capabilities that enable such information to be reliably available at the 
time of a product recall.  This issue is further complicated by the relatively short amount 
of time between detecting a failure and making the recall announcement, which limits the 
recalling firm’s opportunity to investigate and verify sources of quality issues.   
3.7.2 Limitations and Future Research 
The limitations of this study primarily stem from the sample’s limited demographic 
breadth and the use of a fractionated factorial design, which does not allow for separate 
testing of main and interaction effects of our experimental factors.  The full study will 
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address both of these issues by using a more heterogeneous sample, which will improve 
the study’s power to detect certain relationships (e.g., demographic variables such as age, 
education and gender) and by using an expanded design to test for interactions between 
the manipulated factors.  While this study was confined to a single product type and 
failure level, additional levels of failure (severity), product type (pharmaceuticals, and 
consumer goods.) are of interest.  In addition, we would like to improve performance on 
the manipulation checks, in part by more thoroughly investigating potential combinations 
of treatment scenarios, in addition to more thoroughly pre-testing manipulation check 
measurement items.  Measurement item performance in pre-testing was marginal to 
acceptable (See Appendix 3B). Not all measurement items were rigorously pre-tested. 
Therefore, this step of scale development will be addressed in the final study. 
We examine the interface between supply chain management and marketing by 
making the first direct test of consumer perceptions of supply chain characteristics.  This 
exploratory work takes some initial steps towards explaining how short-term demand 
may be impacted as a result of a product recall, while previous studies have only 
documented the existence of this effect using event history methodologies (Chu et al., 
2005; Crafton et al., 1981; Marsh et al., 2004; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983; Thomsen, 
Shiptsova, and Hamm, 2006).  While firms may attempt to manage consumer attributions 
by disclosing supplier failures, this is the first study, to our knowledge, to empirically test 
how consumers interpret this information.  Firms increasingly manage complex, lengthy 
and global supply chains, making the prospect of failures originating outside the firm 
increasingly likely (Bozarth et al., 2009).  Consequently, knowing how informational 
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content regarding product failure in recall announcements affects how consumers react to 














4.1  STUDY IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation contributes to a growing body of literature addressing product 
recalls, doing so in a relatively unique context (FDA-regulated food products), in addition 
to using two different perspectives:  time to recall and consumer behavior.  Although 
product recalls have received significant attention from the popular press in addition to 
consumers, policy-makers and researchers, empirical research that characterizes the 
strategic and operational nature of these failures and factors which influence the relative 
speed of current industry and regulatory systems to handle the recalls is still extremely 
limited (Hora et al., 2011; Roth et al., 2008ab).  
We address the following two research questions through our theoretically-driven 
empirical essays:  1) How do supply chain recall detection competency, in addition to 
supply chain complexity factors related to time to recall? 2) How does information 
provided regarding operational and supply chain management aspects of product failure 
affect consumer perceptions and repurchase intent when a product is recalled? 
Essay 1 examines the factors that influence recall timing in a context which has not 
been studied previously, the FDA-regulated food sector.  Time to recall is an important 
dimension of recall effectiveness, because more timely recalls reduce consumer risks and 
lessen firm costs, including liability costs and other costs to society.  We provide 
evidence that SCRDC, as measured by the proxy detection entity, is a significant 
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predictor of time to recall, a finding that can provide implications to practice (e.g., in 
terms of concentrating efforts and resources on moving detections upstream) and policy 
(e.g., in terms of motivating regulations and guidance that will improve firm incentives to 
move detection entity upstream).   
This work extends quality management theory by conceptualizing differences in the 
nature of external failures based on how they are detected (Crosby, 1979; Roth et al., 
1992; Juran, 1992).  While much of the quality systems improvement work has justifiably 
focused on reducing the number of external defects by improving internal systems, the 
increasing length and complexity of supply chains across all product types has led to 
serious deficiencies in governance and control.  As a result, global firms and supply 
chains have been, and will continue to be, forced to handle product recalls; to the extent 
that existing quality systems can be extended to encompass the issues that product recalls 
raise, firms and supply chains may reduce the need for future recalls and, in effect, learn 
from these disruptions (Haunschild & Rhee, 2006; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011). 
Essay 2 provides insights into whether or not consumers make attributive distinctions 
between recalling firms and their suppliers when products fail.  These insights have 
implications for both the industry and the regulators.  First, when products are recalled, 
firms face complex choices regarding the communication of the details of the product 
failure. The literature currently offers mixed messages regarding the importance of early 
and extensive communication during product harm events.  We believe this study offers 
evidence of how firms should frame communications regarding the product failure and 
the involvement of the larger supply chain.  While the product harm and crisis 
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communications literature has made substantial contributions in this area (Dawar & 
Pillutla, 2000; Laufer & Coombs, 2006; Klein & Dawar, 2000; Laufer et al., 2005; 
Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994), this is the first study to link the operational and supply 
chain dimensions of a failure to consumer behavior.  
Consequently, this  investigation offers tangible evidence of the value of operations 
and supply chain management capabilities that make information regarding the source, 
cause and remedy for a failure available quickly enough to communicate it in a recall 
announcement.  Such capabilities require participation and coordination within a firm 
conducting the recall and also across supply chain partners.   
Regulatory agencies (i.e. FDA, USDA) are necessarily concerned with developing 
regulations and policies that encourage industry to comply and which reduce risk.  Essay 
2 can guide future policy decisions by offering insights into how consumers respond 
behaviorally to various stimuli in product recall announcements.  To the extent that 
policy dictates what firms communicate about these important failures, regulators may be 
able to provide incentives for firms to minimize the risk of product recalls by requiring 
recall announcement information that materially affects consumer behavior.   
Given the limitations of regulatory systems to enforce requirements (e.g., inspections 
and fines), our findings suggest that the product recall announcement content could be 
designed in such a way that it: 1) encourages firms to develop the capabilities necessary 
to provide more complete information at the time of a recall announcement and 2) 




4.2  FUTURE RESEARCH 
The two essays in this investigation develop a foundation for a larger program of 
research which we expect to expand to include additional relevant variables in terms of 
time to recall and recall strategy, and different product type and failure contexts with 
respect to examining consumer behavior.  We plan to extend the use of the database 
constructed for Essay 1, for example, to examine proxies for SCRDC, and, using an 
econometric model which adjusts for selection bias, develop a model which predicts the 
accuracy of recall announcements as another proxy for recall effectiveness.   
Furthermore, our research can be the basis for examining underlying issues of 
incentive misalignment and agency issues between buyers and suppliers managing 
product quality and product recalls.  While Essay 1 is currently limited to examining 
recall timing in terms of suppliers and the recalling firms as one internal detection entity, 
we suggest that incentives and governance structures between purchasing organizations 
and suppliers in the context of quality failures is an area that deserves research attention.  
Due to the sensitive nature of the issues addressed by this work, we expect that 
collecting primary data from firms regarding recall policies and performance may be 
challenging and could suffer from bias due to social desirability.  Furthermore, the use of 
secondary data, while useful in this context, has limitations (Roth et al., 2009).  
Therefore, we suggest that there may be avenues of research suggested by this work that 
will require a more analytical approach to overcome some of the issues with collecting 
valid empirical data.  Information sharing, for example, and incentives between buyers 
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and suppliers to share unfavorable information regarding defects and quality issues, may 
be a potential area to explore using analytical models. 
In Essay 1, we develop a framework of differences between the nature of failures in 
perishable and durable products and subsequent differences in recall strategy and 
management.  While Essay 1 only included FDA-regulated food products, a similar 
strategy for collecting pharmaceutical recall data could be used to compare these two 
different product categories, and that of medical devices, as a point of comparison for 
durable products.  Similarly, this methodology could be used to compare durable 
products in other categories (e.g., consumer products, automobiles) to perishable products 
to begin to more thoroughly assess the differences in product recall strategy and 
effectiveness in different product categories.  Very few studies (see Chu et al., 2005 for 
an exception) in the product recall literature address more than one product type. This 
limits the scope and generalizability of the findings and our ability to develop more 
mature theories of recall strategy.  While such work is extremely challenging, due to the 
need to work across multiple data sources, we contend that it would make a valuable 
contribution to theory and practice. 
The findings from Essay 2 will be used to inform the design and implementation of a 
full factorial experiment examining food product recalls and consumer attributions.  We 
expect that additional measurements and vignette development will be necessary to 
ensure robust results. In addition, we plan to access a more demographically broad 
sample.  Beyond the implications of this experiment to the context of product recalls, 
Essay 2 offers a basis for other future work at the interface between operations and 
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supply chain management and marketing.  Our development of attribution theory’s 
dimension of locus as a construct that applies to different partners in a supply chain opens 
up additional possibilities for investigating the nature of the consumer perceptions of firm 
operations and supply chain management practices, including health and safety standards, 
environmental performance, worker standards, and other corporate social responsibility 
issues.  As lengthy supply chains are opened up to more scrutiny by non-governmental 
organizations in addition to consumer activists, we anticipate that consumer perceptions 
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Time to Recall –  
timetorecall 
 
Time to Recall is the duration 
between T=0 (beginning of shelf life) 
and Ti*, the date of the recall 












Number of products listed 











Downstream Distribution is a 
proxy for the complexity of 
determining the scope of the recall, 
the number of states where recalled 
product was distributed.  
Downstream Distribution has been 
recorded as the number of stages and 
condensed into 3 categories (0=1-3; 








Proactive recalls occur before any 
illness or injury is attributed at the 
agency level to a specific product. 
Reactive recalls occur after an 
illness or injury is attributed at the 











Detection Entity – the entity which 
detected the defect which is the basis 
for the recall as indicated by the 
enforcement report or press release.  
Detection Entity is coded as a binary 
variable, External 


















Supply Chain Entity – a 
categorization of the recalling entity 
– the firm making the recall (e.g. 
agency, manufacturer, distributor, 
retailer).  In practice since all recalls 
in our database were voluntary, this 
did not include the agency category.  
In the final analysis, the 
categorization was collapsed to 











Four defect types were coded: 
labeling/allergens (0), pathogen (1), 
packaging (2), and contaminant or 
stability issue (3).  In the final 
analysis, the categorization was 
collapsed to pathogen (1) and all 









Affected production period 
represents the number of days 
between the production or expiration 
of first affected product and last 
affected product listed in the recall 
announcement, indicating the 
duration of the defect causing the 
recall.  Minimum of 1 day where no 
















Recall breadth indicates (Major=1; 
Other, Not major =0) FDA-
designated “major” recalls – recalls 
which due to the number of products 
or other agency-determined 
characteristics require special 
communication efforts.  Since 2008, 
five major recalls have been 
designated:  Plainview Milk 
Cooperative (powdered milk), Basic 
Food Flavors (hydrolyzed vegetable 
protein), Peanut Corporation of 
America (peanuts/peanut products), 
Setton Pistachios (whole & shelled 
pistachios), and Galt, Wright County, 




















Product categories are based on 
processing & storage attributes.   
 










Private or Public 
public 
The firm’s status as a private or 
publicly traded company at the time 


















Firm size as measured by annual 








annual reports  
Firm Cluster 
firmcluster 
Firm Cluster is a unique dummy 
variable assigned to each firm within 
the sample to enable the use of 
Stata’s clustering option which 









Data were collected by accessing the FDA’s online archives of weekly enforcement 
reports and press releases for food products for the years of 2008-2010.  Enforcement 
report information was matched to press releases to develop an initial set of 1,602 press 
releases for consideration.  Because the dependent variable is a measure of recall timing, 
we exclude any press releases which do not contain enough information about 
production, distribution or expiration dates which are necessary to calculate the 
dependent variable.  This reduces our sample to a total of 846 press releases. 
The remaining press releases and enforcement reports were coded by three different 
persons using a set of scales which were developed during a pilot analysis of 100 press 
releases and refined over time to ensure internal consistency and external validity.  
Approximately 20% of the total sample was coded by more than one person.  Inter-rater 
reliability was high (>97%) and all cases where disagreement occurred were readily 
resolved through discussion among the raters.   
Sample Press Releases 
The following press releases correspond to the examples used in the text.  Each case 















Example 2 Fresh Cut Packaged Produce 
 
 
Time to Recall 
A further complication is introduced in determining our dependent variable because 
of the lack of standardization of the use of dates within the recall press releases.  Because 
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the purpose of including dates and other identifying features specific to the recalled 
products is to assist consumers in recognizing affected items and because product dating 
is not standardized, press releases contain different types of date-related information.  In 
our sample we have used a combination of expiration, production and distribution dates 
and product shelf life sources to calculate the dependent variable.  While product shelf 
lives are determined by the producer, category-specific shelf life information is available 
through agricultural extension offices, academic papers which study different 
preservation and product types, and consumer guidance.   
Table 2A provides summary statistics for the time to recall variable.  Figure 1A 
illustrates the distribution of time to recall which displays the strong skew which is often 
found in duration data. 
Table 2A.2  Summary Statistics for timetorecall (Ti*) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Minimum Maximum 































Detection Entity & Supply Chain Recall Detection Competence 
Detection entity, a proxy for supply chain recall detection competence (SCRDC) is 
operationalized as the entity that detects the defect which results in a product recall.  We 
use a binary characterization of detection entity with the following operationalization: 
1. Internal detection entity – defects detected by the recalling firm (manufacturer, 
distributor or retailer) or their supplier; and 
2. External detection entity – defects detected by a consumer or a regulatory 
agency. 
This operationalization is the most parsimonious and theoretically consistent 
conceptualization of the construct, however we examined the data in more detail in order 
to understand the nature of detection entity. 
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Detection entity was coded directly from the recall press releases.  Based on 
information provided in the press release we could distinguish between the following 
mutually exclusive detection entities: 
1. Agency detections –characterized by statements regarding agency inspections 
and/or testing that resulted in a recall. 
2. Consumer detections –characterized by a defect being discovered through 
customer complaint. 
3. Recalling firm (Manufacturer/Distributor/Retailer) – characterized by the firm 
making the recall announcement indicating that their organization or internal 
processes detected the defect. 
4. Supplier to recalling firm – characterized by a statement by the recalling firm 
that they were notified of a defect by a supplier. 
These categories represent a comprehensive and mutually exclusive categorization of 
how a defect that results in a recall may be discovered.  To further parse out detection 
entity among manufacturers, distributors and retailers, we coded the supply chain entity 
(SCEntity) conducting the recall by searching public and private firm databases to 
determine the primary NAICS code for the firm conducting the recall (Hora et al., 2011).  
Due to the relatively small number of distributors conducting recall announcements, we 
collapsed this variable to a binary categorization (0=producer/manufacturer; 
1=distributor/retailer).  We then matched the SCEntity and Detection Entity 
classifications in an attempt to create a five category Detection Entity variable.  Table 2B 





Table 2A.3  Full Sample (N=434) SCEntity by Detection Entity (4 category) 
 Detection Entity (Four Category Operationalization)  













23 7 2 166 198 
Total 34 22 16 362 434 
 
While we would ideally like to split our categorization of Recalling Firm as a Detection 
Entity into Producer (SCEntity=0) and Distributor/Retailer (SCEntity=1), we cannot do 
so in this sample because only 2 cases correspond to a Distributor/Retailer detecting the 
defect.    
Downstream Distribution 
We first look at the distribution of the variable labeled states, which is an indicator of 
the number of states in which the recalled products were distributed, with a range of 1 to 
50, noting that the distribution appears bimodal (Figure 2A).  We therefore examine a 
number of possible scale adjustments, including a 5-category (Figure 3A), 3-category 
(Figure 4A), and a binary (Figure 5A) operationalization of this construct.  Based on our 
examination of the distribution of each operationalization, we have chosen to use a 3-
category scale where the number of states in which the recalled product was distributed is 
categorized as Local (1-3 states), Regional (4-20 states) or National (>20 states).  Note 
that while the National category contains a total of 4 cases which are distributed in fewer 
than 50 states, however, we argue that these cases correspond to a natural separation in 
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the data between 19 states, which falls into the category of Regional, and the next value 
of 28 states which falls into the category of National. 
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Original Code Book 
Data was recorded in a spreadsheet formatted for the task with one worksheet per 
press release to minimize opportunities for transcription error between cases.   The 
following table is the code book which was used to define how the original data was 
coded from the press releases and enforcement reports.  Not all of the data listed in this 




1 Voluntary or Agency-Led (1 =  Agency-led) 
2 Extension of Prior Recall?  (1 = Extension of Prior) 
3 If extension, extension of what (date/firm)? 
4 Enforcement Report (confirm date this recall is listed in Enforcement 
Report) 
5 Recall Class (1, 2 or 3) Confirm with Enforcement Report 
6 Agency indicates “major” recall (1 = major) 
This is indicated by special FAQ/reports provided by agency on the recall 
– see compiled list of major recalls 
7 Recalling Firm Name    
8 Location of Recalling Firm 
9 Product Name 
If > 1, indicate “multiple” 
10 Recall Announcement Date 
11 Food or Drug (1= Drug; 0=Food) 
Animal feeds = food 






12 Product Category (1-18)  
1 – Fresh produce         
2 – Refrigerated, other 
3 – Dairy                 
4 – Seafood, fresh 
5 – Eggs (in shell)  
6 – Baked goods 
7 – Frozen mixtures 
8 – Frozen seafood 
9 – Other, shelf stable 
10 – Nuts, dried fruits, dried vegetables 
11 - Pet/Animal food 
12 - Canned goods 
13 – Injectable drug (human and vet) 
14 – OTC drug 
15 - OTC vet 
16 – Prescription drug, non-injectable (human) 
17- Vet drug, prescription 
18  - Supplements 
13 Number of Products in Recall Notice 
(Continuous – count them as listed in the notice.  If listed separately, same 
product in different size container is counted as an additional product) 
14 Proactive/Reactive (0,1)            REACTIVE  - 1 
15 # of Injury/Illness/Fatality (typically “no injury” indicated in press 
release; otherwise, check Enforcement Report; CDC investigation, if 
necessary) 
16 Locus of Control (0,1, 2)   EXTERNAL -  1;  Not given = 2 
Internal locus of control = 0  failure is within recalling firm 
External locus of control = 1 failure is outside recalling firm 
Not given = 2 
17 Stability (0,1) 
0 = no corrective action indicated 
1 = corrective action indicated including preventative future measures, 
ongoing investigation 
Does not include shutting down production 
18 Detection Method (1-5; NA)   
CHECK ALL THAT APPLY 
1 – Consumer Complaint 
2 - Agency inspection or agency testing (including CDC investigation of illnesses) 
3 – Supplier testing/recall/investigation 
4 – Internal (firm) testing/investigation 
5 – Other (specify) 
NA – Cannot judge based on the information provided in the announcement. 
19 Import (is the product, not the ingredients, an import?) (0,1).  Import = 1 








21 Brand Attribution (0,1)    Brand Attribution  = 1 
If the recalling firm’s name (or part of name) or a trademarked brand name is 
included in the product name and/or product packaging = 1  
Brand attribution may be confirmed using photos of product provided as part 
of recall information. 
 
22 Defect Type (record all that apply) 
1. Pathogen  
2. Labeling error (including undeclared ingredients, allergens) 
3. Packaging 
4. Sterility 
5. Contaminant, other (includes extraneous matter &  ingredient substitution) 
6. Other, specify 
23 Downstream Distribution (# states product distributed in - count) 
 
24 Manufacturer (as listed in Enforcement Report) 
25 Location of manufacturer (record if available – typically manufacturing 
firm is listed in Enforcement Report) 
26 Volume (Enforcement Report) 
27 Volume Units (as given in Enforcement Report) 
28 Public or Private (0,1) 1 = Private 
29-30 Earliest production date  
Latest production date 
31-32 Earliest expiration date  





















Figure 2B.1  Output, Model 1a Estimates 
 
                                                                              
       sigma     1.545881    .122412                      1.323649    1.805425
                                                                              
     /ln_sig     .4355942   .0791859     5.50   0.000     .2803927    .5907958
                                                                              
       _cons     1.838316   .6199425     2.97   0.003     .6232514    3.053381
detectXbre~h     .0842019    .414835     0.20   0.839    -.7288598    .8972637
detectionX~d     .0025591   .0201312     0.13   0.899    -.0368973    .0420155
breadthXpr~d     -.002004   .0010313    -1.94   0.052    -.0040253    .0000173
 DetectXNatl    -.0459929   .6874248    -0.07   0.947    -1.393321    1.301335
  DetectXReg    -.6495828   .6573978    -0.99   0.323    -1.938059    .6388932
Natlbynoprod     .1261915   .1739725     0.73   0.468    -.2147883    .4671713
 regbynoprod     -.429635   .2337168    -1.84   0.066    -.8877116    .0284415
noprodXpro~d    -.0000213   .0000308    -0.69   0.490    -.0000817    .0000391
     yr_2010     .0971073   .4728534     0.21   0.837    -.8296683    1.023883
     yr_2009    -.0719821   .4609888    -0.16   0.876    -.9755035    .8315393
    National    -.1888054   .4209648    -0.45   0.654    -1.013881    .6362705
    Regional     .6533058   .3372491     1.94   0.053    -.0076903    1.314302
    Pathogen     .1843157   .5134555     0.36   0.720    -.8220386     1.19067
cat2_shelf~e     2.199458   .3897376     5.64   0.000     1.435587     2.96333
 cat1_frozen     1.657273   .6231316     2.66   0.008     .4359578    2.878589
  noproducts     .0174613   .0166233     1.05   0.294    -.0151198    .0500424
  prodperiod     .0022877   .0009465     2.42   0.016     .0004327    .0041428
detentbinary     .9817505   .6016975     1.63   0.103     -.197555    2.161056
    reactive      .099646   .2599794     0.38   0.702    -.4099044    .6091963
recallbrea~h     1.194376   .3456558     3.46   0.001     .5169032    1.871849
    firmempl    -2.28e-07   2.50e-06    -0.09   0.928    -5.13e-06    4.68e-06
     firmrev     6.66e-06   8.84e-06     0.75   0.451    -.0000107     .000024
      public      -.91826   .4987438    -1.84   0.066     -1.89578    .0592599
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 201 clusters in firmcluster)
Log pseudolikelihood =   -478.46945                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   Wald chi2(23)   =    229.94
Time at risk         =        90494
No. of failures      =          258
No. of subjects      =          258                Number of obs   =       258
Lognormal regression -- accelerated failure-time form 
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -478.46945  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -478.46945  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -478.47125  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -480.63588  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -512.57796  
Fitting full model:
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -512.57796  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -512.57796  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -512.57961  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood =  -515.3193  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -779.78271  
Fitting constant-only model:
   analysis time _t:  timetorecall
         failure _d:  1 (meaning all fail)
> rodperiod  detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, dist(lnormal) vce(cluster firmcluster)
> athogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010  noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod  DetectXReg DetectXNatl breadthXp








Hypothesized interactions:  H2a:  Detection X Number of Products; H2b: Detection X 
Regional  Detection X National. 
 
Higher order terms included as mis-specification check:  Number of Products X 
Affected Production Period; Detection X Recall Breadth; Regional X Number of 
Products, National X Number of Products; Recall Breadth X Affected Period. 
 
Results:  See Figure 2B.1.  Hypothesized interaction terms are not significant (retain in 
model).  Additional interactions are not significant except for Recall Breadth X Affected 



























Figure 2B.2  Output, Model 1b Estimates 
 
. 
                                                                              
       gamma     .7569974    .075322                      .6228722    .9200042
                                                                              
     /ln_gam    -.2783955    .099501    -2.80   0.005    -.4734139   -.0833771
                                                                              
       _cons     1.753374   .7169508     2.45   0.014     .3481758    3.158571
detectXbre~h    -.1150818   .4268033    -0.27   0.787    -.9516008    .7214372
detectionX~d     .0023807   .0145847     0.16   0.870    -.0262047    .0309661
breadthXpr~d     -.002311    .000955    -2.42   0.016    -.0041828   -.0004392
 DetectXNatl    -.4719546   .5944863    -0.79   0.427    -1.637126    .6932171
  DetectXReg     -.829853   .5542304    -1.50   0.134    -1.916125    .2564186
Natlbynoprod     .0081877   .1223336     0.07   0.947    -.2315818    .2479572
 regbynoprod    -.1983122   .1866565    -1.06   0.288    -.5641521    .1675278
noprodXpro~d    -4.38e-06    .000022    -0.20   0.842    -.0000475    .0000387
     yr_2010     .0242285   .4514663     0.05   0.957    -.8606292    .9090861
     yr_2009     .1612472   .4575759     0.35   0.725     -.735585    1.058079
    National     .0057826   .3294235     0.02   0.986    -.6398757    .6514409
    Regional     .4100843   .3251966     1.26   0.207    -.2272895    1.047458
    Pathogen     .0229607    .469137     0.05   0.961     -.896531    .9424524
cat2_shelf~e     2.080562   .4271405     4.87   0.000     1.243382    2.917742
 cat1_frozen     1.779548   .5853845     3.04   0.002     .6322153     2.92688
  noproducts     .0127068   .0109912     1.16   0.248    -.0088356    .0342492
  prodperiod     .0024306   .0008935     2.72   0.007     .0006794    .0041817
detentbinary     1.322987   .5769314     2.29   0.022     .1922218    2.453751
    reactive     .0474953    .219995     0.22   0.829     -.383687    .4786776
recallbrea~h     1.564041    .314508     4.97   0.000     .9476172    2.180466
    firmempl    -9.79e-07   1.87e-06    -0.52   0.601    -4.65e-06    2.69e-06
     firmrev     2.70e-06   6.38e-06     0.42   0.672    -9.80e-06    .0000152
      public    -.4184976   .3315999    -1.26   0.207    -1.068421    .2314262
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 201 clusters in firmcluster)
Log pseudolikelihood =   -457.16341                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   Wald chi2(23)   =    215.37
Time at risk         =        90494
No. of failures      =          258
No. of subjects      =          258                Number of obs   =       258
Loglogistic regression -- accelerated failure-time form 
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -457.16341  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -457.16341  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -457.16457  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -457.69648  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -470.86866  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -501.84946  
Fitting full model:
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -501.84946  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -501.84949  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -501.93514  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -516.16367  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -573.88058  
Fitting constant-only model:
   analysis time _t:  timetorecall
         failure _d:  1 (meaning all fail)
> rodperiod  detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, dist(loglogistic) vce(cluster firmcluster)
> athogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010  noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod  DetectXReg DetectXNatl breadthXp









Hypothesized interactions:  H2a:  Detection X Number of Products; H2b: Detection X 
Regional  Detection X National. 
 
Higher order terms included as misspecification check:  Number of Products X 
Affected Production Period; Detection X Recall Breadth; Regional X Number of 
Products, National X Number of Products; Recall Breadth X Affected Period. 
 
Results:  See Figure 2B.2.  Hypothesized interaction terms are not significant (Detection 
X Regional is significant at p<.07).  Retain in model.  Additional interactions are not 
significant except for Recall Breadth X Affected Period.  Retain Recall Breadth X 
























Figure 2B.3  Output, Model 1c Estimates 
 
. 
                                                                              
         1/p     .9724124   .0781853                      .8306363    1.138387
           p      1.02837   .0826845                      .8784357    1.203896
                                                                              
       /ln_p     .0279753   .0804035     0.35   0.728    -.1296126    .1855632
                                                                              
       _cons     2.597077   .4593267     5.65   0.000     1.696814    3.497341
detectXbre~h    -.7183836   .4821068    -1.49   0.136    -1.663296    .2265284
detectionX~d     .0010179   .0125169     0.08   0.935    -.0235147    .0255506
breadthXpr~d    -.0022155    .000915    -2.42   0.015    -.0040089   -.0004221
 DetectXNatl    -.0715644   .6143739    -0.12   0.907    -1.275715    1.132586
  DetectXReg    -.7991718   .5474021    -1.46   0.144     -1.87206    .2737166
Natlbynoprod     .0150573   .0806428     0.19   0.852    -.1429996    .1731142
 regbynoprod    -.1080529   .1348423    -0.80   0.423     -.372339    .1562331
noprodXpro~d    -4.06e-06   .0000111    -0.37   0.714    -.0000258    .0000177
     yr_2010     .1281624    .384042     0.33   0.739    -.6245461    .8808709
     yr_2009     .0356033   .3583767     0.10   0.921    -.6668022    .7380088
    National    -.0625903   .1952739    -0.32   0.749      -.44532    .3201395
    Regional     .2510722   .2355685     1.07   0.287    -.2106336    .7127779
    Pathogen    -.1327504   .4516687    -0.29   0.769    -1.018005    .7525039
cat2_shelf~e     1.716419   .4213375     4.07   0.000     .8906128    2.542226
 cat1_frozen      1.61618   .4429538     3.65   0.000     .7480069    2.484354
  noproducts     .0077731   .0074582     1.04   0.297    -.0068447     .022391
  prodperiod      .002442   .0008878     2.75   0.006      .000702     .004182
detentbinary     1.127145   .5740853     1.96   0.050     .0019586    2.252332
    reactive     .0291969   .1595423     0.18   0.855    -.2835002    .3418941
recallbrea~h     1.747586   .3994999     4.37   0.000     .9645801    2.530591
    firmempl    -2.65e-07   1.20e-06    -0.22   0.825    -2.61e-06    2.08e-06
     firmrev    -7.10e-07   3.12e-06    -0.23   0.820    -6.83e-06    5.41e-06
      public    -.2704438   .2053503    -1.32   0.188    -.6729231    .1320354
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 201 clusters in firmcluster)
Log pseudolikelihood =   -418.87649                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   Wald chi2(23)   =    260.57
Time at risk         =        90494
No. of failures      =          258
No. of subjects      =          258                Number of obs   =       258
Weibull regression -- accelerated failure-time form 
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -418.87649  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -418.87649  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -418.87816  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood =  -419.2948  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -428.43957  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -463.38671  
Fitting full model:
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -463.38671
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -463.38672
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -463.40104
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -468.05622
Fitting constant-only model:
   analysis time _t:  timetorecall
         failure _d:  1 (meaning all fail)
> rodperiod  detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, dist(weibull) vce(cluster firmcluster) time
> athogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010  noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod  DetectXReg DetectXNatl breadthXp









Hypothesized interactions:  H2a:  Detection X Number of Products; H2b: Detection X 
Regional,  Detection X National 
 
Higher order terms included as misspecification check:  Number of Products X 
Affected Production Period; Detection X Recall Breadth; Regional X Number of 
Products, National X Number of Products; Recall Breadth X Affected Period. 
 
Results:  See Figure 2B.3.  Hypothesized interaction terms are not significant (Detection 
X Regional is significant at p<.08).  Retain in model.  Additional interactions are not 
significant except for Recall Breadth X Affected Period.  Retain Recall Breadth X 
Affected Period in model.  Detection X Recall Breadth is significant at p<.07. 
194 
 
Table 2B.1  Comparison of Models 1a, 1b and 1c for Consistency 
Predictor Model 1a  Model 1b Model 1c Conclusion 
 Sign Significance Sign Significance Sign Significance  

































SCRDC + Significant + Significant + Significant Consistent 
QPM + Significant + Significant  + Significant Consistent 









+ Significant + Significant + Significant Consistent 
Cat2_Shelf
Stable 
+ Significant + Significant + Significant Consistent 



















Yr_2009 - Significant - Not 
Significant 
+ Significant Consistent 
Yr_2010 + Significant + Not 
Significant 


































































- Significant + Significant - Significant Consistent 




Figure 2B.4  Output, Model 1b  Estimates with Hypothesized  
& Significant Interactions  
. 
                                                                              
       gamma     .7572869   .0751427                      .6234461    .9198606
                                                                              
     /ln_gam     -.278013   .0992262    -2.80   0.005    -.4724929   -.0835332
                                                                              
       _cons     1.796384   .6549458     2.74   0.006     .5127143    3.080055
breadthXpr~d    -.0024157    .000954    -2.53   0.011    -.0042855    -.000546
detectionX~d    -.0019975   .0141078    -0.14   0.887    -.0296482    .0256532
 DetectXNatl    -.5296953   .5743315    -0.92   0.356    -1.655364    .5959737
  DetectXReg    -.8076223   .5445903    -1.48   0.138       -1.875     .259755
     yr_2010     .0227185   .4429141     0.05   0.959    -.8453772    .8908143
     yr_2009      .187749    .422354     0.44   0.657    -.6400496    1.015548
    National     .0344735   .2672391     0.13   0.897    -.4893056    .5582525
    Regional     .1868613   .3007566     0.62   0.534    -.4026107    .7763333
    Pathogen    -.0016344   .4435496    -0.00   0.997    -.8709756    .8677069
cat2_shelf~e      2.07935   .4206505     4.94   0.000      1.25489    2.903809
 cat1_frozen      1.80218   .5540464     3.25   0.001     .7162696    2.888091
  noproducts     .0057991   .0055747     1.04   0.298    -.0051271    .0167254
  prodperiod     .0025367   .0008902     2.85   0.004      .000792    .0042815
detentbinary     1.304055   .5287892     2.47   0.014     .2676474    2.340463
    reactive     .0778895   .2068846     0.38   0.707     -.327597    .4833759
recallbrea~h     1.537855   .2933666     5.24   0.000     .9628669    2.112843
    firmempl    -1.33e-06   1.90e-06    -0.70   0.484    -5.06e-06    2.40e-06
     firmrev     4.31e-06   6.57e-06     0.66   0.512    -8.57e-06    .0000172
      public    -.4386474   .3376111    -1.30   0.194    -1.100353    .2230581
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 201 clusters in firmcluster)
Log pseudolikelihood =   -457.82824                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   Wald chi2(19)   =    179.52
Time at risk         =        90494
No. of failures      =          258
No. of subjects      =          258                Number of obs   =       258
Loglogistic regression -- accelerated failure-time form 
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -457.82824  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -457.82824  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -457.82862  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood =  -458.0704  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -468.79292  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -501.84946  
Fitting full model:
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -501.84946  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -501.84949  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -501.93514  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -516.16367  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -573.88058  
Fitting constant-only model:
   analysis time _t:  timetorecall
         failure _d:  1 (meaning all fail)
> tic) vce(cluster firmcluster)
>  Pathogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 DetectXReg DetectXNatl  detectionXnoprod breadthXprodperiod,  dist(loglogis














Figure 2B.5  Output, Model 1b Average Marginal Effects 
 
                                                                              
breadthXpr~d    -.5944983   .2421476    -2.46   0.014    -1.069099   -.1198978
detectionX~d    -.4915684   3.469016    -0.14   0.887    -7.290714    6.307577
 DetectXNatl    -130.3551   143.0614    -0.91   0.362    -410.7503      150.04
  DetectXReg    -198.7515   135.0592    -1.47   0.141    -463.4626    65.95972
     yr_2010     5.590909   108.9298     0.05   0.959    -207.9076    219.0895
     yr_2009     46.20402   103.9821     0.44   0.657    -157.5971    250.0051
    National     8.483733   65.67683     0.13   0.897    -120.2405    137.2079
    Regional     45.98555   73.80135     0.62   0.533    -98.66244    190.6335
    Pathogen    -.4022053   109.1544    -0.00   0.997    -214.3409    213.5365
cat2_shelf~e     511.7167   113.4274     4.51   0.000     289.4031    734.0302
 cat1_frozen     443.5068   147.5492     3.01   0.003     154.3157    732.6979
  noproducts     1.427134   1.385898     1.03   0.303    -1.289175    4.143444
  prodperiod      .624274   .2328924     2.68   0.007     .1678132    1.080735
detentbinary     320.9209   132.9066     2.41   0.016     60.42882     581.413
    reactive     19.16818   50.89443     0.38   0.706    -80.58307    118.9194
recallbrea~h     378.4577   87.59462     4.32   0.000     206.7754      550.14
    firmempl    -.0003275   .0004692    -0.70   0.485    -.0012472    .0005922
     firmrev     .0010613   .0016012     0.66   0.507     -.002077    .0041997
      public    -107.9488   81.77511    -1.32   0.187     -268.225    52.32752
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               breadthXprodperiod
               cat2_shelfstable Pathogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 DetectXReg DetectXNatl detectionXnoprod
dy/dx w.r.t. : public firmrev firmempl recallbreadth reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen
Expression   : Predicted median _t, predict()
Model VCE    : Robust
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        258
. margins, dydx(*)
 
                                                                              
    firmempl    -.0185647    .026532    -0.70   0.484    -.0705665    .0334371
     firmrev     .0176703   .0269269     0.66   0.512    -.0351055    .0704462
                                                                              
                    ey/ex   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
ey/ex w.r.t. : firmrev firmempl
Expression   : Predicted median _t, predict()
Model VCE    : Robust
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        258





















Figure 2B.6  Output, Model 2 Gamma Frailty 
 
. 
Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) =     0.00 Prob>=chibar2 = 1.000
                                                                              
       theta     2.04e-08   .0000164                             0           .
       gamma     .7569994   .0408947                      .6809446    .8415488
                                                                              
     /ln_the    -17.70611   803.9214    -0.02   0.982    -1593.363    1557.951
     /ln_gam    -.2783928   .0540222    -5.15   0.000    -.3842743   -.1725113
                                                                              
       _cons     1.753339   .6223486     2.82   0.005     .5335585     2.97312
detectXbre~h    -.1150699   .7866172    -0.15   0.884    -1.656811    1.426671
detectionX~d     .0023809    .024226     0.10   0.922    -.0451012    .0498631
breadthXpr~d     -.002311   .0012207    -1.89   0.058    -.0047035    .0000816
 DetectXNatl    -.4719758    .687932    -0.69   0.493    -1.820298    .8763462
  DetectXReg    -.8298591    .666297    -1.25   0.213    -2.135777    .4760589
Natlbynoprod      .008197   .1295766     0.06   0.950    -.2457684    .2621624
 regbynoprod    -.1983194   .1905304    -1.04   0.298    -.5717522    .1751134
noprodXpro~d    -4.38e-06   .0000222    -0.20   0.843    -.0000479    .0000391
     yr_2010     .0242337   .4944205     0.05   0.961    -.9448126      .99328
     yr_2009     .1612608    .516829     0.31   0.755    -.8517056    1.174227
    National     .0057838   .2904971     0.02   0.984      -.56358    .5751476
    Regional     .4101119   .3523478     1.16   0.244     -.280477    1.100701
    Pathogen     .0229699   .4561784     0.05   0.960    -.8711235    .9170632
cat2_shelf~e     2.080568   .3845387     5.41   0.000     1.326886     2.83425
 cat1_frozen     1.779511   .4521381     3.94   0.000     .8933362    2.665685
  noproducts     .0127069   .0131842     0.96   0.335    -.0131337    .0385475
  prodperiod     .0024306   .0011805     2.06   0.040     .0001168    .0047443
detentbinary     1.323002   .6141569     2.15   0.031     .1192762    2.526727
    reactive     .0474988   .2537291     0.19   0.852    -.4498011    .5447988
recallbrea~h     1.564032   .4071531     3.84   0.000     .7660263    2.362037
    firmempl    -9.80e-07   2.72e-06    -0.36   0.719    -6.31e-06    4.35e-06
     firmrev     2.70e-06   9.17e-06     0.29   0.768    -.0000153    .0000207
      public     -.418532   .3296631    -1.27   0.204     -1.06466    .2275958
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =   -457.16341                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   LR chi2(23)     =     89.37
Time at risk    =        90494
No. of failures =          258
No. of subjects =          258                     Number of obs   =       258
                          Gamma frailty
Loglogistic regression -- accelerated failure-time form 
Iteration 11:  log likelihood = -457.16341  
Iteration 10:  log likelihood = -457.16342  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood = -457.16344  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood = -457.16357  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -457.16414  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -457.16695  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -457.17836  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -457.23048  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -457.46036  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -458.61256  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -467.95985  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -526.82609  
Fitting full model:
Iteration 11:  log likelihood = -501.84947  
Iteration 10:  log likelihood =  -501.8495  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood = -501.84963  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood = -501.85024  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -501.85279  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -501.86832  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -501.94435  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -502.26713  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -503.58912  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -509.12124  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -546.42199  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -613.17391  
Fitting constant-only model:
Fitting llogistic model:
   analysis time _t:  timetorecall
         failure _d:  1 (meaning all fail)
> rodperiod  detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, dist(loglogistic) frailty(gamma)
> athogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010  noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod  DetectXReg DetectXNatl breadthXp






Results:  Neither Gamma nor Inverse Gaussian frailty specifications are significant.  




Figure 2B.7  Output, Model 2 Inverse Gaussian Frailty 
 
. 
Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) =     0.00 Prob>=chibar2 = 1.000
                                                                              
       theta     2.19e-08   .0000182                             0           .
       gamma     .7570569   .0408997                      .6809931    .8416167
                                                                              
     /ln_the    -17.63485   831.2313    -0.02   0.983    -1646.818    1611.549
     /ln_gam    -.2783169   .0540246    -5.15   0.000    -.3842031   -.1724307
                                                                              
       _cons     1.753279   .6223869     2.82   0.005     .5334227    2.973134
detectXbre~h    -.1151623    .786673    -0.15   0.884    -1.657013    1.426689
detectionX~d     .0023788   .0242281     0.10   0.922    -.0451074    .0498651
breadthXpr~d    -.0023109   .0012208    -1.89   0.058    -.0047036    .0000817
 DetectXNatl     -.471969    .687976    -0.69   0.493    -1.820377    .8764393
  DetectXReg    -.8299106   .6663413    -1.25   0.213    -2.135916    .4760944
Natlbynoprod     .0082191   .1295854     0.06   0.949    -.2457636    .2622019
 regbynoprod     -.198314   .1905423    -1.04   0.298      -.57177    .1751419
noprodXpro~d    -4.38e-06   .0000222    -0.20   0.843    -.0000479    .0000391
     yr_2010      .024353   .4944523     0.05   0.961    -.9447557    .9934616
     yr_2009     .1612671   .5168623     0.31   0.755    -.8517644    1.174299
    National     .0057426   .2905146     0.02   0.984    -.5636555    .5751408
    Regional      .410104   .3523689     1.16   0.244    -.2805263    1.100734
    Pathogen     .0229819   .4562065     0.05   0.960    -.8711663    .9171302
cat2_shelf~e     2.080604    .384561     5.41   0.000     1.326878     2.83433
 cat1_frozen     1.779557   .4521637     3.94   0.000     .8933319    2.665781
  noproducts     .0127053   .0131853     0.96   0.335    -.0131374    .0385479
  prodperiod     .0024306   .0011806     2.06   0.040     .0001167    .0047445
detentbinary     1.323012   .6141979     2.15   0.031     .1192061    2.526818
    reactive     .0475194   .2537449     0.19   0.851    -.4498114    .5448503
recallbrea~h     1.564028   .4071793     3.84   0.000     .7659712    2.362085
    firmempl    -9.80e-07   2.72e-06    -0.36   0.719    -6.31e-06    4.35e-06
     firmrev     2.70e-06   9.17e-06     0.29   0.769    -.0000153    .0000207
      public      -.41852   .3296844    -1.27   0.204     -1.06469    .2276495
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =   -457.16341                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   LR chi2(23)     =     89.37
Time at risk    =        90494
No. of failures =          258
No. of subjects =          258                     Number of obs   =       258
                          Inverse-Gaussian frailty
Loglogistic regression -- accelerated failure-time form 
Iteration 9:   log likelihood = -457.16341  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood = -457.16342  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -457.16346  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -457.16366  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -457.16464  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -457.16862  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -457.18625  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -457.28534  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -458.94924  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -506.18742  
Fitting full model:
Iteration 11:  log likelihood = -501.84947  
Iteration 10:  log likelihood = -501.84948  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood = -501.84955  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood = -501.84984  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -501.85111  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -501.85728  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood =  -501.8857  
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -502.00677  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -502.5178  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -505.3142  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -516.14263  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -582.41961  
Fitting constant-only model:
Fitting llogistic model:
   analysis time _t:  timetorecall
         failure _d:  1 (meaning all fail)
> rodperiod  detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, dist(loglogistic) frailty(invgauss)
> athogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010  noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod  DetectXReg DetectXNatl breadthXp




Figure 2B.8  Output, Model 3 Estimates 
 
Model 3 – Log-logistic AFT, Recall Breadth=0 Stata Output 
 
                                                                              
       gamma     .4609275   .0710224                      .3407803    .6234342
                                                                              
     /ln_gam    -.7745146   .1540858    -5.03   0.000    -1.076517    -.472512
                                                                              
       _cons     2.892053   .3992508     7.24   0.000     2.109535     3.67457
detectionX~d     .0107415   .0127656     0.84   0.400    -.0142785    .0357616
 DetectXNatl     .4349917   .7151503     0.61   0.543    -.9666772    1.836661
  DetectXReg     .0766883   .6132956     0.13   0.900    -1.125349    1.278726
     yr_2010    -.0196742   .4872886    -0.04   0.968    -.9747423     .935394
     yr_2009     .3552594   .4067716     0.87   0.382    -.4419983    1.152517
    National    -.7230232   .3279586    -2.20   0.027     -1.36581   -.0802363
    Regional    -.2687472    .526347    -0.51   0.610    -1.300368    .7628738
    Pathogen    -.3162362   .3126884    -1.01   0.312    -.9290943    .2966219
cat2_shelf~e     1.024279   .4217796     2.43   0.015     .1976064    1.850952
 cat1_frozen     2.145696   .6783355     3.16   0.002     .8161829    3.475209
  noproducts     .0092522   .0042262     2.19   0.029     .0009691    .0175354
  prodperiod     .0030842   .0009362     3.29   0.001     .0012493     .004919
detentbinary     .3724697   .4059744     0.92   0.359    -.4232255    1.168165
    reactive     .0908258   .3387813     0.27   0.789    -.5731733     .754825
    firmempl    -4.13e-06   .0000153    -0.27   0.788    -.0000341    .0000259
     firmrev     .0000332   .0000375     0.88   0.377    -.0000404    .0001068
      public     .0055115   .8466115     0.01   0.995    -1.653817     1.66484
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 45 clusters in firmcluster)
Log pseudolikelihood =   -59.713523                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   Wald chi2(17)   =    214.20
Time at risk         =         5304
No. of failures      =           48
No. of subjects      =           48                Number of obs   =        48
Loglogistic regression -- accelerated failure-time form 
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.713523  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.713523  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -59.714947  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -60.318267  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood =  -66.76299  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -80.898227  (not concave)
Fitting full model:
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -80.898227  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -80.898227  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -80.898748  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -81.095309  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -83.907416  
Fitting constant-only model:
   analysis time _t:  timetorecall
         failure _d:  1 (meaning all fail)
> cluster)
>  National yr_2009 yr_2010 DetectXReg DetectXNatl detectionXnoprod if recallbreadth==0 ,dist(loglogistic) vce(cluster firm















Figure 2B.9  Output, Model 3 Average Marginal Effects 
 
                                                                              
detectionX~d     .9633509    1.14792     0.84   0.401    -1.286531    3.213233
 DetectXNatl     39.01203   66.83482     0.58   0.559    -91.98181    170.0059
  DetectXReg     6.877755   55.16717     0.12   0.901    -101.2479    115.0034
     yr_2010    -1.764467    43.6429    -0.04   0.968    -87.30298    83.77405
     yr_2009     31.86128   37.99746     0.84   0.402    -42.61237    106.3349
    National    -64.84401   34.41002    -1.88   0.060    -132.2864    2.598391
    Regional    -24.10247   47.45521    -0.51   0.612     -117.113    68.90803
    Pathogen     -28.3615   27.91058    -1.02   0.310    -83.06523    26.34223
cat2_shelf~e     91.86201   36.54242     2.51   0.012     20.24019    163.4838
 cat1_frozen     192.4358   77.16229     2.49   0.013     41.20045    343.6711
  noproducts     .8297823   .4140056     2.00   0.045     .0183462    1.641218
  prodperiod     .2766038   .1121568     2.47   0.014     .0567805     .496427
detentbinary     33.40477   36.65226     0.91   0.362    -38.43233    105.2419
    reactive     8.145674   30.40481     0.27   0.789    -51.44666      67.738
    firmempl    -.0003701    .001372    -0.27   0.787    -.0030592    .0023191
     firmrev     .0029772    .003308     0.90   0.368    -.0035063    .0094607
      public     .4942939   75.95354     0.01   0.995    -148.3719    149.3605
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
               Pathogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 DetectXReg DetectXNatl detectionXnoprod
dy/dx w.r.t. : public firmrev firmempl reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable
Expression   : Predicted median _t, predict()
Model VCE    : Robust
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         48
. margins, dydx(*)
 
                                                                              
    firmempl    -.0348143   .1292173    -0.27   0.788    -.2880756    .2184471
     firmrev     .0685544   .0775285     0.88   0.377    -.0833987    .2205076
                                                                              
                    ey/ex   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
ey/ex w.r.t. : firmrev firmempl
Expression   : Predicted median _t, predict()
Model VCE    : Robust
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =         48






















Figure 2B.10  Output, Model 3 Estimated Without Interactions 
 
                                                                              
       gamma     .4687317   .0653039                      .3567258    .6159056
                                                                              
     /ln_gam    -.7577247   .1393205    -5.44   0.000    -1.030788   -.4846616
                                                                              
       _cons     2.739497   .4465605     6.13   0.000     1.864255     3.61474
     yr_2010     .0182859   .4953179     0.04   0.971    -.9525192    .9890911
     yr_2009     .3064831     .39035     0.79   0.432    -.4585889    1.071555
    National    -.5391199   .4347696    -1.24   0.215    -1.391253    .3130128
    Regional    -.1984133    .439051    -0.45   0.651    -1.058938    .6621109
    Pathogen    -.2997793   .2933239    -1.02   0.307    -.8746836     .275125
cat2_shelf~e     1.099083   .4021486     2.73   0.006     .3108867     1.88728
 cat1_frozen      2.18034   .7288789     2.99   0.003      .751764    3.608917
  noproducts     .0109142   .0036597     2.98   0.003     .0037414     .018087
  prodperiod     .0029553   .0008827     3.35   0.001     .0012253    .0046854
detentbinary     .5766707   .4138236     1.39   0.163    -.2344086     1.38775
    reactive     .1316331    .319559     0.41   0.680    -.4946909    .7579572
    firmempl    -3.67e-06   .0000159    -0.23   0.817    -.0000348    .0000274
     firmrev     .0000359     .00004     0.90   0.369    -.0000425    .0001142
      public    -.1014371   .7486238    -0.14   0.892    -1.568713    1.365838
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 45 clusters in firmcluster)
Log pseudolikelihood =   -60.144075                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   Wald chi2(14)   =    140.18
Time at risk         =         5304
No. of failures      =           48
No. of subjects      =           48                Number of obs   =        48
Loglogistic regression -- accelerated failure-time form 
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -60.144075  
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -60.144075  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -60.145306  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -60.631914  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -67.197676  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -80.898227  (not concave)
Fitting full model:
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -80.898227  
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -80.898227  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -80.898748  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -81.095309  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -83.907416  
Fitting constant-only model:
   analysis time _t:  timetorecall
         failure _d:  1 (meaning all fail)
>  National yr_2009 yr_2010 if recallbreadth==0, dist(loglogistic) vce(cluster firmcluster)





In order to avoid potentially excessive inflation of standard errors due to 
multicollinearity among the predictor variables, we test a linear model for variance 
inflation. Using a variance inflation factor (VIF) of less than 10 or a tolerance (1/VIF) of 
less than 0.1, we find no evidence of excessive multicollinearity in Model 1b or Model 3. 
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Figure 2B.11  Output, Model 1b Multicollinearity Check 
 
. 
    Mean VIF        3.03
                                    
    reactive        1.19    0.839405
detectXbre~h        1.42    0.703574
  prodperiod        1.59    0.629271
detectionX~d        1.81    0.552817
      public        1.87    0.533827
     yr_2010        1.95    0.511959
noprodXpro~d        2.17    0.461157
 DetectXNatl        2.58    0.386894
    Pathogen        2.71    0.369500
 cat1_frozen        2.89    0.346073
Natlbynoprod        3.10    0.323088
    National        3.12    0.320813
  DetectXReg        3.15    0.317617
    firmempl        3.34    0.298999
  noproducts        3.51    0.285063
     firmrev        3.51    0.285007
cat2_shelf~e        3.54    0.282157
    Regional        3.70    0.270369
 regbynoprod        3.99    0.250384
recallbrea~h        4.07    0.245642
     yr_2009        4.74    0.211104
detentbinary        6.64    0.150555
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. estat vif
                                                                              
       _cons    -113.1491   91.19802    -1.24   0.216    -292.9822     66.6839
detectXbre~h    -2.949961   110.5108    -0.03   0.979    -220.8658    214.9659
detectionX~d     -2.64471   3.077076    -0.86   0.391    -8.712384    3.422965
 DetectXNatl     93.74887   114.3089     0.82   0.413    -131.6563    319.1541
  DetectXReg    -36.90156   105.7534    -0.35   0.728    -245.4362    171.6331
Natlbynoprod     22.49533   29.44564     0.76   0.446    -35.56841    80.55908
 regbynoprod     -18.9369   53.22967    -0.36   0.722    -123.9003    86.02649
noprodXpro~d     .0009566   .0048197     0.20   0.843    -.0085473    .0104604
     yr_2010     2.138258   61.87279     0.03   0.972    -119.8685     124.145
     yr_2009    -14.51589   59.42215    -0.24   0.807    -131.6902    102.6584
    National    -45.65813   76.36621    -0.60   0.551    -196.2444    104.9281
    Regional     52.14509   100.1605     0.52   0.603    -145.3611    249.6512
    Pathogen     65.06117   66.38328     0.98   0.328    -65.83976    195.9621
cat2_shelf~e     244.6637   50.36914     4.86   0.000      145.341    343.9864
 cat1_frozen     164.4753   81.71949     2.01   0.045     3.332942    325.6176
  noproducts       .22862   2.789562     0.08   0.935    -5.272106    5.729346
  prodperiod       .07089   .0936036     0.76   0.450    -.1136867    .2554666
detentbinary     92.40993   82.96326     1.11   0.267      -71.185    256.0049
    reactive    -1.257054   49.82181    -0.03   0.980    -99.50049    96.98638
recallbrea~h     237.5881   59.93876     3.96   0.000     119.3951    355.7811
    firmempl    -.0001451   .0004526    -0.32   0.749    -.0010376    .0007473
     firmrev     .0002467    .001292     0.19   0.849    -.0023009    .0027943
      public    -108.0758   55.04034    -1.96   0.051    -216.6096    .4580902
                                                                              
timetorecall        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 201 clusters in firmcluster)
                                                       Root MSE      =  302.64
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1931
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 22,   200) =    7.88
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     258
> Natl detectionXnoprod detectXbreadth, cluster(firmcluster)
> _shelfstable Pathogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010  noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod  DetectXReg DetectX
. regress timetorecall public firmrev firmempl recallbreadth reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2
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Figure 2B.12  Output, Model 3 Multicollinearity Check 
 
. 
    Mean VIF        4.55
                                    
 cat1_frozen        1.68    0.594900
    reactive        1.76    0.567523
cat2_shelf~e        1.93    0.517100
     yr_2010        1.95    0.512193
     yr_2009        2.07    0.483446
    Pathogen        2.27    0.440003
      public        2.40    0.417488
  prodperiod        2.98    0.335717
detectionX~d        3.78    0.264355
  noproducts        4.01    0.249254
Natlbynoprod        4.27    0.233956
 DetectXNatl        5.47    0.182729
noprodXpro~d        5.76    0.173473
detentbinary        6.21    0.160950
 regbynoprod        6.64    0.150584
    Regional        6.87    0.145525
  DetectXReg        7.03    0.142300
    National        7.37    0.135619
     firmrev        7.82    0.127913
    firmempl        8.72    0.114622
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. estat vif
                                                                              
       _cons     15.17917    39.6613     0.38   0.704    -64.75293    95.11128
detectionX~d    -.8325769   3.006134    -0.28   0.783    -6.891041    5.225887
 DetectXNatl     113.1902   68.77179     1.65   0.107     -25.4102    251.7907
  DetectXReg     125.0521   87.61368     1.43   0.161    -51.52171    301.6258
Natlbynoprod    -65.33483   37.95169    -1.72   0.092    -141.8214    11.15177
 regbynoprod    -88.86661   36.65101    -2.42   0.019    -162.7319   -15.00135
noprodXpro~d     .0236162   .0600458     0.39   0.696    -.0973981    .1446305
     yr_2010    -12.47665   49.10257    -0.25   0.801    -111.4364    86.48308
     yr_2009    -30.76605   47.95215    -0.64   0.524    -127.4073    65.87517
    National    -32.96084   43.25282    -0.76   0.450    -120.1312    54.20948
    Regional     23.58726   66.60766     0.35   0.725    -110.6517    157.8262
    Pathogen     22.96281    44.6152     0.51   0.609    -66.95321    112.8788
cat2_shelf~e     19.56158   31.44824     0.62   0.537    -43.81817    82.94134
 cat1_frozen     220.4318   75.04498     2.94   0.005     69.18857     371.675
  noproducts     5.123869   1.573785     3.26   0.002     1.952115    8.295624
  prodperiod     .4458118   .2809858     1.59   0.120    -.1204778    1.012101
detentbinary    -46.75614   40.94244    -1.14   0.260    -129.2702    35.75792
    reactive     42.46192   46.41534     0.91   0.365    -51.08205    136.0059
    firmempl     .0027464   .0020103     1.37   0.179    -.0013051    .0067978
     firmrev    -.0067717    .006179    -1.10   0.279    -.0192247    .0056814
      public     69.67727   54.78716     1.27   0.210      -40.739    180.0935
                                                                              
timetorecall        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 45 clusters in firmcluster)
                                                       Root MSE      =   99.59
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7081
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 20,    44) =    7.15
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      48
> od if recallbreadth==0, cluster (firmcluster)
> hogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 noprodXprodperiod regbynoprod Natlbynoprod DetectXReg DetectXNatl  detectionXnopr













Figure 2B.13  Output, Model 3 Without Interactions Multicollinearity Check 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -18.66388   49.69564    -0.38   0.709    -118.8189    81.49109
     yr_2010    -12.84213   44.13347    -0.29   0.772    -101.7873    76.10304
     yr_2009    -10.87949    46.3849    -0.23   0.816    -104.3621    82.60312
    National    -23.86519    43.0145    -0.55   0.582    -110.5552    62.82484
    Regional     10.81511   43.09993     0.25   0.803    -76.04708    97.67731
    Pathogen    -13.63888   37.81564    -0.36   0.720     -89.8513    62.57353
cat2_shelf~e     39.45472   30.35269     1.30   0.200    -21.71711    100.6266
 cat1_frozen     210.9417   86.27126     2.45   0.019     37.07341      384.81
  noproducts     1.069738   .6060481     1.77   0.084    -.1516722    2.291147
  prodperiod     .4534164   .2274918     1.99   0.052    -.0050631    .9118959
detentbinary      45.1678   33.59368     1.34   0.186    -22.53582    112.8714
    reactive     31.40179   34.53904     0.91   0.368    -38.20707    101.0107
    firmempl     .0017262   .0023062     0.75   0.458    -.0029217    .0063741
     firmrev    -.0034452   .0066789    -0.52   0.609    -.0169056    .0100151
      public     67.24404   62.99791     1.07   0.292    -59.71991     194.208
                                                                              
timetorecall        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                           (Std. Err. adjusted for 45 clusters in firmcluster)
                                                       Root MSE      =  108.33
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5779
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0006
                                                       F( 14,    44) =    3.55
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      48
> hogen Regional National yr_2009 yr_2010 if recallbreadth==0, cluster (firmcluster)
. regress timetorecall public firmrev firmempl reactive detentbinary prodperiod noproducts cat1_frozen cat2_shelfstable Pat
 
    Mean VIF        2.52
                                    
  noproducts        1.22    0.819883
    reactive        1.36    0.735934
  prodperiod        1.36    0.734063
 cat1_frozen        1.54    0.650848
cat2_shelf~e        1.67    0.599211
detentbinary        1.68    0.596910
     yr_2010        1.68    0.596001
    Pathogen        1.80    0.554571
     yr_2009        1.86    0.536483
    Regional        2.09    0.478918
      public        2.11    0.474822
    National        2.34    0.428246
     firmrev        6.72    0.148846
    firmempl        7.91    0.126484
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Table 3A.1  Constructs and Operational Definitions 
Construct Definition Citations 
Purchase Risk Purchase risk consists of two components:  
1) the severity of the loss (physical, 
financial, etc.) associated with a potential 
negative outcome and 2) the likelihood that 
the outcome will be negative. 
Bettman, 1973; 
Gurhan-Canli & Batra, 
2004; Mitchell, 1999; 
Siomokos & Kurzbad, 
1994; Taylor, 1974 
Locus  An internal locus occurs when a defect that 
causes a product recall happens inside the 
manufacturing firm. 
Folkes, 1984; Folkes 
1988;  Klein & Dawar, 
2004 
An external locus occurs when a defect that 
causes a product recall happens outside the 
manufacturing firm.   In other words, the 
defect is because of something that happened 
at a supplier or retailer, or some other entity 




Stability relates to the permanence of the 
cause of the defect.  A stable defect is one 
that a consumer could reasonably expect to 
occur again in the future.  An unstable defect 
is one that the consumer can reasonably 
expect will not occur again in the future.  
Stability is operationalized by providing 
(unstable) or withholding (stable) a 
corrective action in the recall announcement. 
Folkes, 1984 
Controllability A controllable defect is one in which the 
supplier or manufacturer has volitional 
control over the circumstances that allowed 
the defect to happen or to pass on to the 
consumer.  An uncontrollable defect is one 
in which the manufacturer or supplier does 
not have volitional control over the 
circumstances which cause the defect to 
happen or pass on to the consumer. 
Folkes, 1984; Folkes 




Purchase dissatisfaction occurs when a 
consumer's expectations about a product's 
performance are not met. 
Oliver, 1993; Oliver &  
DeSarbo, 1988; Oliver 
& Swan, 1989; 




Construct Definition Citations 
Repurchase 
Intent 
Repurchase Intent is an individual's intent 
regarding purchasing a product that they 
have already purchased at some time in the 
past.  In other words, the individual has 
experience with buying and using the 
product, and Repurchase Intent has to do 
with whether they would buy it again. 
 




The degree to which a consumer’s 
expectations regarding the handling of a 
product recall are met by the firm 
announcing the recall 
Jolly & Mowen, 1985; 
Laufer, 2002; Mowen, 
Jolly & Nickell, 1981 
Recall 
Responsibility 
The degree to which the consumer holds the 
supplier (supplier responsibility) or the firm 
conducting the recall (manufacturer 
responsibility) responsible for the recall 
event.   




The degree to which the consumer believe 
that the supplier and the firm conducting the 
recall share responsibility for the recall 






Supplementary Sample Descriptives 
 
Table 3A.2  Treatment Assignment 
Scenarios 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Scenario 1 - Text 1 45 25.0 25.0 25.0 
Scenario 2 - Text 1 41 22.8 22.8 47.8 
Scenario 3 - Text 1 50 27.8 27.8 75.6 
Scenario 4 - Text 1 44 24.4 24.4 100.0 
Total 180 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table 3A.3  Demographics - Gender 
What is your gender? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Female 63 35.0 35.0 35.0 
Male 117 65.0 65.0 100.0 




















Table 3A.4  Demographics – Age 
 
Which category below includes your age? 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 20 or younger 12 6.7 6.7 6.7 
21-29 98 54.4 54.4 61.1 
30-39 39 21.7 21.7 82.8 
40-49 18 10.0 10.0 92.8 
50-59 9 5.0 5.0 97.8 
60-69 4 2.2 2.2 100.0 
Total 180 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 3A.5  Demographics - Education 
 
What is your highest level of education completed?  
Please mark the most appropriate choice. 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid High School 5 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Some College 79 43.9 43.9 46.7 
Bachelor’s Degree 27 15.0 15.0 61.7 
Some Graduate School 40 22.2 22.2 83.9 
Master’s Degree 22 12.2 12.2 96.1 
Doctorate 7 3.9 3.9 100.0 
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Preliminary Vignette Exercise 
The following four in-class “exercises” were distributed to a MBA class at Clemson 
University.  Two scenarios deal with food recalls and two deal with pharmaceutical 
recalls.  Approximately 15 minutes were allowed for responses.  Fifteen responses were 
collected; the responses were evaluated qualitatively to determine if the scenarios had 
face validity and were used as the basis for developing the scenarios for the sorting 
exercise.  Although vignettes dealing with pharmaceutical products were included in this 




Please read the scenario below and answer the questions that follow.  There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
On your way home from work, you do some grocery shopping at a local store.   One of the items you 
purchase is a box of individually wrapped nutrition bars.  After arriving home, you check your email and a 
news headline related to a product recall catches your eye.  You click on the headline and are redirected to 
the following press release: 
Nutramill Announces Nationwide Voluntary Nutrition Bar Recall 
Contact: Consumer - 555-310-1479  
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – February 27, 2012 – Nutramill has initiated a voluntary recall of 
all Nutramill Nutrition Bars manufactured using wheat flour imported from Zhou Ying Development 
Co. Ltd., because they have the potential to be contaminated with Salmonella, an organism which 
can cause serious and sometimes fatal infections in young children, frail or elderly people, and 
others with weakened immune systems. Healthy persons infected with Salmonella often experience 
fever, diarrhea (which may be bloody), nausea, vomiting and abdominal pain. In rare 
circumstances, infection with Salmonella can result in the organism getting into the bloodstream 
and producing more severe illnesses such as arterial infections (i.e., infected aneurysms), 
endocarditis and arthritis. 
Twenty-one illnesses have been reported to date in connection with this product. 
The Nutramill Nutrition Bars are sold individually and in boxes of six individually wrapped bars at 
retailers nationwide.   The batch numbers, located on the outside wrapper of each bar, included in 
the recall are 20061006, 20061027, 20061101, 20061108, 20061122, 20061126, 20061201, 
20061202, 20061203, and 20061204. Each batch was manufactured using wheat flour supplied by 
Zhou Ying Development Co. Ltd.  The supplier’s certificate of analysis information indicated that 
testing for salmonella was negative.   
On February 26th, the FDA announced they had found salmonella in samples of the Nutramill 
Nutrition Bars. 
Nutramill is extremely concerned about the quality and safety of all of its products. The company is 
particularly troubled that the certificates of analysis provided by the above-named supplier did not 
report the presence of salmonella. 
Nutramill wants to ensure its products are safe. Consequently, in addition to its ongoing 
cooperation with the FDA, Nutramill will be conducting its own independent, analytical tests of 
wheat flour from all of its suppliers. 
After reading the press release you check the label of the nutrition bars you have just purchased and find 
that it is Nutramills brand packaged in a box of six individually wrapped bars.  The lot number in the press 




Please read the scenario below and answer the questions that follow.  There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
On your way home from work, you do some grocery shopping at a local store.   One of the items you 
purchase is a box of individually wrapped nutrition bars.  After arriving home, you check your email and a 
news headline related to a product recall catches your eye.  You click on the headline and are redirected to 
the following press release: 
Nutramill Announces Nationwide Voluntary Nutrition Bar Recall 
Contact: Consumer - 555-310-1479  
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – February 27, 2012 – Nutramill has initiated a voluntary recall of 
all Nutramill Nutrition Bars because they have the potential to be contaminated with Salmonella, 
an organism which can cause serious and sometimes fatal infections in young children, frail or 
elderly people, and others with weakened immune systems. Healthy persons infected with 
Salmonella often experience fever, diarrhea (which may be bloody), nausea, vomiting and 
abdominal pain. In rare circumstances, infection with Salmonella can result in the organism 
getting into the bloodstream and producing more severe illnesses such as arterial infections (i.e., 
infected aneurysms), endocarditis and arthritis. 
Twenty-one illnesses have been reported to date in connection with this product. 
The Nutramill Nutrition Bars are sold individually and in boxes of six individually wrapped bars at 
retailers nationwide.   The batch numbers, located on the outside wrapper of each bar, included in 
the recall are 20061006, 20061027, 20061101, 20061108, 20061122, 20061126, 20061201, 
20061202, 20061203, and 20061204.  
On February 26th, the FDA announced they had found salmonella in samples of Nutramill Nutrition 
Bars.   
Nutramill is extremely concerned about the quality and safety of all of its products. Nutramill wants 
to ensure its products are safe. Consequently, in addition to its ongoing cooperation with the FDA, 




Questions for Food 1 & 2 
 
Please answer the following questions based on the scenario you just read.  There 
are no right or wrong answers. 
 
1. Whom do you hold responsible for the defect that has caused the recall of the nutrition bars? 
 
 
2. What, if any, additional information would you like to see in the press release? 
 
 
3. What will you do with the nutrition bars you have purchased? 
 
 
4. Whom do you hold responsible for the safety of the nutrition bars? 
 
 
5. If this were a real situation, how much would this recall influence your future purchase decisions 
regarding nutrition bars?  (Circle one) 
 
a. NEGATIVE influence – less likely to purchase this brand again 
 
b. NO INFLUENCE on future purchases one way or the other 
 
c. POSITIVE influence – more likely to purchase this brand again 
 
 










Please read the scenario below and answer the questions that follow.  There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
On your way home from work, you decide to stop by a local pharmacy to buy cough and cold medicine.  
You have been feeling a cold coming on for the past few days and want to get relief from the symptoms.  
After arriving home, you check your email and a news headline related to a product recall catches your eye.  
You click on the headline and are redirected to the following press release: 
Sierra Pharmaceuticals Initiates a Nationwide Voluntary Recall of Sierra Cough & Cold 
12-Hour Relief Syrup, Lot Number 3J6274B 
Contact:  Consumer - 555-233-8536  
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – February 27, 2012 – Sierra Pharmaceuticals Inc. has initiated a 
voluntary recall of one lot of 4 ounce bottles of Sierra Cough & Cold 12-Hour Relief Syrup, after 
being notified by its supplier, Stillwater Laboratories, that a manufacturing error had affected the 
product. Due to this manufacturing error, acetaminophen, an active ingredient in the cough and 
cold syrup, may be present in quantities greater than what is specified on the product label.  Bottles 
of the cough and cold syrup are sold to consumers via pharmacies and other retail outlets. The lot 
number affected in the U.S. is 3J6274B with an expiry date of September 30, 2012. The lot number 
appears on the bottom of the bottle. 
Sierra Cough & Cold 12-Hour Relief is used to treat the symptoms of the cold virus.  A decrease of 
active ingredient could reduce the efficacy of the syrup.  An increase in the active ingredient could 
result in over dosage of acetaminophen which may result in liver toxicity, kidney damage, and blood 
disorders. 
Twenty-one incidents of acetaminophen over dosage have been reported in connection to this 
product. 
Patients who may have the affected syrup should discard the product or return it to the retailer for a 
full refund.   
Sierra Pharmaceuticals is committed to ensuring patient safety and is working to resolve this issue 
quickly and appropriately. The company has notified the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), and will issue recall communications to all distributors and retail outlets involved. 
Any adverse reactions may be reported to the FDA's MedWatch Program by fax at 1-800-FDA-
0178, by mail at MedWatch, HF-2, FDA, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, MD 20852-9787, or on the 
MedWatch website at www.fda.gov1. 
After reading the press release you check the label of the cough and cold medicine you have just purchased 
and find that it is Sierra Pharmaceuticals brand Cough and Cold 12-Hour Relief Syrup, in a 4 ounce 





Please read the scenario below and answer the questions that follow.  There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
On your way home from work, you decide to stop by a local pharmacy to buy cough and cold medicine.  
You have been feeling a cold coming on for the past few days and want to get relief from the symptoms.  
After arriving home, you check your email and a news headline related to a product recall catches your eye.  
You click on the headline and are redirected to the following press release: 
Sierra Pharmaceuticals Initiates a Nationwide Voluntary Recall of Sierra Cough & Cold 
12-Hour Relief Syrup, Lot Number 3J6274B 
Contact:  Consumer - 555-233-8536  
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE – February 27, 2012 – Sierra Pharmaceuticals Inc. has initiated a 
voluntary recall of one lot of 4 ounce bottles of Sierra Cough & Cold 12-Hour Relief Syrup. Bottles 
of the cough and cold syrup are sold to consumers via pharmacies and other retail outlets. The lot 
number affected in the U.S. is 3J6274B with an expiry date of September 30, 2012. The lot number 
appears on the bottom of the bottle.  The recall is being conducted after testing indicated that 
acetaminophen, an active ingredient in the cough and cold syrup, may be present in quantities 
greater than what is specified on the product label.   
Sierra Cough & Cold 12-Hour Relief is used to treat the symptoms of the cold virus.  A decrease of 
active ingredient could reduce the efficacy of the syrup.  An increase in the active ingredient could 
result in over dosage of acetaminophen which may result in liver toxicity, kidney damage, and blood 
disorders. 
Twenty-one incidents of acetaminophen over dosage have been reported in connection to this 
product. 
Patients who may have the affected syrup should discard the product or return it to the retailer for a 
full refund.   
Sierra Pharmaceuticals is committed to ensuring patient safety and is working to resolve this issue 
quickly and appropriately. The company has notified the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), and will issue recall communications to all distributors and retail outlets involved. 
Any adverse reactions may be reported to the FDA's MedWatch Program by fax at 1-800-FDA-
0178, by mail at MedWatch, HF-2, FDA, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, MD 20852-9787, or on the 
MedWatch website at www.fda.gov1. 
After reading the press release you check the label of the cough and cold medicine you have just purchased 
and find that it is Sierra Pharmaceuticals brand Cough and Cold 12-Hour Relief Syrup, in a 4 ounce 




Questions for Pharma 1 & 2 
 
Please answer the following questions based on the scenario you just read.  There 
are no right or wrong answers. 
 




2. What, if any, additional information would you like to see in the press release? 
 
 
3. What will you do with the cough and cold syrup you have purchased? 
 
 
4. Whom do you hold responsible for the safety of the cough and cold syrup? 
 
5. If this were a real situation, how much would this recall influence your future purchase decision 
regarding cough and cold syrup?        (Circle one) 
 
a. NEGATIVE influence – less likely to purchase this brand again 
 
b. NO INFLUENCE on future purchases one way or the other 
 
c. POSITIVE influence – more likely to purchase this brand again 
 
 








Vignette Exercise Findings 
 
General in-class feedback indicated that the vignettes, which were patterned after the 
format dictated by FDA guidance for product recalls, and the situation described were 
considered by the subjects to be realistic.  As expected, the reactions to the scenario 
indicated a negative influence or no influence on repurchase intent (of 15 responses, 10 
indicated a negative influence, 5 indicated no influence), which seemed to be related to 
the degree of satisfaction the subject felt with respect to the content and tone of the recall 
announcement.   
The use of the word “voluntary” in the recall announcement, which is typical for 
FDA-regulated product recalls which are typically not legal enforcement actions, 
triggered, for some respondents, a positive feeling towards the recalling firm.  Noting 
this, we determined that we would exclude the use of the word “voluntary” from the final 
experimental scenarios to remove the potential for a spurious attribution of responsible 
action on the part of the recalling firm.  Since, in our investigation of FDA-regulated 
recalls over the period of 2008-2010 we found no more than a handful of recall 
announcements which were involuntary, and carried out by the FDA (among over a 
thousand voluntary recalls) we believe this departure from realism to be justified in the  
interests of maintaining internal validity of the experiment. 
Interestingly, even in the manipulations where the recalling firm attributed the failure 
to a supplier’s actions, the respondents indicated that they held the recalling firm 
primarily responsible for the product’s safety.  In some cases, respondents indicated that 
they consider governmental agencies, such as the FDA to be secondarily responsible for 
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product safety.  We considered this to provide an intriguing clue to the way consumers 
may respond when firm’s attempt to deflect blame for a defect on to their suppliers. 
A number of respondents indicated that they would like to have more information 
from the recalling firm, including the root cause of the defect, corrective action for the 
defect, symptoms of illness, and more information about what to do if the product had 
been recently consumed. 
 
Vignette Pre-Test 
The following food product recall scenario was administered to a group of 
undergraduate management students at Clemson University.  Students received extra 
credit for completing the exercise.  The exercise was administered online; 17 responses 
were collected.  The purpose of this pilot was to ensure face validity, readability, confirm 
the amount of time the exercise required, and to test participant comprehension of the 
manipulation.  Results from this pilot were used, including feedback from participants, to 
design the experimental vignettes for the pilot study reported in this dissertation. 
In general, comprehension was excellent.  One clearly inconsistent statement was 
made regarding the circumstances described in the announcement; results of this item 
were unambiguously negative.  Response to manipulations of locus (external), 
controllability (controllable), and corrective action (unstable – corrective action provided) 
were consistent with the information presented.  Results of items related to perceived risk 
were relatively high, consistent with the product failure scenario provided.  Repurchase 
intent, recall satisfaction, and responsibility were directionally consistent with our 
expectations based on the cues provided.  One item – dealing with whether or not the 
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product was expired at the time of the recall announcement (it was not) appeared to be 
confusing to participants. 
Participants estimated that the exercise took between 10 and 20 minutes on average.  
Free text comments regarding clarity ranged from “the entire survey was easy to 
understand” to a few comments explaining that blame was perceived to be shared by the 
buyer and supplier in this scenario. 
The text of the pre-test vignette is provided below.  Table 4b.1 below summarizes the 




On your way home from work you do some grocery shopping at a local store.  One of the items 
you purchase is a frozen cheese pizza.  After arriving home, you check you email and a news 
headline related to a product recall catches you eye.  You click on the headline and are redirected 
to the following press release: 
 
Chef Milo Announces Nationwide Recall of Frozen Cheese Pizza 
 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:  April 9, 2012 – Chef Milo Corporation has initiated a 
recall of all frozen cheese pizza manufactured using flour imported from Zhou Ying 
Development Co., Ltd, because they have the potential to be contaminated with 
Salmonella, an organism which can cause serious and sometimes fatal infections in young 
children, frail, or elderly people, and others with weakened immune systems.  Healthy 
persons infected with Salmonella often experience fever, diarrhea (which may be bloody), 
nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain.  In rare circumstances, infection with Salmonella 
can result in the organism getting into the bloodstream and producing more severe 
illnesses such as arterial infections (i.e., infected aneurysms), endocarditis and arthritis. 
 
One hundred and twenty-one illnesses have been reported to date in connection with this 
product. 
 
The Chef Milo frozen cheese pizzas are sold individually nationwide.  The batch numbers, 
located on the outside packaging of each pizza, included in the recall are 20061006 with 
an expiration date of September 30, 2012.  Each batch was manufactured using flour 
supplied by Zhou Ying Development Co., Ltd.  The supplier’s certificate of analysis 
information indicated that testing for salmonella was negative.   
 
On April 8th, the FDA announced they had found salmonella in samples of frozen pizzas 
collected during a routine inspection.  Subsequent investigation revealed that the source of 
contamination was the flour supplied by Zhou Ying Development Co., Ltd. 
 
Chef Milo is extremely concerned about the quality and safety of all of its products.  The 
company is particularly troubled that the certificates of analysis provided by the above-
named supplier did not report the presence of salmonella. 
 
Consumers who have the affected pizzas should discard the product or return it to the 
retailer for a full refund. 
 
Chef Milo wants to ensure its products are safe.  Consequently, in addition to its ongoing 
cooperation with the FDA, Chef Milo will be conducting its own independent, analytical 
tests of flour from all of its suppliers. 
 
After reading the press release you check the label of the frozen pizza you have just purchased 
and find that it is a Chef Milo brand frozen cheese pizza.  The batch number in the press release 
matches that listed on the box. 
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Table 3B.1  Vignette Pre-Test Items, Means, Standard Deviations  
and Interpretation of Results1 
Item Mean Std Dev Interpretation 
Salmonella can cause a variety 
of health problems, some of 
them very serious. 
1.29 .59 Salmonella warning appears to be 
taken seriously. 
The product was recalled 
because the manufacturer found 
out that the distributor's 
refrigeration failed, causing 
bacteria to grow and the product 
to spoil. 
4.19 .83 Comprehension good – this is not 
what was described in the 
announcement. 
I blame the Chef Milo 
Corporation for this recall. 
3.24 .75 Consistent with external locus. 
I could get sick from consuming 
food that has quality issues. 
1.35 .61 Perceived risk – high, consistent 
with product failure & hazard 
warnings. 
This product recall could have 
been prevented by Zhou Ying 
Development Co. Ltd. 
1.82 .64 Consistent with supplier 
involvement & controllability. 
I feel like this product could be 
hazardous. 
1.53 .72 Perceived risk – high, consistent 
with product failure & hazard 
warnings. 
The Chef Milo Corporation 
recalled this product prior to its 
stated expiration date. 
3.12 1.65 Confusion regarding expiration 
and date of recall. 
I blame the supplier of the flour 
for this recall. 
1.76 .66 Consistent with supplier 
involvement & controllability. 
I would probably eat this pizza 
anyway. 
4.47 .87 Perceived risk – high, consistent 
with product failure & hazard 
warnings. 
In general, I'm worried about the 
quality of the food supply. 
2.13 .96 Perceived risk – high, consistent 
with product failure & hazard 
warnings. 
A number of people got sick 
because of this problem. 
2.67 1.3 Consistent with announcement 
and ambiguous wording of item. 
I believe that the responsibility 
for this problem is shared by 
Chef Milo and their supplier. 
2.18 1.07 Consistent with supplier 
involvement & controllability 
I would definitely think twice 
before buying a Chef Milo 
product in the future. 
2.00 .71 Repurchase intent – consistent 
with product failure 
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Item Mean Std Dev Interpretation 
I believe that the Chef Milo 
Corporation could have done 
more to prevent this problem. 
2.6 .74 Consistent with free text 
statements – that Chef Milo 
should have done more testing. 
This product recall could have 
been prevented by the Chef Milo 
Corporation. 
2.38 .81 
Based on this recall I would be 
less likely to purchase Chef Milo 
brands in the future. 
2.18 .81 Repurchase intent – consistent 
with product failure 
This particular problem is 
unlikely to happen again in the 
future. 
2.89 .88 Consistent with announcement & 
corrective action. 
I feel like it is more likely than 
ever that the food I buy might 
have something wrong with it. 
3.53 .87 Perceived risk does not appear to 
extend across all food products. 
Now that I know the frozen 
pizza was recalled, I feel like 
eating it might be unsafe. 
2.24 1.48 Perceived risk – high, consistent 
with product failure & hazard 
warnings. 
This product recall was triggered 
by testing conducted by the 
FDA. 
2.41 1.46 Consistent with announcement. 
The Chef Milo Corporation 
seems to have handled this 
problem responsibly. 
2.06 .67 Recall satisfaction - consistent 
with corrective action, supportive 
statements of concern. 
Please estimate how much time 
you think reading & completing 
this survey has taken you. 
4.24 .56 Between 10 and 20 minutes on 
average. 
If you have any comments about 
the wording of the scenario or 
questions, or if you find any of 
the questions or information 
provided confusing, please note 
it below. 
NA NA  
Note 1:  All scales are 1 to 5 agreement 1= Very strongly agree and 5= Very strongly 
disagree except for time estimate, which is a 5 point scale anchored by “>40 minutes” 
and “<10  minutes”, in 10 minute increments and the open-ended question for comments 






Q-sort exercises were conducted in undergraduate management classes at Clemson 
University.  Students received extra credit for completing the sorting exercise.  The 
exercise was administered online.  To minimize the length of the sorting exercise, items 
were broken up into three sorting groups.  Some of the sorted constructs were not 
included in the final design and ultimately several constructs were added.  In order to 
detect unusable or inattentive responses, the sorts included unrelated items which would 
necessarily be correctly classified as “Not Applicable”.  These items included unrelated 
phrases such as “I would like to live off campus” and “Clemson colors are purple and 
orange”.  Responses which did not correctly classify these obviously unrelated items 






















The company recalled the product because they detected salmonella in 
their finished goods. 
The company recalled the product because they added the wrong 
amount of an ingredient during manufacturing. 
The company recalled a product after it was discovered that many 
units had been sold to consumers even though the products had failed 
internal quality testing. 
The firm was unaware that a lightning strike had interrupted power 
supply to the company's refrigeration units, causing products to be 











When the company announced the product recall, it said that the defect 
was due to contamination that occurred at a Chinese contract 
manufacturer. 
The company didn't know that their overseas supplier had substituted a 
potentially harmful substance for the legitimate ingredient.  
The company recalled this product because it found out that a supplier 
had provided a counterfeit raw material. 
The company recalled several products after it was informed by its 
supplier that bacterial contamination might be present in a raw 
material. 
The product was recalled after the manufacturer found out that the 
distributor's refrigeration failed, causing bacteria to grow and the 
product to spoil. 
When the company recalled this product, it announced that the defect 
was due to a supplier error. 
In the product recall announcement, the company said that its supplier 





I feel dissatisfied with this purchase. 
I am unsatisfied with how this product performs. 







I will avoid purchasing this brand in the future. 
I would be less likely to buy this company's products in the future. 
I am less likely to purchase this brand in the future. 
When a product (such as spinach or granola bars) is recalled, I tend to 
not buy any brand of that product for a while. 
This product recall has decreased the chance that I would purchase this 
product in the future. 





Table 3B.3  Q-Sort Set 2 Items 
Constructs Items 





After conducting a product recall due to a counterfeit raw material 
provided by a supplier, the company has announced that it will 
conduct more frequent supplier audits and testing of raw materials. 
The company recalled a product because a supplier provided a 
contaminated ingredient.  The company has stated that it has 
instituted new testing policies as a result of this issue. 
After the company recalled this product, it announced that it was 
conducting a comprehensive investigation into the cause of the 
defect. 




The company recalled a product, stating that the defect was due to a 
contaminated ingredient provided by a supplier. 
The firm indicated that the recall was due to contamination in its 
contract manufacturer's facility. 
The company recalled all of its frozen pizza products due to 
salmonella contamination.  The cause of the contamination has not 
yet been determined. 
The company has recalled a product after testing revealed that it was 
contaminated with salmonella. 















Table 3B.4  Q-Sort Set 3 Items 








The company recalled the product because they detected salmonella 
in their finished goods. 
If a company tests a product and finds out that it is unsafe, they are 
responsible for making sure it is not distributed. 
The company recalled the product because they added the wrong 
amount of an ingredient during manufacturing. 
The company recalled a product after it was discovered that many 
units had been sold to consumers even though the products had failed 
internal quality testing. 
In the product recall announcement, the company said that its 










The firm was unaware that a lightning strike had interrupted power 
supply to the company's refrigeration units, causing products to be 
exposed to higher temperatures.   
When the company recalled this product, it announced that the defect 
was due to a supplier error. 
The product was recalled after the manufacturer found out that the 
distributor's refrigeration failed, causing bacteria to grow and the 
product to spoil. 
The company didn't know that their overseas supplier had substituted 
a potentially harmful substance for the legitimate ingredient. 
The company recalled this product because it found out that a 
supplier had provided a counterfeit raw material. 
When the company announced the product recall, it said that the 
defect was due to contamination that occurred at a Chinese contract 
manufacturer. 
The company recalled several products after it was informed by its 









I feel like this product could be hazardous. 
I will lose money if this product doesn't perform as expected. 
I'm worried about the quality of the food supply. 
It's likely that I will be sick from food poisoning this year. 
I could get sick from consuming food that has quality issues. 
I feel like it is more likely than ever that the food I buy might have 
something wrong with it. 
I feel less safe about consuming eggs after hearing about the latest 
product recall. 





Table 3B.5  Item Placement Ratios for Controllable,  
Uncontrollable and Purchase Risk 
 
 
Actual Construct Classification     
 Theoretical Classification Controllable Uncontrollable Purchase Risk   Total % Hits 
  
    
 
  
 Controllable 32 16 2 
 
40 80.00% 
Uncontrollable 6 38 5 
 
56 67.86% 




    
 
  
 Total 38 58 56 
 
152 78.29% 




Table 3B.6  Item Placement Ratios for Internal Locus, External 
 Locus, Repurchase Intent and Purchase Dissatisfaction 
 
 
Actual Construct Classification     
 




Dissatisfaction Total % Hits 
  
    
 
  
 Repurchase 43 1 0 1 55 78.18% 
Internal Locus 0 32 10 0 44 72.73% 
External Locus 0 10 65 0 77 84.42% 
Purchase Dissatisfaction 12 1 2 32 33 96.97% 
 
          
 Total 55 44 77 33 209 82.30% 








Table 3B.7  Item Placement Ratios for Stable and Unstable 
 
Actual Construct Classification   
Theoretical Classification Stable Unstable  Total % Hits 
Stable  8 11 24 33.33% 
Unstable 16 21 32 65.63% 
  
    
 Total 24 32 56 51.79% 





Table 3B.8  Final Measurement Items 
Construct Summary Measure  Label Measurement Item 
Purchase Risk       
(Pre-Test) PRAgg PR1 I'm concerned about food safety. 
  
PR2 




I could get sick from eating food that 
has quality issues. 
  
PR4 
I feel like consuming frozen cheese 
pizza could be hazardous. 
Purchase 
Dissatisfaction DissAgg DIS1 








This product did not meet my 
expectations for quality. 
    
Repurchase Intent RPurchaseAgg RP1 
This product recall has decreased the 
chance that I would buy a Chef Milo 
pizza in the future. 
  
RP2 
I would be less likely to purchase the 
Chef Milo brand in the future. 
  
RP3 




I would avoid purchasing the Chef Milo 
brand in the future. 
  
RP51 
After this recall I would probably avoid 
buying frozen pizza of any kind for a 
while. 
Recall Satisfaction RecallSatAgg RSat1 
I feel satisfied with Chef Milo 
Corporation's statements about quality. 
  
RSat2 
I'm satisfied with how the Chef Milo 
Corporation handled this product recall. 
  
RSat3 
The Chef Milo Corporation seems to 
have handled this problem responsibly. 
Supplier 
Responsibility Not applicable2 SuppRes 
I hold the supplier responsible for this 
problem. 
Manufacturer 
Responsibility Not applicable2 MfgRes 
I hold the Chef Milo Corporation 
responsible for this problem. 
Shared 
Responsibility Not applicable2 SharResp 
I feel that responsibility for this problem 
is shared by the Chef Milo Corporation 
and their supplier. 
1.  RP5 was dropped based on measurement model results.  2.  Responsibility measures are single-




Table 3B.9  Manipulation Check Items 





CheckLocus1 The defect that caused this 




CheckLocus2 The defect that caused this 
recall happened at the Chef 
Milo facility. 
 
CheckLocus3 The salmonella contamination 
in the pizza came from Chef 
Milo’s processing equipment. 
 
CheckLocus4 The salmonella contamination 
in the pizza came from cheese 






CheckControl1 Chef Milo had control over 
the circumstances which 
caused this recall. 
7 point “Very 
strongly disagree” 
to “Very strongly 
agree” 
CheckControl2 The supplier detected 
salmonella  contamination in 




CheckControl3 The supplier had control over 
the circumstances that caused 
this recall. 
7 point “Very 
strongly disagree” 
to “Very strongly 
agree” 
CheckControl4 Chef Milo detected 
salmonella contamination in 








CheckStability1 Chef Milo described what 
they are doing to prevent a 
similar problem in the future. 
7 point “Very 
strongly disagree” 
to “Very strongly 
agree” CheckStability2 Chef Milo described what 
will be done to reduce the risk 
of the same defect happening 
again. 
CheckStability3 I feel like Chef Milo has 
described what they are doing 
to correct this problem so that 
it doesn’t happen again. 
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Table 3B.10  Single-Item Covariates Measures 
Covariate Item Scale 
Age Which category below 
includes your age? 
7 point scale anchored by 20 or younger and 
80 or older 




What is your highest 
level of education? 
7 point:  Elementary/Middle School, High 
School, Some College, Bachelor’s Degree, 




I remember hearing about 
at least one food recall 
within the past year. 




I believe that within the 
past year I have become 
ill from something I’ve 
eaten. 




Please indicate if you 
have any work 
experience in the 
following areas: 
Check all that apply:  Food manufacturing, 
Food service, and Healthcare 
 
